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The 53
rd Conference brought 172 scientists and
scholars from 39 countries to Halifax Canada for
a conference with a familiar format, and at the
same time it was unique in its stimulation of both an intel-
lectual response and a heartfelt intensity in relation to its
theme “Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technol-
ogy and Politics.” The Canadian Pugwash Group, with 30
attendees, was delighted with its role as host, and the
chance to have first meetings with new Pugwashites at the
airport, in the university residences, at meals and, of
course, in the conference venues at Dalhousie University.
Evidence of our success at
fostering the right conference
ambience is found in the fol-
lowing sample comment “I
have benefited a lot in meet-
ing and having introduction
to different professors
around the world and their
diverse views. I found flexi-
bility and responsibility
among the participants which
made me impressed. Indeed
this sort of gathering will
have great impact on global
security affairs. I am also impressed with the working sys-
tem of Pugwash and its background. As a new member, I
am proud of it and will do my best to achieve its aims.” 
The opening session of the conference heard a welcom-
ing address by Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., Chair, Cana-
dian Pugwash Group, and then received the report of Sec-
retary-General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino. The support of the
host country is demonstrated by several means, the most
visible of which is the participation of senior government
officials. The Hon. Susan Whelan, Minister of
International Cooperation, gave the keynote speech “Pro-
moting Human Security After Conflict.” Minister Whelan
chaired a lively question and answer session that lifted the
whole conference group into “discussion mode.” The first
day was completed with a reception at historic City Hall.
Even as the first sessions began, and throughout, we
received significant media attention nationally and
locally—on TV, radio and newspapers, thus raising public
awareness of current issues in nuclear disarmament, mis-
sile defense, peacekeeping, terrorism, human development
and environmental change. 
Eminent speakers addressed the conference through
several invited lectures. Dr. Jayantha Dhanapala, (former)
Undersecretary-General of the United Nations for Disar-
mament Affairs, gave the
Dorothy Hodgkin Lecture, a
central event of the Confer-
ence. Professor M.S. Swami-
nathan, President of
Pugwash Conferences, world
leader in agricultural plant
genetics and the head of the
research institute bearing his
name, at Chennai, India gave
the President’s lecture on the
topic of sustainable food
security. The closing dinner
was addressed by Chris
Bryant, Dept. of Economic Development, Nova Scotia on
the topic “All Security is Local.” Professor Sir Joseph Rot-
blat, Nobel Laureate and founder of the Pugwash move-
ment, gave the Public Forum lecture on the topic “The
Nuclear Issue: Pugwash and the Bush Policies.” It was a
night to remember, as Jo Rotblat received a standing ova-
tion for his incisive analysis of the current problems in
nuclear disarmament. Through media interviews, many
others had a chance to hear his views, and all of us
admired his stamina and patience for interviews in the face
of a very full schedule. 
The entire conference convened in Pugwash, Nova
Scotia at Thinkers Lodge, the place of origin, on a day
To the Pugwash Community
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billed as “Back to
Pugwash.” It was a high
point for many who had
spent years in the
Pugwash movement,
because very few of the
Pugwashites had ever
seen Pugwash. The con-
ference grew too large
for the original venue
after only a couple of
years from its first meet-
ing in 1957, at which
there were 22 scientists
from 10 countries. Jo
Rotblat and Ruth
Adams, representing the
1957 group, both addressed the crowd, seated on the
lawn, with the sea in the background. An open plenary
session was held at the local high school, and as we
boarded the buses after the elegant final reception at the
Thinkers Lodge, it was not hard to see that many felt
reluctant to leave. For a day to remember, all Pugwashites
attending would undoubtedly be glad to join us in thank-
ing the Pugwash Park Commission for arranging such a
fine event. 
The ultimate goal for this specific Conference was to
advance human security by dialogue with stakeholders,
and by new viewpoints that would strengthen Canada and
the global community in their ability to respond to threats
to human security. The Pugwash Conferences are ongoing;
because of this continuity, the impact level sought for the
conference is enhancement of the freedom and safety of
citizens. The conference outcomes, as seen in the Working
Group Reports, and the various speeches of the confer-
ence, are on the website www.pugwash.org, thus enabling
the possibility of a wide readership. 
A number of Working Group papers were very signifi-
cant, and from those, we have selected a representative
group that, we believe,
has enduring value.
Many excellent papers
were presented, but are
not seen in this
newsletter due to space
limitations. We partic-
ularly commend the





of the six papers, the
one from WG6 is from
a student contributor. 
Only with financial
contributions and the work of many volunteers and staff
can we proceed with the annual Pugwash Conference on
Science and World Affairs. For the 53rd Conference, we
gratefully acknowledge the support received from several
Canadian government agencies, private foundations, and
friends of Pugwash:
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT); Peacebuilding and Human Security Division;
Canada International Development Agency (CIDA);
Conference Secretariat; Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC); Province of Nova Scotia;
Regional Municipality of Halifax; Cyrus Eaton Founda-
tion; Ploughshares Fund; Cut Foundation; Nancy Ruth;
Anonymous; Resource and Conflict Analysis Inc.: Post-
Communist Studies, York University; University College
of Cape Breton; International Pugwash; Canadian
Pugwash Group; Members of Canadian Pugwash. 
To all who made the effort to come to Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada, we say thanks and hope you will come
again.
In peace,
Adele Buckley, Chair, Halifax Conference Committee
Standing: Raymond Szabo, Bryan Jamieson, Margaret Eaton,
Giovanni Brenciaglia. Sitting: M.S. Swaminathan, Joseph Rotblat, 
Ruth Adams, Patrick Boyer 
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NATO. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
has been indefinitely extended.
But the one change that Pugwash
stands for, the one change the seeking
of which won for Sir Joseph Rotblat
and Pugwash the 1995 Nobel Peace
Prize, the one change directed by the
International Court of Justice, the
one change called for by a myriad of
United Nations resolutions, the one
change yearned for by millions
around the world—the abolition of
nuclear weapons—has not happened.
At the 1981 Conference in Banff,
calls were made for a nuclear freeze
and to eliminate tactical nuclear
weapons from Europe. Afterwards,
the Pugwash Council said clearly: “It
is a fallacy to believe that nuclear war
can be won.” Leaders of the nuclear
powers were urged to explicitly deny
military doctrines which legitimize
limited nuclear warfare. The Council
of the day looked outward at the
growing human needs for security
and declared: “The investment in
arms is non-productive and diverts
badly needed resources from a
nation’s capacity to meet human
needs and for development.”
If the Pugwash words were pre-
scient in 1981, they are compelling
today. For, the end of the Cold War
notwithstanding, the world is moving
to new levels of danger.
A few weeks ago, the Mayor of
Hiroshima, Tadatoshi Akiba, warned:
“We stand today on the brink of
hyper-proliferation and perhaps of
repeating the third actual use of
nuclear weapons.” A few days ago,
Amnesty International, in its annual
report, said the world has become a
more dangerous place: “The war on
terror, far from making the world a
safer place, has made it more danger-
ous by curtailing human rights,
undermining the rule of international
law, and shielding governments from
scrutiny.”
These are not cheery forecasts for
humanity. We in Pugwash do not
belong to the “gloom and doom”
school, neither do we believe in
ignoring warning bells.
September 11, 2001 was certainly
such a warning bell for humanity. Ter-
rorism is growing. We must not only
deal with terrorism but also examine
the whole canvas of violence in the
world. The division of the world into
rich and poor, the hegemony of the
powerful over the vulnerable, the
retention of nuclear weapons by some
while proscribing their acquisition by
others—all this is de-stabilizing the
world at the very moment society
should be concentrating its energies
on building a culture of peace.
Pugwash does believe a culture of
peace is possible. The gathering
Iam honoured, on behalf of theCanadian Pugwash Group, towelcome everyone to the 53rd
Pugwash Conference on Science and
World Affairs: “Advancing Human
Security: The Role of Technology and
Politics.”
I give a special welcome to the
President of Pugwash, Professor M.S.
Swaminathan; the Secretary-General,
Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino; the
Executive Director, Dr. Jeffrey
Boutwell; and the Chair of the Pug-
wash Council, Professor Marie
Muller, as well as all my colleagues
on the Pugwash Council.
Dalhousie University, Halifax,
Nova Scotia, and Canada greet you
warmly and we hope that your stay
at this conference will be pleasant
and productive. The outstanding
work of Adele Buckley and the Hali-
fax Planning Committee have
prepared an excellent program for
you.
Only once before, in 1981 in
Banff, Alberta, has Pugwash held its
annual conference in Canada. The 22
years that have elapsed have seen
many changes. The Cold War, during
which Pugwash first brought Soviet
and American scientists together, has
ended. Russia has entered the halls of
Welcome Address
By Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.,Chairman, 
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forces of civil society may one day
bring it about. Pugwash offers the
world that hope.
Indeed, the Pugwash Mission
Statement affirms that our purpose is
to bring scientific insight and reason
to bear on threats to human security
arising from science and technology
in general, and above all from the
catastrophic threat posed to human-
ity by nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction. The Pugwash
agenda extends to ways of alleviating
the conditions of economic depriva-
tion, environmental deterioration
and resource scarcity and exploita-
tion that so readily give rise to resent-
ment, hostility and violence through-
out the world. This noble work is
inspired by the Russell-Einstein Man-
ifesto of 1955, which called upon
leaders of the world to renounce
nuclear weapons and “remember
their humanity.”
Last year, at the La Jolla Confer-
ence, the goals for Pugwash’s Tenth
Quinquennium, 2002-2007, were set
down. The very first words of this
stirring call to action speak of “the
overriding peril” to humanity by the
vast destructive power of nuclear
weapons, and the increased threat
due to proliferation. The listing of the
new dangers and the new strain the
non-proliferation regime is under are
sobering. Thus the Pugwash goal of
reducing and eliminating the nuclear
peril will be more important than
ever in the Tenth Quinquennium.
The Goals Document challenges
each one of us: “Pugwash is strongly
committed to the goal of abolishing
all nuclear weapons. It is imperative
that Pugwash constantly remind the
international community of the
immorality, illegality, and peril inher-
ent in nuclear weapons, and to pro-
pose concrete steps toward their
elimination.”
The Pugwash agenda also pays
attention to increasing the effective-
ness of the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention and the Biological and Toxic
Weapons Convention. Conventional
weapons, too, ranging from small
arms to antipersonnel mines to new
high-technology weapons are of deep
concern to Pugwash. From weapons
of mass destruction to new develop-
ments in biotechnology and other
sciences, Pugwash accepts the respon-
sibility to stress the ethical and moral
responsibility of scientists to further
the beneficial applications of their
work and prevent their misuse.
Almost by definition, Pugwash
must look into the future to help
guide the formulation of the public
policy process. That is why it is so
important to have young Pugwashites
among us. We must enlarge not only
the Student Pugwash membership
but the ways Pugwash as a whole can
reach out to new generations of sci-
entists, academics, analysts, and pol-
icy-makers.
Our work at the Halifax Confer-
ence is cut out for us. We are here for
the most serious of purposes: to con-
tribute to the safety and human secu-
rity of the world around us.
I think it will be hard to exceed
the inspiration that awaits us on our
trip Sunday to the Thinkers’ Lodge in
Pugwash, Nova Scotia. This is
“where it all began.” The vision of
Cyrus Eaton in bringing the first Pug-
washites to the Thinkers’ Lodge has
flowed through to today. Patrick
Boyer, Giovanni Brenciaglia and the
Pugwash Parks Commission have
prepared an outstanding program for
you. You have a treat in store.
Welcome again. We are thrilled to
have you in our midst. Enjoy the
Canadian hospitality.
Let the conference begin.
Sen. Douglas Roche welcomes conference participants.
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nisms, are an indication of the serious
challenges faced by the international
community in commonly protecting
human security.
The world today must acknowl-
edge, confront, and overcome the cur-
rent paralysis engendered by ‘the
banality of nuclear weapons.’ In the
same way that a ‘banality of evil’
made possible the holocaust of the
Final Solution, so now has public
acquiescence to the continued
primacy of nuclear weapons in world
affairs, almost 60 years after their cat-
astrophic effects were demonstrated
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, made
more likely a nuclear holocaust.
The world’s peoples will not, of
course, be directly responsible for
such a catastrophe if it happens, but
they will be its primary victims.
Those responsible will be the leaders
of countries who have failed to recog-
nize that nuclear weapons represent
the single, largest danger to the secu-
rity of the international community. 
Primary among these is the cur-
rent US administration, which has
abdicated its moral responsibility as
the world’s strongest power in not
taking the lead to rid the world of
nuclear weapons. To the contrary, the
US administration has declared its
intention of relying on nuclear
weapons as a core component of US
national security for the indefinite
future. This and other US policies run
directly counter to the full implemen-
tation of the thirteen practical steps it
and other nuclear states agreed to
during the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Review Conference held in
2000, as well as to its obligations
under Article VI of the NPT to work
for the elimination of nuclear
weapons. Inter alia, the US adminis-
tration is exploring the development
of new nuclear weapons, may well
resume nuclear testing, has with-
drawn from the 1972 ABM Treaty
and will shortly deploy missile
defenses (of dubious military value),
and seems committed to violating the
non-weaponized environment of
outer space by deploying a space
weapons test-bed by 2008. Without a
180 degree reversal of US nuclear
weapons policies, there is no chance
of eliminating the incentives of other
countries to acquire nuclear weapons
and abolishing such weapons entirely.
This failure of American leader-
ship by no means absolves a large
number of other countries and gov-
ernments from their failure to act
decisively to eliminate the nuclear
threat.
The withdrawal by North Korea
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and uncertainties over its nuclear
aims is a major cause of international
concern. Through urgent negotiations
and international diplomacy a com-
monly satisfying agreement can be
The Pugwash Council, meetingduring the 53rd PugwashConference held in Halifax
and Pugwash, Nova Scotia, is
extremely concerned that the dangers
posed by nuclear weapons are
increasing the risk of a nuclear cata-
strophe. Widening cracks in the
nuclear non-proliferation regime, the
deadlock in nuclear arms control,
renewed interest in nuclear war-fight-
ing strategies, inadequate measures to
control and dispose of fissile materi-
als, the near term deployment of mis-
sile defenses and the prospect of
weapons in space, all point to the
very real possibility of nuclear
weapons being used, whether in con-
flict, by miscalculation or accident,
or by terrorists. 
Of equal concern to the Council,
and directly related to the militariza-
tion of global affairs spawned by the
so-called ‘war on terrorism,’ are the
marginalization of international insti-
tutions, especially the United
Nations, the diversion of resources
away from meeting challenges to
global sustainability, and a weaken-
ing of fundamental civil liberties and
basic human security protections.
The illegality under international law
of the war on Iraq, and the disdain of
the US administration for seeking
security through multilateral mecha-
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ing the 53rd Pugwash Conference,
new technologies hold out both
promises and challenges in the sus-
tainable use of resources and the use
of new biotechnologies in agriculture,
medicine and other fields. In all such
endeavors, it is crucially important
for scientists to remember their indi-
vidual responsibility regarding the
beneficial applications of their work
in promoting true human security for
all individuals.
All such improvements in the
human condition, however, will be
for naught if a nuclear catastrophe
occurs. The world stands on the
knife-edge of the nuclear dilemma.
Will it myopically continue to accord
nuclear weapons a primary role in
world politics and face the ultimate
threat of nuclear devastation, or will
the global community stand up, say
no, and take the necessary action to
at last rid the world of the prospect
of nuclear annihilation?
Between now and the 2005 NPT
Review Conference, the international
community has the opportunity to
move decisively away from a contin-
ued and dangerous reliance on
nuclear weapons. Progress toward
achieving the 13 practical steps
agreed to in 2000, as well as the entry
into force of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, accelerated reductions in
US and Russian nuclear forces
beyond what is called for in the May
2002 Moscow Treaty, improved
accounting for and control of fissile
material, reductions in tactical
nuclear weapons, and solutions to
regional nuclear crises, all would
contribute to moving the world away
from the catastrophic dangers to
human security inherent in a contin-
ued misplaced reliance on nuclear
weapons for national security.
incorporating nuclear weapons. 
In a world where many govern-
ments often emphasize exhortation
over concrete action in the pursuit of
a world free of nuclear weapons,
Pugwash supports the important con-
tribution to the strengthening of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty made by
the New Agenda Coalition and urges
even stronger dialogue between the
New Agenda countries and the
nuclear weapons states. 
In seeking to mobilize world pub-
lic opinion to demand concrete and
immediate steps to reverse current
developments that threaten the use of
nuclear weapons, the Pugwash Coun-
cil feels it imperative that global
action be undertaken to exert all pos-
sible pressure on governments to act
in concert to rid the world of nuclear
weapons.
Human security for the world’s
peoples is at greater and greater risk.
The large majority of them continue
to face unacceptable depredation in
their access to water, food, health
care, resources, and basic security.
Intensive international cooperation,
especially between industrial and
developing countries, is needed to
redress these imbalances, many of
which contribute directly to human
insecurity and conflict. As noted dur-
found between the main regional
powers, in which North Korea
receives security and non-aggression
guarantees while renouncing in a ver-
ifiable manner, once and for all, its
capability to acquire nuclear
weapons. 
In the Middle East, the continued
existence of Israel’s nuclear weapons
and ambiguity over Iran’s intentions
regarding it’s nuclear infrastructure
and the IAEA additional protocol
complicate efforts to achieve true
regional peace and stability and cre-
ate a region free of weapons of mass
destruction. 
In South Asia, the two newest
nuclear weapons states, India and
Pakistan, need to resolve their long-
standing conflict over Kashmir and
cross-border terrorism while moving
decisively to reduce the nuclear threat
between them. 
The other four original nuclear
powers—Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, and China—con-
tinue to rely on nuclear weapons for
deterrence despite the inherent dan-
gers of doing so. Similarly, the mem-
bers of NATO exhibit an irrational
attachment to US nuclear weapons as
part of NATO strategy, at a time
when NATO faces no threat and can
have no reason for a military strategy
53rd Pugwash Conference
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M O N D A Y ,  J U L Y  1 4
19:00-22:00 International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Board Meeting 
T U E S D A Y ,  J U L Y  1 5  
14:30-17:30 ISYP Symposium “The Role of the UN after the Iraqi Crisis”
19:30-21:00 ISYP Working Groups A and B 
W E D N E S D A Y ,  1 6  J U L Y  
09:00-12:30 Pugwash Council Meeting/ISYP Conference 
14:30-17:30 Pugwash Council Meeting/ISYP Conference
T H U R S D A Y ,  1 7  J U L Y  
09:00-11:30 Pugwash Council Meeting/ISYP Conference 
11:30-12:30 Pugwash Council members meet with ISYP Pugwash 
14:00-15:30 PLENARY SESSION 1 [Closed] (McCain Building, Scotiabank Auditorium) Chair: Douglas Roche
Welcoming address by Chair of Canadian Pugwash Douglas Roche
Report of Pugwash Secretary General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino
16:00-17:30 PLENARY SESSION 2 [Open] 
Chair: M.S. Swaminathan
Keynote Speaker: Hon. Susan Whelan, Minister of International Cooperation
18:00-19:00 Reception: City of Halifax —City Hall
Remarks: Mayor Peter Kelly
Response: Sec.-Gen. Paolo Cotta Ramusino 
F R I D A Y ,  1 8  J U L Y   
09:00-12:30 Working Groups 1-6 meet (McCain Building) 
14:30-18:00 Working Groups 1-6 meet 
20:00-22:00 PUBLIC FORUM (McCain- Ondajtee Auditorium) [Open] Chair: Marie Muller 
Speaker: Sir Joseph Rotblat, President Emeritus—Pugwash (UK)
S A T U R D A Y ,  1 9  J U L Y  
09:00-12:30 Working Groups 1-6 meet 
14:00-15:30 PLENARY SESSION 3 [Open] Chair: Jeffrey Boutwell
Human Security and the Middle East
Speakers: Galia Golan (Israel), Gabriel Baramki (Palestine), Mohamed Kadry Said (Egypt) 
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16:00-18:00 PLENARY SESSION 4 [Open] Chair: Paolo Cotta-Ramusino
Eliminating the Threat of Nuclear Weapons
Speakers: Miguel Marin-Bosch (Mexico), Pan Zhenqiang (China), John Holdren (USA)
18:00-19:00 Pugwash Council meets representatives of National Pugwash Groups 
S U N D A Y  2 0  J U L Y  
10:00-11:30 Reception at Thinker’s Lodge, Pugwash, Nova Scotia
Introduction and welcoming address by Patrick Boyer
Pugwash: past and present history, comments by Joseph Rotblat, Ruth Adams
11:30-12:30 Tours of Thinkers’ Lodge
12:30-13:30 Lunch at Pugwash District High School & Joseph Rotblat Hall
14:30-16:15 PLENARY SESSION 5 [Open] Pugwash District High School
Chair: Ochieng Adala (Kenya) 
Cooperative Security and the Future of Multinational Institutions
Speakers: Robert Lawson (Canada), Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Vladimir Baranovski (Russia),
Steven Miller (USA)
16:30-17:30 Closing Reception at Thinkers’ Lodge
17:30 Departure by bus for dinner at Truro (enroute to Halifax) 
18:30-20:00 Dinner at Truro
20:00 Departure for Halifax 
M O N D A Y ,  2 1  J U L Y  
09:00-10:30 PLENARY SESSION 6 [Closed] Chair: Anne McLaren (UK)
Reports on Working Groups 1, 2, 3
11:00-12:15 PLENARY SESSION 7 [Open] 
Chair: Douglas Roche 
Dorothy Hodgkin Lecture by Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) 
14:00-15:30 PLENARY SESSION 8 [Closed] 
Chair: Adele Buckley
Reports on Working Groups 4, 5, 6




Final remarks by Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Jeffrey Boutwell
18:30-21:30 Reception and Closing Banquet (University Club)  M.C.: Adele Buckley
Banquet Speaker: Chris Bryant, Department of Economic Development, Nova Scotia
Downeast Entertainment: Background music and half hour performance
T U E S D A Y ,  2 2  J U L Y  
09:00-12:30 Pugwash Council Meeting 
14:00-16:00 Pugwash Council Meeting
53rd Pugwash Conference
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W G 1 :  
N U C L E A R  W E A P O N S
Status of and prospect for nuclear disarmament.
Prospects for the 13 steps decided at the 2002 NPT
Review Conference
Recent developments in nuclear proliferation
Current strategies and postures of nuclear-armed states.
No first use
W G 2 :  
W E A P O N I Z A T I O N  O F  S P A C E  
A N D  M I S S I L E  D E F E N S E
Missile defense and space weapons
Weaponization of space and its impact on civil activities 
Preserving the non-weaponization of space 
W G 3 :  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O O P E R A T I O N  A N D
H U M A N  S E C U R I T Y
Role of international institutions in the prevention of
armed conflict. Civilian protection and humanitarian
assistance 
Multilateral actions and unilateral initiatives
Post-conflict reconstruction; governance; assistance to
democratization
W G 4 :  
T E R R O R I S M  
Terrorism: its roots and its divisive effects on the world
community
Technology and the prevention of terrorism.
Antiterrorism and limitation of civil liberties
Preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass
destruction
W G 5 :  
N E W  T E C H N O L O G Y  F O R  H U M A N
D E V E L O P M E N T  A N D  S E C U R I T Y
Communications, monitoring and information
technology for human protection
Agricultural biotechnology
International cooperation to promote equity in human
development
W G 6 :  
M I T I G A T I O N  O F  G L O B A L
E N V I R O N M E N T A L  C H A N G E
Advances in modeling and long-term global energy trends 
Initiatives and technology to limit human-induced global
changes
Access to and availability of energy, water, food
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Report on Working Group 1 
Nuclear Weapons
Co-conveners: Dr. Jo Husbands (USA) and 
General Pan Zhenqiang (China) 
Rapporteur: Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (The Netherlands) 
Next steps for non-proliferation
and disarmament
In concreto, achieving full implemen-
tation of the 13 practical steps agreed
upon at the NPT Review Conference
in the year 2000 is essential. In par-
ticular, a number of actions should be
undertaken with high priority. Strate-
gic nuclear arms agreements between
the Russian Federation and the US, in
particular the May 2002 ‘Moscow
Treaty’, should be promptly imple-
mented and expanded. Reduced war-
heads and their delivery systems
should be dismantled irreversibly in a
transparent and verifiable manner.
Remaining deployed Russian and US
nuclear forces should be de-alerted to
further reduce the operational status
of nuclear weapons systems. The
entry into force of the CTBT should
be achieved, and until that time the
moratorium on nuclear testing
should be strictly observed. A process
of improved accounting for and con-
trol of fissile materials holdings
should be created on a worldwide
basis. Negotiations should be com-
menced on a fissile materials produc-
tion ban and reduction plan, and the
role and capacity of the IAEA in
these matters must be strengthened. 
Furthermore, the recent US trend
towards expansion of the options for
usage of nuclear weapons should be
reversed, especially their use against
non-nuclear weapon countries, as
unambiguously allowed in its
Nuclear Posture Review. Countries in
both bilateral and multilateral secu-
rity alliances with the US, which
include policies allowing the first use
of nuclear weapons, must resolve the
tension between these policies and
their NPT obligations.
Low-yield and tactical nuclear
weapons
The development of new or modified
nuclear weapons should be
renounced as contrary to the 2000
NPT Review Conference
commitment to a diminishing role of
nuclear weapons in security policies
and the NPT article VI obligation of
a cessation of the nuclear arms race.
Current US movement towards the
development of low-yield nuclear
weapons, as well as the concurrent
evolution of the designing of ever
more powerful conventional
weapons, could blur the distinction
between nuclear and conventional
weapons, and could render nuclear
weapons more usable. Once the
development of low-yield nuclear
weapons reaches its test phase, a col-
lapse of the global testing
Introduction
Today, the nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament process faces its
greatest challenge since the end of the
Cold War. With the increasingly
urgent danger of regional nuclear
proliferation, and with a US Admin-
istration that has shifted from its ear-
lier nuclear policy, in which nuclear
weapons were regarded as weapons
of last resort, to one in which it may
use nuclear weapons for preemptive
purposes—also in cases of non-
nuclear threats and against non-
nuclear weapon states—the nuclear
non-proliferation regime is currently
in a profound crisis. 
As participants of Working
Group 1, we want to draw renewed
attention to the present nuclear disar-
mament deadlock, and, while empha-
sizing the need to imminently find
regional solutions for the world’s
most worrisome nuclear emergencies,
we point out that increasing urgency
exists to seek a universal elimination
of nuclear weapons. Mankind there-
fore ought to address without delay
the lack of progress in solving these
nuclear threats.
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moratorium of nuclear weapons is
likely to follow, and perhaps even
that of the entire NPT regime itself.
For these reasons, the
development of low-yield nuclear
weapons constitutes a significant
menace to the present non-prolifera-
tion regime. The prevention of the
development of low-yield nuclear
weapons is to be included in future
non-proliferation efforts. Also exist-
ing tactical nuclear weapons should
be included in future nuclear disar-
mament negotiations. In particular,
US tactical nuclear weapons deployed
under NATO auspices in Europe
should be unilaterally removed, and a
wider process of reduction of US and
Russian tactical nuclear weapons
should be created.
Regional crises
The current crisis on the Korean
peninsula constitutes one of the most
urgent nuclear threats the world faces
today. While the US – North Korean
deadlock is profound and intricate,
we believe that finding a sustainable
and peaceful solution to the present
dilemma is not only possible but also
imperative. Through urgent negotia-
tions and international diplomacy a
commonly satisfying agreement can
be found between the main regional
protagonists, in which North Korea
is given the security and non-aggres-
sion guarantees it desires, while
renouncing in a verifiable manner
once and for all its endeavors to
acquire nuclear weapons. In the
longer run, a gradual process of con-
sensus building should lead to a
Peace Treaty.
Similarly in other parts of the
world, regional approaches to nuclear
non-proliferation should be realized
that are embedded in the broader
political context of the region under
consideration. More nuclear-weapon-
free-zones should be established cov-
ering territories as large as possible.
In particular, nuclear non-prolifera-
tion should be integrated in regional
conflict resolution and confidence
building measures in the Middle East
and South Asia. Such regional and
step-by-step approaches could initi-
ate a process towards the universal
elimination and abolition of nuclear
weapons.
Nuclear relations
During the Cold War, global nuclear
relations rested on two mutually sup-
portive arrangements: the elaborate
structure of nuclear deterrence and
the non-proliferation regime. A
rough equality of military power was
measured in terms of assured mutual
destruction, while uneven distribu-
tion of military nuclear capabilities
assured a rank ordering among
nuclear weapon powers. This balance
of terror created a semblance of
order, based primarily on the
unprecedented common interest of all
states in avoiding a nuclear
holocaust. Thanks to the NPT,
nuclear weapon and non-nuclear
weapon states found a common
ground in averting the spread of
nuclear weapons with all undertaking
respective obligations.
Today, the situation has funda-
mentally changed. The US no longer
sees nuclear arms control as an essen-
tial part of its nuclear policy and is
instigating substantial changes in the
nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Considerable unease exists about
combining the campaign against ter-
rorism with preventive or preemptive
counter-proliferation. With possibili-
ties of a nuclear response to chemical
or biological attack, a danger now
exists of a further abuse of nuclear
weapons. Nuclear war has been
avoided so far largely because of the
taboo against the military use of
nuclear weapons during each succes-
sive decade of the nuclear era. Any
such use in the future would destroy
whatever remains of that taboo.
Nuclear awareness
Strengthening public awareness
about the dangers inherent in nuclear
weapons may contribute to a greater
international effort for nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament. For
many, the end of the Cold War
implied the end of the nuclear threat.
The lack of public concern regarding
the continuously existing and proba-
bly increasing nuclear threat, how-
ever, contrasts starkly with the way
international events have moved over
the past few years. Efforts to
convince the public that nuclear
weapons pose a dangerous liability
for mankind need greatly enhanced.
An international public information
effort is needed to raise nuclear
weapons higher up the political
agenda, to a level where governments
will have to engage in the debate and
be responsive to a growing body of
public opinion that is opposed to the
possession and threatened use of
nuclear weapons. Heightened aware-
ness should also be realized of the
threat of terrorist use of nuclear
devices and materials, or terrorist
attacks against nuclear facilities,
including those related to the civil
nuclear power industry. 
It is not easy to see an immediate
way forward for an effective public
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information program that may clarify
the need for a process towards the
universal elimination of nuclear
weapons. One message seems to be
clear, however: it is important to
remind everyone of the constant
nuclear threat and the horrifying con-
sequences of the use of nuclear
weapons. Whereas the crisis in the
nuclear non-proliferation and disar-
mament process is enormous, we
think that positive ways exist out of
the current perilous situation. Much
more thought and effort are needed
to try to escape from today’s nuclear
crisis. The Pugwash Conferences on
Science and World Affairs can play a
unique role in both educating and
providing expertise information.
Concise summary
• With the increasingly urgent danger
of regional nuclear proliferation,
and with a US Administration that
has shifted from its earlier nuclear
policy, in which nuclear weapons
were regarded as weapons of last
resort, to one in which it may use
nuclear weapons for preemptive
purposes, the nuclear non-prolifera-
tion regime is currently in a
profound crisis.
• Achieving full implementation of
the 13 practical steps agreed upon
at the 2000 NPT Review Confer-
ence is essential.
• A process of improved accounting
for and control of fissile materials
holdings should be created on a
worldwide basis, while negotiations
should be commenced on a fissile
materials production ban and
reduction plan, and the role and
capacity of the IAEA herein must
be strengthened.
• The development of low-yield
nuclear weapons constitutes a sig-
nificant menace to the present non-
proliferation regime and its preven-
tion should therefore be included in
future non-proliferation efforts,
while a reduction of tactical nuclear
weapons should be included in
future disarmament negotiations.
• Through urgent negotiations and
international diplomacy a peaceful
solution and commonly satisfying
agreement can be found between
the main regional protagonists in
the crisis on the Korean peninsula,
in which North Korea is given the
security and non-aggression guar-
antees it desires, while renouncing
in a verifiable manner once and for
all its endeavors to acquire nuclear
weapons.
• Similarly in other parts of the
world, regional approaches to
nuclear non-proliferation should be
realized on the way towards univer-
sal elimination of nuclear weapons,
and, in particular, nuclear non-pro-
liferation should be integrated in
regional conflict resolution and
confidence building measures in the
Middle East and South Asia.
• Strengthening public awareness
about the dangers inherent in
nuclear weapons may contribute to
a greater international effort for
realizing nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament.
Report on Working Group 2 
Weaponisation of Space and Missile Defence
Co-Conveners: John Rhinelander (USA) and Rebecca Johnson (UK)
Co-Rapporteurs: Will Marshall (UK), Robert Schingler (USA) 
and George Whitesides (USA)
Introduction and Working
Group Focus
The Working Group on Weaponisa-
tion of Space and Missile Defence
was composed of 22 members from
11 countries (including 6 members
from the International Student Young
Pugwash). This report of the working
group is the sole responsibility of the
rapporteurs, and while there was a
high level of consensus in the group,
this does not necessarily represent
consensus on all points. 
The majority of the discussion
was focused on continuing efforts on
the prohibition of space weapons as
instigated during the 52nd Pugwash
Conferences in La Jolla and the First
Annual workshop on Preserving the
Non-Weaponisation of Space held in
Castellón de la Plana, Spain in May
2003. The threat assessments, under-
lying motivations and arguments
concerning missile defence (MD) and
the potential weaponisation of space
were not discussed in detail here since
they were well covered in Castellón,
although the workshop briefly con-
sidered two papers from participants
on regional debates and implications
of missile defense, which focused on
North-East Asia and Britain respec-
tively. 
Missile Defence
In general, it was agreed that devel-
opments in missile defenses could
have major effects on international
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and regional security and that many
components in the currently
proposed multi-tiered, layered system
are technologically far from proven. 
Firstly, we discussed that the
effects on regional security must be
rigorously analysed by each individ-
ual country invited to join. It was
argued that the development of mis-
sile defense could create a new
regional missile arms race in the
Korean Peninsula, Japan, China, and
Taiwan region. The practical applica-
tion of missile defense was debated in
the context of international stability
and world order, and concerns were
raised that with the current direction
under the leadership by the United
States, ballistic missile defences
(BMD) could be detrimental to over-
all security. 
A useful paper on the revolution
in military affairs (RMA) led to con-
sideration of the relationship between
RMA, increased reliance on space
assets in a military context, and the
ideological commitment of the Bush
administration to space control and
the development of missile defense
systems. An important linkage
between the missile defense debate
and the weaponisation of space is the
intended US deployment of a testbed
for space-based interceptors in 2008.
This is seen as the nearest term threat
to the status quo of no weapons in
space. It was noted that while both
the issues of missile defense and space
weapons are exceedingly important,
each needs to be addressed in differ-
ent ways. In considering the regional
and international merit and
disadvantages of missile defense,
attention must be given to alternative
mechanisms and arrangements for
addressing missile threats, controls,
and non-proliferation. One main rec-
ommendation was for Pugwash to
initiate regional discussions on the
impact of missile defense for specific
regions.
While recognising that a growing
number of states, including NATO,
were being drawn into discussions on
BMD collaboration, it was noted that
there was a need for more informa-
tion to inform public debate on the
issue, and that the costs appear to be
out of proportion with the threats
from missiles and the capabilities of
MD systems to aid national security. 
Space Security
Following on from the more general
discussions in Castellón, the work-
shop chose to focus specifically on
short and medium term initiatives
currently being undertaken, and con-
sideration of roles for Pugwash and
its members. The discussions devel-
oped a working objective, as follows:
Pugwash should seek to facilitate
incremental steps leading to a com-
prehensive space security architecture
to ensure the peaceful uses of space.
Initiating this discussion, we heard
from the Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (DFAIT), which has been
working with international experts to
develop a knowledge base to facili-
tate constructive dialogue on the
issue of the weaponization of space.
This dialogue has evolved to be in the
context of ‘space security,’ and is
defined to be the ‘equitable, sustain-
able, and secure use of and access to
space and freedom from space-based
threats’. There is development of a
Space Security Index aimed to be a
research-based trend analysis that
provides a net assessment of the col-
lective progress, or lack of progress,
towards space security. The
Canadian Space Security Index is
envisaged to measure twelve indica-
tors within three themes of space
security; space environment (e.g.
space debris, allocation of orbital
slots), the intentions of space security
actors (e.g. space military doctrine)
and capabilities of space security
actors (e.g. launch capabilities, ASAT,
space weapon capabilities). 
Space Security Strategy
A considerable amount to time was
spent on widening discussion of the
strategy initiated in the Castellón
workshop, and identifying specific
actions for moving forward (see also
the key papers from the workshop on
the Pugwash website). In this regard,
it was felt that Pugwash could play
an important role in increasing the
knowledge base and the public and
political salience of space security.
The strategy for preserving the non-
weaponization of space is to start
with three themes, which need to
interact in parallel: continue to build
the knowledge-base and increase
salience; stopping financial resources
via the US Congress toward the 2008
space weapons testbed; and working
on incremental confidence building
and regulation steps, while laying the
groundwork for comprehensive inter-
national agreements within the space
security architecture. The following
outlines the three main themes in
greater detail:
1. Increase the knowledge base 
• Space Security Index (see above)
– Coordinate a network of experts
on space, especially from the sci-
entific community, in order to
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facilitate the Space Security Index
(SSI) and fulfill specified research
and analysis needs
– Produce publication on space
security to collate the knowledge
base gathered in the SSI.
• Increase Salience
–Networking: reaching out to pub-
lic, space scientists and space
users
–Reach out to space scientists who
are under represented in Pugwash
–Encourage development of a
Space Security Bulletin to inform
space community on recent news
–Co-convene a conference with
Pugwash and Committee on
Space Research (COSPAR) poten-
tially on Space Debris
–Reach out to commercial actors
and industries using space assets
and increase their awareness of
the effects of the weaponization of
space
–Reach out to military community
and space scientists to encourage
dialogue amongst space actors
and users
–Increase public outreach through
space NGOs
• Further Research and Rigorous
Analysis 
–Feasibility of threats to space-
based assets from ASATs launched
by non-traditional space powers
–Feasibility of a ‘Space Pearl
Harbor’ scenario
–Space Security Index
-The hazard posed by Space
Debris
-Access to space and equity 
–Costs and Benefits of space
weapons
–The impact of space weapons on
the commercial space sector
2. Political Initiatives towards
prohibition of space weapons
• Major goal is to make sure that
there is no US test-bed deployed by
2008
–Engage the US Congress in dia-
logue to cut spending from space
weapons development prior to a
critical debate
–To convene a roundtable or work-
shop to improve the understand-
ing of the issue amongst
politicians.
3. Laying the groundwork for a
comprehensive space security
approach
• Discussions with US Military,
Congress and the White House
• Increase the visibility of existing as
well as new research and reports
• Research into verification for
potential agreements 
• High-profile spokespeople for pub-
lic attention 
• International space security summit
• Consider the pros and cons of
advocating a moratorium on no
first testing, deployment or use of
space weapons
• A timeline for political/legal initia-
tives




–Increase number of parties to the
Outer Space Treaty (OST)
towards universalisation
–UNGA resolution to multilater-
alise agreement on non-interfer-
ence with space assets, building
on the provisions in the CFE and
other treaties 
Members of Working Group 2.
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–Negotiations on banning ASAT,
weapons in and from space and
international rules of the road reg-
ulations, either as a protocol to
the OST or as separate legal
instruments.
Recommended Priorities
In order to move forward on the
detailed issues mentioned above, the
working group identified potential
organizations for each action, some
of which already have work under-
way on space security-related issues,
and some which Pugwash members
could invite to get them involved in
the space security movement. Below
is a list of the suggested short-term
priorities for Pugwash and Interna-
tional Student Young Pugwash to
focus their continued efforts on the
space security movement.
Pugwash priorities
1. Reach out to military community
and space science community to
encourage dialogue on space secu-
rity including, where possible, par-
ticipation in the development of
the Space Security Index
2. Coordinate further research and
work on space debris as part of
raising awareness of the need for
legally instituted rules of the road 
3. Research into potential verification
measures to increase the credibility
of political and legal initiatives.
Student/Young Pugwash priorities
1. Push universal ratification of
Outer Space Treaty
• Create a Ratification kit
• Work with the Space Generation
Advisory Council and possibly
the United Nations Office of
Outer Space Affairs
2. European Union
• Input to the development of EU
White Paper on space policy
• Increase knowledge among senior
EU people
3. Cost-benefit analysis in collabora-
tion with military actors
• Publish in high-level journal
• Use that as a connection to meet
more military contacts
4. Identify space scientists / and poli-
cymakers for Space Security Index
expert base
Report on Working Group 3 
International Cooperation and Human Security
Co-convenors: Gabi Baramki (Palestine) and Gerard Toulouse (France)
Rapporteur: H. Peter Langille (Canada)
A recurring theme throughout this
workshop was the critical importance
of the United Nations. It is widely
viewed as the one international insti-
tution committed to encouraging
global cooperation and the advance-
ment of human security. As such,
there was considerable support for
strengthening the UN. Given the
Organization’s new responsibilities
and assigned tasks, many noted the
need for additional resources and
funding. But, there was also support
for encouraging member states to ful-
fill their obligations under the UN
Charter. It is noteworthy that these
commitments do not diminish over
time or with non-compliance. They
remain obligations of membership. 
Human security proved to be a
timely, goal-oriented, organizing
principle; one that facilitated discus-
sion of diverse, contemporary chal-
lenges. Our workshop reflected
numerous priorities evident in the
official human security agenda. We
also discussed further cooperation to
ensure freedom from fear of violence,
the direct violence of war, the struc-
tural violence of exploitation and the
cultural violence of discrimination.
We have witnessed formative
events over the past two years. It
appears we should have heeded an
earlier promise of a ‘new world
order’. This one is clearly more
divided, increasingly militarized and,
arguably, more risky. Perspectives
differ over whether these changes are
permanent or temporal, but there is a
general sense that we are now
approaching a crossroads. Our cur-
rent trajectory should not provide
comfort. It appears that we have less
political control, less capacity to
brake and slow our speed, less capac-
ity to determine a safe course. Aside
from immediate risks, we are also
beginning to understand the cumula-
tive effect of human behavior, with
evidence, albeit preliminary, inferring
that we have only one or two genera-
tions in which to reinvent ourselves.
Working Group 3 focused on
‘International Cooperation and
Human Security’, under the follow-
ing headings:
• The role of international
institutions in the prevention of
armed conflict, protection of civil-
ians and humanitarian assistance;
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• Multilateral actions and unilateral
initiatives, and;
• Post-conflict reconstruction, gover-
nance and assistance to democrati-
zation.
Specific Recommendations
The UN’s capacity to monitor, to pro-
vide early warning and oversight, as
well as to act in prevention is now
beginning to benefit from an ‘emerg-
ing global watch’. Already, we can
discern the framework for coordina-
tion of a global monitoring system in
individuals, NGOs, UN offices and
missions worldwide. There remains a
need for multiple, informal and secret
sources of information, as well as
rapidly deployable, fact- finding
teams. Despite the controversial
nature of ‘intelligence’ within the UN
system, the Organization and the
member states should address the
prevailing gap in information gather-
ing, intelligence and analysis. The
alternative is to be unduly reliant on
the current monopoly held by the
most powerful. There is a risk that
we will continue to be misled.
The report of the International
Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, The Responsibility
to Protect, has met with unantici-
pated resistance. Clearly, it will
require ongoing efforts to attract sup-
port for a new norm and multilateral
action, particularly when it entails
the use of force to protect civilians
threatened by genocide and mass eth-
nic cleansing. Unilateral campaigns
cannot be convincingly rationalized
under such pretenses. Yet legitimate
questions are being raised about
‘how’ to protect and with ‘what’,
establishing the need to identify and
elaborate upon the alternatives. Sup-
portive member states should recog-
nize that the essential criteria will be
legitimacy, credibility and universal-
ity. Civil society will increasingly
expect more than multilateral ‘coali-
tions of the willing’. This may imply
not only UN authorization, but also
UN management. At present, this is a
tall task, but not mission impossible.
The UN’s capacity to prevent
armed conflict, to protect civilians
and to conduct effective peace opera-
tions also depends on the extent to
which it can organize reliable and
rapid responses to diverse emergen-
cies. Regrettably, rather than rapid
deployment, routine delays of 4-to-6
months became the norm in the late
1990s. Modest progress is evident
with the recent expansion of the
Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions, the development of ‘on-call
lists’ for mission headquarters, the
expansion of the UN Standby
Arrangements System, particularly
the multinational Standby High
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).
Combined, these now provide a more
effective foundation for peacekeep-
ing. As they remain reliant on prompt
national decision-making and access
to well-trained, well-equipped
national personnel, there is little
assurance of rapid deployment. 
If the UN is to prevent armed
conflict and to protect civilians, there
will be a need for further, more ambi-
tious efforts and new mechanisms.
An additional SHIRBRIG would
help, as would additional
participants and a larger brigade
pool. In this respect, it might help to
encourage complementary national
defence reforms, particularly the ear-
marking of battalions specifically for
UN operations. 
There is also an urgent need for a
UN Emergency Service—a dedicated,
multidimensional ‘UN 911’, that can
address human needs, including pro-
tection, security, health and hope.
This service should be composed of
volunteer military, police and civilian
volunteers that are recruited globally,
selected for high standards of profes-
sionalism and commitment, and then
directly employed by the UN. It is
time for an in-depth, independent,
transnational study to identify the
general and specific requirements for
starting and operating such a service. 
Contrary to the notion that gov-
ernments are constrained by fiscal
austerity rendering new initiatives
unfeasible, we heard that the ‘inter-
national community’ could afford
more effective structures and reforms
in many of the areas noted. Govern-
mental priorities determine the allo-
cation of funding. To cite one exam-
ple, with wider cooperation, the
proposed Tobin tax of 0.1% on inter-
national financial transactions would
have yielded $97 billion in 1997.
Such a source of funding for the UN
system would make it less dependent
on governmental contributions.
With respect to questions of dis-
armament and arms control, it is not
easy to commence or conclude on a
promising note. However, it is note-
worthy that the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross recognizes
significant reductions in use of land
mines globally. The International
Campaign to Ban Landmines attests
to the complete elimination of the
international trade in landmines, as
well as far fewer victims of these
weapons. This progress arises despite
the fact that better de-mining tech-
nology has been frequently promised,
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but seldom provided. To ensure this
process concludes on a promising
note, Pugwash and other supportive
parties may need to encourage gov-
ernments to renew their funding.
Many believe those planting mines
should, at least, be held responsible
for their removal. The big task is
in figuring out how to enforce
compliance. 
Small arms also figure
prominently on the human security
agenda, primarily because of their
large impact, low cost and availabil-
ity. It is easy to understand why they
are ‘the weapon of choice’ in the
majority of contemporary armed con-
flicts. We heard compelling testimony
about the reciprocal feedback loop
between insecurity, poverty, violence
and acquisition of additional small
arms. We also support the need for
better incentives to turn in weapons,
including individual, national and
multinational buy-back programs.
Regrettably, we are experiencing
re-armament today on an unprece-
dented scale in every region of the
world. It is past time that the UN
called the world to account to begin
reversing this process. It is proposed,
that we call for the UN General
Assembly to prepare for, and conduct
a Fourth Special Session on
Disarmament.
Together, we devoted consider-
able time to discussing human secu-
rity, the rapid militarization of much
of the world and the consequences
for human welfare. Could Pugwash
or a group of individual members
initiate a study on the interface of
human security and military security
to determine whether and to what
extent the concepts are compatible or
not, and whether both can exist
within a single foreign policy?
Our working group benefited
from approximately forty-three par-
ticipants from twenty-four countries.
Within, there was widespread sup-
port for Pugwash’s emphasis on
analysis and advocacy. Yet we also
recognize the need for critical reflec-
tion and adaptation of this organiza-
tion. It was agreed that one challenge
ahead is to mainstream gender and
youth analysis, utilizing the wider
perspective and strengths of each. As
noted (and agreed), “men desperately
need more creative ideas for
overcoming a war system”. 
Another challenge is to encourage
a much-needed culture of peace,
which will necessitate further support
for peace research and peace educa-
tion. We know a few of the implica-
tions when there is neither tolerance
nor assistance for independent analy-
sis, constructive criticism and the
development of policy options. This
is now an evident trend; arguably one
sustained by organized fear and a cul-
ture of violence. Clearly, the atten-
dant risks merit further research,
education and advocacy to counter
this trend.
UNESCO was mentioned favor-
ably for a program in peace educa-
tion that might be renewed. This UN
department shares Pugwash’s long-
standing commitment to education,
science, culture and ethics, making it
a natural partner. We also heard a
compelling recommendation for the
UN to prepare an annual report on
state of world peace and security.
To effect promising change, a
number of participants suggested the
need for constituency-building with
like-minded groups, preferably on an
issue-specific basis.
There was also support for ‘out-
reach’ to attract additional scientific
expertise, prominent members, par-
ticularly from countries that are cur-
rently under-represented and
acknowledged leaders in science,
such as Nobel laureates in the natural
sciences.
It was proposed that Pugwash
participate in both the world
economic and social forums. Many
expressed hope that others would not
only enjoy, but also learn consider-
ably from a repeat performance of
what has already been labeled, ‘the
brilliant Joe show’. 
Over the past decade, we gradu-
ally recognized the need for
integrated approaches across the full
spectrum of peace operations. Slowly,
we drew some connections and
learned that seemingly different
aspects of the human security agenda
were actually interrelated. Although
political and corporate leaders will
occasionally dismiss any connection,
elementary students know that
human security is related to environ-
mental security. Given the disappear-
ance of the tropical rainforest, is it
for us, or for others to ask the gov-
ernment of Brazil what they might
need to stop the cutting? 
Hopefully, we also learned the
UN cannot be expected to carry addi-
tional responsibilities without addi-
tional support and resources. An
effort could be made to engage
regional organizations under the UN
umbrella (e.g. OAS, AU and OSCE),
encouraging them to take on a more
active role in support of the UN Secu-
rity Council. Success, and quite possi-
bly survival, will depend upon the
extent to which civil society develops
a constituency of support for the UN
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through cooperative partnerships
with supportive member states,
NGOs, institutes and individuals.
There will be a need for reliable
information, wider efforts to educate
at the political level and smart media
campaigns. 
Good governance should not be
taken for granted, here or elsewhere.
When under intense pressure from
abroad, even respected democracies
may behave like vicious gang mem-
bers. One task that merits further
thought and a final question is how
we can counterbalance and offset
some of that pressure. Well-
conceived, common approaches
would appear to offer better
prospects than unilateral reactions.
2. “Terrorism is the deliberate target-
ing of civilians with a view to kill
and to intimidate”.
What is interesting about the lat-
ter definition is that it makes no dis-
tinction between terrorist acts com-
mitted by states from those
committed by non-state actors.
The need for a precise definition
of terrorism does not only stem from
the fact that there are more than 200
definitions of terrorism but that vari-
ous government have opportunisti-
cally sought to label legitimate politi-
cal opponents in an effort to narrow
the political space.
The need for greater precision in
our terminology also extends to the
term “weapons of mass destruction”
or WMD. This stems from the fact
that the term places in the same cate-
gory—chemical, biological, radiologi-
cal and nuclear weapons. This is inap-
propriate and misleading bearing in
mind that nuclear weapons are many
orders of magnitude more powerful,
and hence more damaging than the
other three and its characteristics and
case of manufacture are completely
different. As the choice of words we
use shape responses, it is imperative
that we are as precise as possible with
the words we so loosely use.
On the Origins of Terrorism
Terrorism stems at individual and
group levels. At the individual level,
the Oklahoma bombing committed
by Timothy McVeigh springs to
mind. Given the random nature of
such acts they are far more difficult
to control. At the level of groups; one
has leaders of racial, ethnic, religious
or national groups mobilizing follow-
ers to commit terrorist acts on the
Report on Working Group 4
Terrorism
Co-Convenors: Francesco Calogero (Italy) 
and Pervez Hoodbhoy (Pakistan)
Rapporteur: Hussein Solomon (South Africa)
Abstract
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon,
but what is new today is its scope
and magnitude. Whilst acknowledg-
ing that terrorism does not exist in a
vacuum; the simplistic notion that
poverty leads to terrorism must be
rejected. At best poverty is a facilitat-
ing condition not a necessary one.
There can be no justification for the
taking of innocent life! Today’s ter-
rorists do not only have traditional
small arms and explosives in their
arsenals but the potential to access
nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons. In responding to terrorism,
the centrality of the United Nations
must be stressed as must the legal as
opposed to military approaches. This
would entail the strengthening of
international legal instruments such
as the International Criminal Court
as well as the Chemical and Biologi-
cal Weapons Conventions. In
responding to terrorism a fine line
should be maintained between the
need for security and the encroach-
ment of civil liberties. Responding to
terrorism should not only be the pre-
serve of governments and inter-gov-
ernmental bodies. Indeed members of
civil society have a social responsibil-
ity to join in this global scourge.
Introduction
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon
but what is new today is the scope
and magnitude of this global scourge.
This report is divided into four sec-
tions. In the first section we look at
definitions. In the second, the origins
of terrorism are explored. Third, the
scope and magnitude of terrorism is
analyzed and finally we turn to
responses to terrorism.
On Definitions
Two of the most interesting defini-
tions to emerge on terrorism are the
following:
1. “Terrorists are people who think
their ideas are more important
than other peoples’ lives”; and
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basis of a commonly perceived griev-
ance or wrong.
Whilst acknowledging that terror-
ism does not exist in a vacuum, the
simplistic notion that poverty leads
to terrorism must be rejected. Under
no circumstances can a Mohamed
Ata, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers
or Osama bin Laden, leader of the
Al-Qaeda network be regarded as
poor. At best, poverty can be a facili-
tating condition, not a necessary one.
In similar vein, the pro-Israeli policies
pursued by the US as well as its sup-
port to autocratic Arab regimes was
similarly jettisoned. In the final
instance, there can be no justification
for the taking of innocent life!
But, the origins of this current
wave of terrorism are also intimately
related to opportunity. Indeed, Al-
Qaeda owes its emergence to the
decision by the US government to
organize a Great Jihad against Soviet
forces in Afghanistan in 1979. The
CIA actively recruited radical Mus-
lims from Algeria, Sudan, Saudi Ara-
bia, Egypt and further afield to fight
the holy cause as mujahedeen. Saudi
Arabian money and support from
Pakistani intelligence services also
came to support US objectives in
Afghanistan. Washington actively
supported the development of a mili-
tant Islam and provided advanced
military training to such mujahedeen
as Osama bin Laden. By 1988, the
USSR withdrew but the terror camps
remained until 2001. By that time,
70,000 terror graduates from fifty
countries emerged from its camps
and formed the basis of today’s Al-
Qaeda network. 
This is clearly a lesson of where
long-term stability and security is
sacrificed by short-term strategic con-
siderations. Neither were Washing-
ton’s policy-makers alone in this
folly. The Indonesian government
also encouraged Islamic radicalism as
a bulwark against communism and in
Algeria militant Islam was mobilized
in the national independence struggle
against the French. Having given
birth to Frankenstein monsters, both
countries now find they cannot con-
trol these forces as the 100,000 dead
Algerians will testify to in the vicious
battle between Algiers and Islamic
militants.
Opportunity, however, does not
only arise from the changing geo-
strategic nature of world politics but
also from new weapons and commu-
nication technology. The fact that
terrorists have in their possession
iridium satellite phones eases com-
munication as does the growing
interconnectedness of the world
economy where millions of dollars
can be transferred by the press of a
button.
The growing relationship between
terrorist networks and organized
crime syndicates is also cause for
concern.
The Scope and Magnitude of
Terrorism Today
Terrorism today takes the form of
global networks functioning at local,
national, regional and international
levels. Responses therefore have to
occur at all these levels if one wants
to effectively deal with this scourge.
It is quite interesting that the con-
tinent which is most plagued by ter-
rorism—Latin America—does not
feature on the `war on terrorism’.
Pugwash must seek to give the
terrorism plaguing Latin America
greater visibility in the media and
amongst policy-makers.
Terrorists are opportunistic and
seek to achieve their objectives by
any and all means available. In this
respect, the five million illegal
firearms circulating among the MER-
COSUR states of South America is a
cause for concern as is the highly
enriched uranium stockpiles in the
former Soviet Union, which is
enough to produce 20,000 nuclear
devices. If such HEU falls into the
hands of terrorists via say organized
crime syndicates, it would be
relatively easy to gather the rest of
the components and build a crude
non-transportable nuclear device in
the city to be destroyed. Possibilities
also exist of chemical weapon tech-
nology passing into the hands of ter-
rorists since most reasonably devel-
oped states possess crude chemical
weapon technology. The sarin gas
attack in a Tokyo subway by the
apocalyptic sect, Aum Shinrikyo, is a
case in point.
One should also not under-esti-
mate the power of biological
weapons. Ten milligrams (or one fifti-
eth the weight of a paper clip) of bot-
ulinal toxin could in principle kill
25,000 people.
The possibility that terrorist could
target a nuclear power plant for
attack is also not beyond the bounds
of possibility. As such the probabili-
ties for terrorist attacks to occur
should form an integral part of stud-
ies that investigate the potential
future of nuclear energy production.
In particular, its vulnerability to ter-
rorist attack should be part of pro-
grams intended to design innovative
reactor types, in which passive safety
features play an important role, and
options such as the construction of
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nuclear power plants underground
should perhaps be revisited. The con-
struction of rod-or cage-like struc-
tures around nuclear facilities to pro-
tect against in-flying airplanes as well
as the installation of short-range air-
defence systems should also be con-
sidered.
Responding to Terrorism
Earlier mention was made of how
words contribute to mind-sets that
shape policies. This point needs repe-
tition in our attempt to understand
responses to terrorism. Why a `war’
on terror? This suggests the primacy
of the military approach to dealing
with terrorists. This military-led
approach has also seen military inva-
sions of Afghanistan and Iraq where
the chief protagonists, Mullah Omar
and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan
and Saddam Hussein and sons in
Iraq, have disappeared. This military-
led approach has also seen large
numbers of Taliban and Baathists
leaving their positions in the face of
the US military juggernaut and fading
into the local population. This mili-
tary approach has also seen
organized attacks by these elements
against government authorities and
US soldiers in these countries. In
Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai is
referred to as the “Mayor of Kabul”
on the basis that his writ does not
extend beyond the capital. Others
believe even this is charitable given
the assassination of members of his
own cabinet and attempts on his life
within the city limits of Afghanistan!
Moreover, the resumption of heroin
production in Afghanistan and their
export to Western Europe and the US
should also be viewed as a source of
concern. In Iraq, the killing on aver-
age of one American soldier a day
since the fall of the tyrannical regime
of Saddam Hussein also shows up the
limitations of a military-led campaign
on terrorism. Indeed, the invasion
and occupation of foreign territory in
dealing with the threat posed by a
global terror network is itself a ques-
tionable military strategy. As the
most recent attacks in Riyadh and
Casablanca demonstrate Al-Qaeda
retains its military capabilities and
global reach.
Is there an alternative? We believe
that there is. Stressing a ‘crimes
against humanity’ approach is a pos-
sible alternative. This would stress
strengthening influential legal instru-
ments like the International Criminal
Court as well as the structures of the
UN system. Such an approach would
not mean the abandonment of the
military approach but rather that the
military exists to enforce legal deci-
sions.
But should we stress this legal
approach then we need to take stock
of certain shortcomings in the legal
anti-terror regime. For instance, both
the Chemical Weapons Convention
and Biological Weapons Convention
is designed to counter atrocities com-
mitted by states and does not really
make provision for terrorism com-
mitted by non-state actors. This
would need to be rectified. Given the
multidimensional nature of the ter-
rorist threat posed, strengthening the
legal anti-terror regime means not
only strengthening it at international
level but also at regional level such as
the Organization of American States
(OAS), the Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the African
Union (AU).
Responses would also need to
reduce the opportunities available to
terrorists. In the light of this, the
amount of fissile materials from
weapons and other sources that are
held in poorly guarded sites all over
the former Soviet Union and the
related possibility of theft remains a
grave threat to world security. Under
these circumstances, should we con-
sider a revitalized Nunn-Luger initia-
tive to buy these materials?
Responding to terrorism however
is not only the preserve of
governments and inter-governmental
bodies; civil society also has a duty to
play a key role. Here the important
work of organizations like the
Bioweapons Prevention Project
which aims to strengthen the norms
against using disease as a weapon
needs to be supported.
Over the past three decades we
have been experiencing a revolution
in biotechnology that are having
great impacts on domains as diverse
as medicine and food security. How-
ever, the techniques used to improve
health or to protect people from the
worst consequences of biological
warfare can also be applied to create
a new generation of biological
weapons. Because of the dual-use
aspect of biotechnologies, the prohi-
bition of any type of biological
research is not feasible. Instead, the
close monitoring of developments in
technology can serve as an early
warning of activities that could prove
dangerous. Also it is imperative to
educate students on relevant weapon
control regimes in carrying out
research. 
The desire to prevent sensitive
information from getting into the
wrong hands is understandable and
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wise. However there are some who
wish to take this further with mea-
sures, which may encroach on civil
liberties. In January 2003 in the US,
for instance, a group of journal edi-
tors and authors discussed strategies
to enhance security. One of these
strategies read as follows: “We recog-
nize that on occasions an editor may
conclude that the potential harm of
publication outweighs the potential
societal benefits. Under such circum-
stances, the paper should be modi-
fied, or not published”. Meanwhile,
the editorial comment of Physics and
Society of January 2003 states, “…
since good science, often underlines
national advantages conducive to
security, it is occasionally vital to live
with effective secrecy in order to
enhance security”.
In this charged atmosphere there
is also talk of boycott of scientific
colleagues and research laboratories
being closed to foreign students.
Under these circumstances, we must
ask who determines which publica-
tion may be published or not or
which parts to excise before publica-
tion? Who determines which scien-
tific colleagues do we interact with
and what is the criteria on which
these judgments are to be made? This
is something that needs the direct
intervention of the scientific commu-
nity such as that contained in
Pugwash.
Summary of discussions
Forgotten or suppressed issues. The
topic of the discussions in working
group 5 was New Technologies for
Human Development and Security.
In the first session it was suggested
that the topic of the working group
be changed to Risks and Threats of
New Technologies: Identifying Cru-
cial Forgotten and Suppressed Issues.
The argument behind this suggestion
was that the working group title left
out a crucial issue: that technologies
can be a source of new problems. 
Downside impact of nanotech-
nology. The commissioned paper on
nanotechnology recommended that
Pugwash consider endorsing the call
of other groups and organisations for
a moratorium on certain types of
research into molecular and atomic
engineering, specifically research into
self-replicating and self-assembling
“nanomachines,” to allow for ade-
quate reflection and debate. The call
for such a moratorium was
motivated by a range of concerns
about the possible social, health and
environmental impacts of such tech-
nology, most importantly, in terms of
Pugwash tradition, the potential
emergence of a new category of
weapons of mass destruction. 
The paper gave rise to a vigorous
discussion. Some participants con-
tested the description of the present
and potential nature of these
technologies. The adequateness of the
proposed moratorium was
questioned. 
The grassroots scientist. Three pre-
sented papers discussed the links
between science, technology and
grassroots issues. A clear distinction
between science and technology was
emphasised. Science differs from
technology with regard to the norms
guiding its practitioners. Also the dri-
ving forces behind science and tech-
nology are different. Science is
curiosity driven. Special—commer-
cial or military—interests are usually
the impulse to technological produc-
tion. It was believed that grassroots
problems currently seem forgotten by
mainstream science and technology.
The idea of the grassroots scientist
emerged. This concept refers to a per-
son who uses the scientific approach
to grassroots issues. It was mentioned
that scientists should be better
trained in analysing complex systems
and thinking in new ways.
GMOs and food security. A paper
presented on the effects of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) on food
security of developing countries
stated that more attention should be
paid to international attempts to reg-
ulate and mitigate the risks of GMO-
technologies following the example
of the Cartagena protocol on
Report on Working Group 5
New Technology for Human Development 
and Security
Co-convenors: Marie Muller (South Africa) and 
Suzuki Tatsujiro (Japan)
Rapporteur: Tom Børsen Hansen (Denmark)
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biosafety and the International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGRFA). It was argued that the
role of profit oriented research and
development on techno-scientific
‘progress’ and its ability to address
human security issues be addressed.
AIDS as a security issue. A presented
paper advanced the argument that
the already known characteristics of
the present (southern African) and
impending waves of HIV/AIDS pan-
demic indicated novel and grave
threats to global security. Noting the
unsatisfactory record to date, it
explained how this situation had
come about and suggested that there
was a precise and urgent task of defi-
nition and analysis that was prerequi-
site to more successful policy to com-
bat the pandemic. Security
consequences for the “next waves”
of HIV/AIDS countries were
outlined, and concrete scenarios
regarding Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia,
India and China given. Most immedi-
ately, Nigeria and Ethiopia will be
the hardest hit with the social and
economic impact, as they have the
highest 2010 estimates of adult
prevalence rates: 18–26 % for
Nigeria and 19–27 % for Ethiopia.
Both countries are key to regional
stability, have important geo-strategic
implications (west African oil, for
example) and the rise of HIV/AIDS
will strain their governments, as that
of Zimbabwe already is being
strained. 
Health and sustainable development.
A paper dealing with the complexity
of nutrition in health, disease and
sustainable development was put for-
ward. It dealt largely with two of the
top-10 world health risks, malnutri-
tion and obesity, and aimed at pro-
viding some insight into and under-
standing of these pathologies. The
paper concluded that health is not an
isolated problem, but one of environ-
mental, societal and global concern;
humans need healthy environments
in which to live in order to be healthy
themselves. Robbing communities
and nations of their greatest wealth
— the health of their people—drains
the human and institutional capaci-
ties that fuel sustainable
development.
Myths of ICTs. Two papers on infor-
mation and communication
technologies (ICTs) were presented
and discussed. Myths related to ICTs
were pointed out, e.g. that the use of
mobile phones per se offer the poor
in developing countries crucial infor-
mation that will help them or that
information transmitted through the
internet (e-newspapers etc.) helps us
make more rational choices.
Concerns were raised about the
‘scientific positivism’ currently sur-
rounding ICTs inside and outside sci-
entific communities. It was generally
agreed that ICT does have impacts,
of course, but that their depth as well
as their nature was still not well
analysed, and gave no grounds for
complacent assumptions such as the
presented paper challenged. In dis-
cussion, some argued that the man-
ner in which the two-edged sword of
ICT might cut depended less upon
the technology, more upon the con-
text in which these technologies are
used. It was suggested that this is a
common feature of all technologies. 
Of positive effect of ICT, it was
put forward that ICTs might poten-
tially facilitate the rise and / or
growth of social movements and
hence promotion of their aims (e.g.
public awareness of the nuclear
threat). The life-saving roles of mod-
ern telecommunications, for example
in surgery, were described. On the
downside of ICTs the group was
alerted by the potential risks that
accidental disclosure or surveillance
pose to human security and privacy,
in particular as a consequence of the
war against terrorism. This was in
turn countered by noting the reassur-
ance which comes from a capacity to
track individuals in circumstances of
criminality. 
Recommendations to Pugwash
An important theme underlying the
paper-discussions was recommenda-
tions for future Pugwash activities
related to new technologies. Many
potential areas of concern for Pug-
wash emanate from the application
of new technologies. Even though
many of these issues have
implications for human development
and security, Pugwash cannot take on
all of them. The group considered
criteria that could be used to select
the issues for Pugwash to take up. It
concluded that Pugwash must be able
to add value to or ‘tip the balance’ on
such issues. Meeting the security cri-
terion is axiomatic in selecting issues
for action by Pugwash. Some specific
guidelines were identified:
• If science or technology creates a
circumstance that poses potential
threats to global / human security
then we, as scientists, have a
responsibility to do something
about it. 
• If a complex problem is emerging,
or a simple problem has to be
looked at in a complex context, and
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engagement with it is not possible
without thinking in a new way. 
• If new technologies are required to
deal with a problem.
• If issues are systematically forgotten
or suppressed. 
The issue of what constitutes the
target group of Pugwash endeavours
was raised. There was general agree-
ment on the principle: “horses for
courses;” a principle historically well
rehearsed. Pugwash’s audience is, for
some causes, decision-makers; for
other causes the general public is the
target group. 
Based on a careful consideration
of the various issues raised in the
papers presented, followed by the
application of the guidelines
mentioned above, the group made
three recommendations: 
• A Pugwash focussed study group
entitled “Threats without enemies:
security implications of 21st cen-
tury health problems” should be
established. Pugwash will set up an
expert forum where the visibility
and potential impacts of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic upon global
security will be analysed by experts
from different disciplines, who will
then formulate policy support
advice for decision-makers. The
model in mind is that of the
successful series of focussed meet-
ings on intervention and
sovereignty.
This recommendation fulfils cri-
teria b), c) and d). Health issues are
very complex, and connected to
environmental, societal and global
concerns. The fact that no one else
is doing something similar supports
setting up the proposed Pugwash
focussed study group.
• A working group at the next year’s
Pugwash conference in South Korea
on the topic “Early warning and
preventive action on emerging tech-
nologies” should be established.
Topics within such a working
group could be: the character of the
early warning institutions, and the
scientific analysis of examples of
potential threats from emerging
technologies—downside
consequences of nanotechnology,
biomedical technology etc., and
security and privacy issues related
to ICTs (Echelon etc.). The analysis
should include contextual aspects
(commercial, religious, and ideolog-
ical etc.) surrounding emerging
technologies, as well as account for
the epistemological and historical
meta-assumptions on which they
are built. 
There was agreement in the
group that this recommendation
fulfils criteria a), b), and d). 
• Put on the Pugwash agenda a con-
sideration of “a new relation
between science and grassroots.” 
This recommendation fulfils cri-
teria b), c), and d). Understanding
of and solutions to grassroots prob-
lems were considered forgotten
issues within mainstream science
and technology. Discussions of this
topic need to be initiated. 
Report on Working Group 6
Mitigation of Global Environmental Change
Co-Conveners: Omar Masera (Canada) and Kit Hill (UK)
Rapporteur: David Sandomierski (Canada)
The theme of this conference is
“Advancing Human Security: The
Role of Technology and Politics.”
The second part of this title
recognizes that we need integrated
approaches to ensure our survival.
Scientific and social inventiveness
together will help us address our
complex problems. Similarly,
“Human Security” is a fertile
concept. We must chose to define
“security” broadly. Our security—
our safety—is inextricably tied up in
the health of the Earth. It is time to
expand our intellectual horizons to
include the urgent and real threat of
environmental degradation.
Under continuation of recent
trends, we can expect, by 2100, a
tripling of pre-industrial levels of
atmospheric carbon dioxide, with a
quadrupling almost unavaoidable
thereafter. That world would be a
“scorched earth:” unbearably high
surface air temperatures, severe
drought conditions, dramatic change
in ocean levels, and irretrievable loss
of biodiversity. 
Global Climate Change is primar-
ily a human-induced phenomenon. In
the past fifty years, climate models
which combine natural processes
with human intervention correlate
extremely well with temperature
records. 
Levels of consumption, the car-
bon intensity of energy sources and
processes such as deforestation and
land degradation all determine
atmospheric CO2 levels. Reforesta-
tion can reduce CO2 and has local
benefits but cannot be relied upon
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alone to abate global climate change.
Stabilization of global population
will help. For example, in countries
where universal free education has
been extended, especially to women,
fertility rates are lower. One possible
solution is to reduce population
growth rates through education. 
However, it is the high energy
consumption on behalf of the devel-
oped world which is most urgent.
Carbon-based fuels contain hidden
subsidies that artificially lower their
cost, placing a barrier to renewable
energy sources. Wind and solar
energy are too intermittent to provide
adequate base loads of electricity. For
many countries, the main alternative
to coal, whose carbon emissions are
extremely high, remains nuclear
power. In that sense, countries may
need to consider keeping the nuclear
option open providing issues such as
nuclear proliferation, vulnerability to
terrorist attacks and the safe disposal
of nuclear waste are solved. The
widespread move to renewable
energy sources, while desirable,
requires a thorough economical and
technological assessment.
Despite these difficulties, it is
urgently important that mitigation
strategies are not sacrificed in favour
of adaptation strategies. Whereas the
cost of mitigation will be borne
largely by rich countries, poor coun-
tries bear the brunt of adaptation
measures. Further, climate change
information risks becoming
commoditized and sold to the highest
bidder, giving preferential access to
those least in need. Early knowledge
about climatic events, for example,
can enable rich farmers to exhaust
the supply of drought-resistant seeds.
Focus upon adaptation, which is
dependent upon access to scientific
data, can drive a wedge deeper
between rich and poor. 
Many areas of the world are
already facing dwindling water
resources. Given the high prevalence
of transboundary water systems,
nations must cooperate through
water sharing and joint management
in order to avert water-based
conflicts. Concurrently, nations must
balance their needs for capital invest-
ment with an affirmation that water
is a universal human right. Govern-
ments must distinguish between dif-
ferent uses of water so that water for
basic survival purposes is not com-
moditized.
On the one hand, large scale pro-
jects such as dams and industrial irri-
gation can provide sophisticated
technological solutions to water
problems. On the other hand, water
management at the individual level—
such as collecting rainwater and
using backyard filtration systems—
can vastly increase water yields. The
imposition of inappropriate water
technologies can undermine social
cohesion. Managers of local water
resources should weigh the high legit-
imacy of small-scale, individual
efforts against the technological
advantage of large-scale projects.
Traditional knowledge has much
to offer science. For example, oral
accounts by the indigenous inhabi-
tants of Canada’s Arctic region can
provide researchers with information
about climate change for which there
is no numerical data. An appreciation
of complexity and ambiguity chal-
lenges the administrative mind which
tends to artificially compartmentalize
problems into narrow parts. Techno-
logical fixes are no panacea but must
rather be seen as part of a bigger pic-
ture.
A “sustainability” paradigm
should inform responses to the global
environmental threat. A shift towards
this paradigm must be achieved
through the “ultimate” drivers of
society: our values and needs, our
knowledge and understanding, our
power structures and our culture.
The participation of a number of dif-
ferent actors, termed “Governance,”
can accomplish this goal better than
the more limited conception of gov-
ernment. Support for governance ini-
tiatives can be bolstered by research
into, and education about, the ulti-
mate drivers of society. 
Is sustainability an appropriate
conception for Pugwash to adopt?
We are familiar with the Russell-Ein-
stein manifesto of 1955. As one par-
ticipant in our group suggests, how-
ever, it may be appropriate to
reformulate the manifesto to address
the pressing needs of today:
We are speaking as an integral
part of planet Earth, whose
continued provision of a hos-
pitable environment for
humanity is in doubt…
remember sustainable use and
forget the rest… If you can-
not, there lies before you the
risk of universal death.
The words of TS Eliot give us
sober pause to reflect upon the
changing nature of our world: “This
is the way the world ends/ Not with a
bang but with a whimper.” Human
security today is threatened by
nuclear proliferation. But we have
more to fear than the big bang. The
whimpers contained in the warnings
of environmental exhaustion threaten
our security just as much. Pugwash
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can, and should, assist in bolstering
support for sustainable development
world wide.
This can be achieved without
undermining Pugwash’s esteemed
position in the intellectual and politi-
cal communities. Pugwash can lend
support to organizations at the local,
national and international levels by
commissioning scientific studies
whose findings would be accessible
to specialists and generalists alike.
This working group urges individuals
in Pugwash to contribute to the fol-
lowing initiatives:
1. Develop a workable interna-
tional strategy to implement the thor-
ough findings of IPCC. The Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change
has extensive evidence and
recommendations about global cli-
mate change. Due to their close rela-
tionship with national governments,
however, they have not been given
the mandate to devise a concrete
strategy. Pugwash members have the
expertise to translate their findings
into action, and the independence to
advocate this new strategy to
national governments.
2. Prepare readable and accessible
studies on specific environmental
threats in local areas. Grassroots
organizations can use this data to
support their advocacy activities.
3. Study how businesses can oper-
ate within a sustainability paradigm.
If business have access to solid sug-
gestions on how to decrease their
ecological impact in ways that can
increase their economic efficiency,
they will be likely to implement them.
Given the increasing role of multina-
tional corporations, this recommen-
dation is particularly relevant. Pug-
wash can advocate the “quadruple
bottom line” that urges business to
consider not only economic but also
social, environmental and security
factors.
4. Related to this, Pugwashites
can contribute to the ongoing
research and reflection on alternative
economic development, whereby
indices such as GDP are replaced by
more holistic measures.
5. Examine the negotiation
processes of international
agreements. This is necessary not
only to increase accessibility to these
processes but also to indicate in
which ways diverse perspectives can
be incorporated.
6. Finally, Pugwashites can advo-
cate for a “Blue Revolution” that
calls for water conservation, wise
management and equitable distribu-
tion of our most necessary resource.
The horrific images of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki capture our imagina-
tion. The mind throbs when it tries to
understand how quickly so many
lives can just vanish. The repulsion
that such cruelty comes at the hands
of humans, and the faith that we are
wise and compassionate enough to
avert it, if only we could get our pri-
orities straight, has inspired
Pugwashites for decades. But a
torched earth and a scorched earth
have the same moribund result. If we
are to remember our humanity, we
must remember our capacity for
change. In the face of the very real
threat of global warming and
resource exhaustion, Pugwashites can
use their expertise to help society to
deal with the complex and intercon-
nected nature of our troubles. We are
free to imagine the world we want,
and in this world, human security
depends on environmental sustain-
ability. It is time to define our goals
and responsibilities more broadly.
N E T H E R L A N D S  P U G W A S H
Sharing the Planet: 
Population—Consumption—Species
Science and Ethics for a Sustainable
and Equitable World
Edited by Bob van der Zwaan and Arthur Petersen
The internationally renowned scholars contributing
to this volume aim to fill an often-existing gap: they
assess various specific biodiversity-related features in
detail, while attempting not to lose track of the sus-
tainability problem at large. Moreover, their purpose
is to formulate realistic strategies that can
contribute to bringing about changes in the interna-
tional policy arena necessary for reaching a sustain-
able and equitable world. The book is intended for
scientists, policy-makers, and interested and con-
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dynamics, our evolving sense of pur-
pose, ongoing and new projects, rec-
ommendations for the Pugwash
movement from the ISYP perspective,
and a few questions to guide future
dialogue between and within our
organizations.
As students and young
professionals we are grateful for the
opportunity to share our thoughts
with the Pugwash Conferences on
Science and World Affairs. It is our
hope that this report can contribute
to enriching the ideas and actions of
the Pugwash Community. 
Furthermore, we would like to
thank the note-takers for the contri-
bution, in particular Moira Ann
Goodfellow and Pablo Suarez.
Irna van der Molen
Joelien Pretorius
Report on ISYP Working
Groups A (1,2 and 4)
Facilitator: Hugo Estrella
Rapporteur: Joelien Pretorius
Group A included three sub-groups,
namely a sub-group on nuclear
weapons (1), weaponization of space
and missile defense (2) and on terror-
ism (4). Because of the overlap of the
themes and practical considerations,
these were all discussed in one work-
ing group.
Nuclear weapons
The working group considered three
themes with respect to this topic:
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
We currently face a crisis in the non-
proliferation regime: both horizon-
tally (India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons tests, Israel’s covert nuclear
weapons programme, North Korea’s
withdrawal from the NPT, Iran’s ura-
nium enrichment programme) and
vertically (the US plans to develop
low yield nuclear weapons that can
be used in conventional warfare—
mini-nukes). This highlights certain
flaws in the NPT, namely:
• Nuclear weapons states have
preached to non-nuclear weapons
states, but have not kept their end
of the bargain, which is ultimately
to give up their nuclear weapons.
This may be perceived as unjust for
non-nuclear weapons states and if
threatened these states may decide
to withdraw from the NPT as
North Korea did;
• An incoherent and insufficient
response to the withdrawal of
North Korea as well as to countries
outside of the NPT (Israel, India,
Pakistan). The lift of sanctions on
India and Pakistan and the military
aid that these countries receive may
send a message that acquisition of
Introduction
The present document reportsthe discussion of over 30 stu-dents and young professionals
from 17 countries who participated in
the ISYP working groups preceding
the 53rd Pugwash Conference entitled
‘Advancing Human Security: the Role
of Technology and Politics’. Each par-
ticipant presented a paper along one
of the following topics suggested by
the senior Pugwash Conference orga-
nizers:
1. Nuclear Weapons
2. Weaponization of Space and Mis-
sile Defense
3. International Cooperation and
Human Security
4. Terrorism
5. New Technology for Human
Development and Security
6. Mitigation of Global Environmen-
tal Change: Beyond Johannesburg.
Two ISYP Working Groups were
formed: ‘A’ (comprising themes 1,2
and 4) and ‘B’(comprising themes 3,
5, and 6). The first two sections offer
the rapporteurs’ report of working
groups ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively. Sec-
tion ‘C’ offers an outline of the pre-
sentation made by ISYP to the Pug-
wash Council on July 17, 2003,
including recent changes in working
T H E  5 3 R D  P U G W A S H  C O N F E R E N C E
Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and Politics
Halifax and Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada, 14–22 July 2003
REPORTS OF THE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDENT/YOUNG PUGWASH (ISYP)
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nuclear weapons has little
diplomatic cost;
• Non-nuclear weapons states could
acquire a nuclear fuel-cycle under
NPT for peaceful purposes, but
then decide to withdraw and to
pursue a weapons programme;
• Proliferation to non-state actors
(e.g. terrorists) is not included in
the NPT framework.
At the 2000 Review Conference
the NPT was extended indefinitely.
Although, at the time, this was con-
sidered to be positive, it may be that
these flaws are so ingrained in the
structure of the Treaty that it would
have been better to negotiate a new
treaty altogether. In the absence of
this possibility, several suggestions
came up to strengthen the NPT such
as the support of a fissile material
cut-off treaty and additional proto-
cols or even a treaty like the
proposed Nuclear Weapons Conven-
tion (providing for a total ban on
nuclear weapons and infrastructure
supporting them) to transcend the
NPT.
Regional hot spots: South Asia
The perceptions in India and
Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons
can be categorized as:
• Nuclear optimism: also referred to
as nuclear hawks, people who hold
this view actively support the
nuclear weapons programmes and
are present in military and govern-
ment think tanks;
• Nuclear pessimism: also referred to
as nuclear doves or abolitionists,
people with this view are against
nuclear weapons and are present in
academia and some NGOs; and 
• Nuclear pragmatism: people who
have this view take the realist posi-
tion that the nuclear genie is out of
the bottle, and it is best to manage
the problem through robust com-
mand and control systems and con-
fidence building measures between
India and Pakistan.
The question was raised whether
Pugwash can entertain the pragmatic
position. It seems that some hawks
turn into pragmatists when they
retire from government
establishments and then it is often
too late to affect a real change in gov-
ernments’ programmes.
Nuclear Weapons Awareness
In Britain, after the end of the Cold
War, the number of people who
regard nuclear weapons as an impor-
tant issue decreased significantly. It is
likely that there is a similar trend in
other countries. The lack of aware-
ness extends to:
• The horrific consequence of the use
of nuclear weapons in terms of
human and environmental destruc-
tion;
• The financial cost of nuclear
weapons;
• Arguments that nuclear weapons
may not increase the actual security
of states;
• The legal obligations of nuclear
weapons states to de-nuclearize.
Awareness-raising programmes
should start by identifying the
counter-arguments to the reasons
that governments give for having
nuclear weapons and these are:
• Threat perception and deterrence:
the decision to acquire nuclear
weapons are often rooted in histori-
cal animosity between countries or
a strategic domino effect, where
one country acquires nuclear
weapons in response to another
country’s weapons programme. It
is, however, questionable whether
nuclear weapons improve the secu-
rity of one country vis-à-vis other
countries, or could prevent conven-
tional warfare through deterrence.
• Sign of national prestige: it is fair to
say that some governments may see
their nuclear weapons as essential
to be major powers in the world
and use this to gain public support.
In the case of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons, they may be portrayed as
the ‘Islamic bomb(s)’. This view is
perpetuated by countries such as
France and Britain hanging on to
their nuclear weapons in the
absence of a real threat to their
security.
• A weapon of the poor. Convention-
ally weak states might acquire
nuclear weapons as a cheaper
option than spending a lot of
money on conventional weapons to
reach comparable levels of military
might. However, India and Pakistan
still spend money on conventional
forces and their nuclear weapons
have not been successful in dimin-
ishing the intensity of their conflict. 
With regard to nuclear weapons
awareness initiatives, the working
group was briefed on two projects:
• An interactive on-line quiz designed
by Oxford University Student Pug-
wash where questions are asked
and information is given about the
amount of nuclear weapons that
exist, the cost of nuclear weapons
and so forth, and where the issue is
placed in the broader context
(www.oxford.ac.uk; search for
Student Pugwash).
• An exhibition of photographs from
the Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum by physicians for global
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survival by a student group in Hali-
fax, which shows the aftermath of
the use of nuclear bombs.
Other suggestions were:
• Nuclear hawks in the political and
military realm should be identified
and the public should be made
aware of their positions;
• Awareness programmes should also
be initiated in non-nuclear weapons
states to inform their citizens about
the perils of nuclear weapons as a
measure to prevent proliferation to
their countries.
Missile defense and the
weaponization of space
Missile defense
• The Bush Administration has set a
date for deployment in 2004/5 for
a ballistic missile defense system,
which will not only consist of
homeland defense against inter-
continental missiles, but also
include US ‘friends and allies’; 
• This will have implications for the
strategic stability in North-East
Asia. Countries such as China and
North Korea might increase the
range and amount of missiles in
their arsenals to maintain strategic
deterrence. Thus missile defense
could lead to horizontal
proliferation in the region.
• An alternative to missile defense in
the region may be initiatives to
obtain regional missile stability, for
example, placing regionally agreed
limitations on missiles that would
break the security dilemma in the
region.
Weaponization of space
• The issue of space weapons links
up with missile defense in that
interceptors may be put in space
and shot from and through space.
Although the 2004/5 deployment
plan does not include space
weapons, there are plans for
developing a test bed in space;
• The US’ withdrawal from the
Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)
in order to pursue missile defense,
left a legal loophole to test
weapons that could be put in space
(the Outer Space Treaty only
prohibits weapons of mass
destruction in outer space and all
other weapons on celestial bodies).
• It should be noted that space is
already militarised and that the US
is increasingly reliant on space for
military operations. It is thus often
argued that weapons in space are
strategically justified for three
reasons: to protect military assets
and superiority, to deny it to other
countries, and to fight from space.
• On close inspection: if cost-benefit
analyses are performed, it shows
that military advantage is only
short-term
• Any security advantage would be
degraded once other states also
deploy state weapons (In other
words, the US might be worse off
than they were before initial
deployment).
Terrorism
• Terrorism is often sketched as a
characteristic of the Post-Cold War
context, but it should be
recognized that it existed long
before then. However, after the
September 11 attacks, there is a
fear that terrorists may acquire
WMD and missiles to deliver them
(an argument to support the
development of missile defense).
• In the aftermath of September 11th,
anti-terrorist legislation in Canada
was rapidly adopted without
sufficient consultation.
• The implications of this for civil
liberties are now being realized and
this has been cause for public
debate.
• One of the lessons learned from
the process is to explore the
insertion of a ‘sunset clause’ in
rushed legislation to ensure a
review mechanism and, more in
general, to promote civil society
interest in parliamentary /
congressional processes when
important legislation is passed.
• The idea that the International
Criminal Court should prosecute
terrorists as opposed to national
governments was also discussed.
This might establish an
international norm of condemning
terrorism and promote
international law at the same time.
• All of this should be seen in the
context of human security.
International economic injustice,
international financial institutions
and foreign policy behaviour of
strong states in developing
countries perpetuate poverty,
inequality and a break-down of
structures. These circumstances
can be a breeding ground for
terrorism as well as dictatorships.
• There is a need to make
international institutions (e.g. the
IMF) accountable for human
security and pressurize
governments to take responsibility
for their foreign policy behaviour.
Recommendations for S/Y Pugwash
• From our deliberations, the follow-
ing recommendations are made to
S/Y Pugwash:
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• New strategies should be explored
regarding the NPT or new treaties
that could come afterwards. Aware-
ness-raising is a key priority as well
as being informed about changes in
military strategies such as the inclu-
sion of ‘small’ nuclear weapons in
the US military strategy.
• ISYP should be involved in the
Conference on Disarmament and
feed ideas into the discourse.
• ISYP should liaison with other
NGOs, especially International
Network of Engineers and Scien-
tists for Human responsibility.
• At future ISYP meetings conflict-
simulations could be organized as
well as symposia on peaceful con-
flict resolution.
• ISYP could invite Israeli and Pales-
tinian Student Pugwash members
together to discuss scientific or
technological issues, such as those
related to water management. This
should take place in a ‘neutral’ set-
ting removed from the region
(Europe?).
• Increase awareness about Pugwash
among the general public
• Make ISYP’s application to be one
of the UN affiliated bodies one of
the major priorities coming out of
this conference
• ISYP already has a project on the
weaponization of space, but it
should also raise awareness within
the scientific, business, and political
community in the US and among
allies of the US that might
contribute to weaponization of
space through cooperation on mis-
sile defense systems. Further atten-
tion should be paid to the impact of
space weaponization on developing
nations.
• ISYP should advocate further ratifi-
cation of the Outer Space Treaty as
a foundation for the efforts to keep
space free from weapons.
• ISYP should advocate a ‘No First
Use’ / Moratorium Pledge on
deploying weapons in space to rele-
vant nations, especially the US.
• ISYP should support the efforts for
an international agreement banning
space weapons modelled after the
Ottawa-process
• ISYP members should write editori-
als in major media outlets on the
space weapons issue based on
sound scientific arguments to
increase awareness.
• ISYP can also create a space
weapons quiz for popular education.
Report on ISYP Working
Group B
Facilitator: Tom Børsen Hansen
Rapporteur: Irna van der Molen
An initial overview of the papers pre-
sented in Working Group B led us to
identify many common features that
transcended the divisions proposed
by the conference organizers.
Inspired by Senator Roche’s encour-
agement at the ISYP symposium to
come forward with our own unique
approach, we decided to emphasize
those issues which might be underex-
posed in discussions at the senior
meeting, and to form the sub-groups
along three cross-cutting issues that,
in our opinion, provided a better
platform to guide our discussions:
• Grassroots aspects of human secu-
rity and new technologies (facilita-
tor: Tom Børsen Hansen, note-
taker: Moira Ann Goodfellow)
• International cooperation and
human security (facilitator: Joanne
Macrae, note-taker: Irna van der
Molen)
• Environmental Issues and develop-
ment (facilitator: Magdalena Kropi-
wnicka, note-taker: Pablo Suarez).
ISYP sub-group on grass-roots
aspects of human security and new
technologies
In the sub-group discussions, seven
papers were presented on topics
related to grassroots aspects of
human security and new technolo-
gies. The papers fell in two
categories: 1) grassroots science and
technology and 2) post-conflict
reconstruction. Both categories cov-
ered conceptual discussion and prac-
tical / action-oriented recommenda-
tions.
The idea of grassroots science
refers to the production of
knowledge relevant to or linked with
grassroots institutions and social
movements. Grassroots science rests
upon particular assumptions, norms
and criteria which are partly different
from conventional science and tech-
nological (industrial and military)
research. Grassroots scientific activity
ought to be guided by inter-discipli-
narity, a social responsible approach
and new ways of thinking.
Grassroots institutions can bene-
fit from the use of technology. It was
argued that the internet can
contribute to the growth of social
movements. Limiting factors, such as
access to the internet in developing
countries, were addressed. The over-
all conclusion was that the internet
can be helpful in making social move-
ments grow.
An example of grassroots science
was presented. In the Tamil Nadu,
Chengulpet district, India, an attempt
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will be made to obtain food security
through the establishment of so-
called agricultural information ‘clin-
ics’. Biotechnological and ecological
knowledge, as well as practical skills,
will be shared with local unemployed
people, enabling them to initiate
effective agricultural production. 
Post-conflict resolution: there is
typically an abundance of small arms
in civilian hands in post-conflict envi-
ronments. These pose a serious
impediment to post-conflict recon-
struction efforts and development.
They form part of an intricate cycle
of insecurity, violence, and poverty.
Combating this problem requires
promoting cultures of peace, commu-
nity development initiatives, and vol-
untary weapons collection programs
at the grassroots level. 
Peace education should be
actively pursued in peacekeeping
within a civil-military cooperative
framework. Peace education projects
should be targeted at different target
groups, e.g. for different age groups.
All of these groups must be
approached in a manner correspond-
ing to the characteristics of their
group. Peace education programs
should address the concept of nega-
tive peace (absence of violence) and
contribute to sustainable peace.
Peace education and peace culture
are reflected in a nation’s peace his-
tory. Cultures which have a history of
peacefulness are better equipped and
more likely to adopt a culture of
peace, following a conflict or other
type of violent episode, than other
types of culture. Creating cultures of
peace is closely linked to peace edu-
cation. But how is this accomplished?
The Russell-Einstein Manifesto is
a good document and should be used
to actively address current science
and world affairs issues within a
framework of economic democracy.
This would ensure the inclusion of all
decision-making processes related to
new technologies.
ISYP sub-group on international
cooperation and human security
We acknowledge that geographic and
cultural differentiation is required
when talking about a concept as
complex as human security. There is
a human security index but this index
needs further contextualisation. State
security and human security cannot
be seen in isolation, but at the same
time, it would be naïve to assume
that all states consider human secu-
rity as a main priority. A state can
even be a threat to human security if
particular groups are prevented from
having access to relevant resources.
Additionally, one should distin-
guish between state security and state
capacity for the provision of gover-
nance. Human security depends to a
great extent on economic, political
and social conditions in countries.
We have to recognize that some local
and regional conflicts cannot simply
be solved by military intervention. It
is not only useful but also necessary
to invest in non-military activities to
increase human security.
One of the issues not always
included in the debate on human
security is how conflicts are affected
by the protection or strengthening of
religious, ethnic and national identity.
We need to understand the complex-
ity of structural conditions, temporal
factors and triggering events which
can result in political conflict. 
It seems that we have accepted a
hierarchy of values in the human
security debate, in which some
aspects, like individual liberty, are
considered more important than
other values, such as collective
responsibilities. This hierarchy is
often reflected in the foreign policy
agenda of many countries. The ques-
tion is: how useful is the definition of
human security if it doesn’t match
people’s perception? This is where
dialogue comes in, as well as
accountability and transparency,
which are also elements of the so-
called ‘good governance’ debate.
Since this debate has its own political
history and agenda, there should be a
serious effort to open dialogue about
different perceptions of human secu-
rity, accountability and democracy, as
these are often historically
determined. Not acknowledging this
ignores the reality and is likely to
result in ineffective policies. 
Some governments have a politi-
cal and economic agenda which is de
facto counter-productive to human
security. In these cases, one should
look for complementary strategies
which are tailored to the conditions
in each and every country and which
allow for cooperation with civil soci-
ety. At the same time, we should rec-
ognize that certain mechanisms
within international organisations do
not promote human security. Tradi-
tional principles such as the
sovereignty of states can obstruct the
implementation of human security
programmes. International organisa-
tions require therefore feedback from
the local level to make international
cooperation more appropriate and
more effective. Summarizing, the
basis for ensuring human security lies
in ensuring good governance which is
in accordance with the reality of
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human (in) security as this is
perceived by people at local level.
ISYP sub-group on environment and
development
This sub-group acknowledged that
our understanding of problems, our
way of defining problems and the
way we try to measure success is
often too narrow. Additionally, the
way in which decision-making
processes are structured can, and
often does, result in the exclusion of
those perspectives which try to
address complexity and interconnect-
edness. Simultaneously, it can result
in the marginalization of the interests
of weaker actors, such as women,
ethnic groups, minorities, aboriginal
communities and other vulnerable
groups in society.
Another concern is the strong
reflection of neoclassical economics
in policy-formulation. The partici-
pants agreed that the perspective of
neoclassical economics is misleading,
and that it has too much influence in
policy formulation.
There was agreement on the need
to address key issues in future
research, including:
• Incorporation of the perspectives
and concerns of marginalized
groups of society in problem defini-
tion, scientific research and policy
implementation;
• Exploration of creative ways to
translate the complexity of social
and natural systems in institutional
frameworks;
• Investigation of the way in which
economic forces are shaping
science. Strengthen the funding of
non-for-profit research that aims at
understanding and solving the main
problems that humanity faces.
In terms of concrete steps for the
Pugwash movement, the following
guidelines for future action were sug-
gested:
• Address the integrated nature of
development and environment in
the next years’ Pugwash working
groups
• The ‘Ethics and Science’ initiative
should try to have an impact on
private scientific research and tech-
nological development;
• Organize an event (or a series of
events) addressing the changing
nature of scientific endeavours in
the context of global economic
change. We should pay attention to
the influence of economic tenden-
cies in policies on science and tech-
nology and try to counteract the
growing impact of commercial
interests on the long-range future of
research agendas;
• Compile and highlight ‘inspiring’
research initiatives that connect sci-
ence with social responsibility in
order to attract young scientists to
ethical aspects of science;
• While discussions and working
groups are absolutely enriching, we
believe that the Pugwash Confer-
ences could allocate more energy to
action-oriented initiatives;
• Allow for more creative formats for
Pugwash working groups. This may
facilitate the identification of con-
crete action items for participants.
• If senior Pugwash is interested in
expanding participation from
young professionals in their deliber-
ations, ISYP would be delighted to
sit down with the Seniors in order
to explore mechanisms to achieve
this.
• We as ISYP would like to learn
from Senior Pugwash in what ways
they believe we can contribute to
their initiatives and discussions.
Outline of ideas presented




• Changes in ISYP working
dynamics:
– Renewed atmosphere of enthusi-
asm and cooperation
– Development of concrete ideas
moving forward
– Acknowledged need to document
plans, accomplishments and com-
mitments
• Changes in ISYP conference: paper
submissions, symposium, new focus
on brainstorming and project devel-
opment
Our evolving sense of purpose:
• Spread the Pugwash way of think-
ing among students and young pro-
fessionals, across diverse disciplines
and regions
• Facilitate the recruitment of poten-
tial new Pugwash members
• Provide the Pugwash conferences
with a solid, thought-out young
perspective
• Identify emerging set of concerns in
the realm of science and world
affairs
• ‘Warm-up’ young participants to
enrich their individual involvement
in the Pugwash working groups
• develop activities and projects tai-
lored to the interests of Pugwash-
minded young people
- Mechanisms of international
cooperation which negatively
affect human security
- Economic forces which are
shaping science
Brainstorming: exploring future
collaboration between Pugwash and
ISYP
• Questions? Comments?
• How can ISYP contribute to Pug-
wash efforts?
• How can Pugwash assist ISYP ini-
tiatives?
• How can the Pugwash-ISYP dia-
logue be strengthened?
• What are the main challenges about
the long-term future of Pugwash?




– Hold subsequent Pugwash confer-
ences in developing countries;
organize more events in develop-
ing countries
– Support Ottawa-type process to
lead to Ban on Space Weapons
– Pugwash/ISYP Collaboration on
Nuclear Awareness
– Round Table in Washington D.C.
to educate politicians on space
weapons
– Organize events and initiatives to
address the following issues:
- Grassroots science and the role
of marginalized groups in sci-
ence;
- Local perspectives of human
security and the inclusion of
local voices / perspectives in sci-
ence, policy formulation and
implementation;
Continuing projects and new
initiatives
• Organization of Student/Young
Pugwash (Pre-) Conferences
• Activities within National Groups
• ISYP symposium
• Educational Project
• Information and communication
technology
• Publications / Outreach
• Nuclear Awareness
– Korea 2004 ISYP Symposium
– Sweden 2004 workshop
– Nagasaki 2005 event
– Activities within National Groups
• Support for Emerging and New
National Groups
• UN Reform and Affiliation
• Space Weaponization
Summary of ISYP recommendations
to the Pugwash Council
• Recommendations to enhance fur-
ther cooperation between ISYP and
senior Pugwash
– Organize a meeting in which ISYP
and senior Pugwash members
together discuss the expansion of
the Pugwash movement, mecha-
nisms to address the generational
gap within the movement, and
looks towards the future;
– Discussion between ISYP and
senior Pugwash members on
strategies to strengthen existing
groups and to establish new S/Y
Pugwash groups in countries such
as Iran, Iraq, South and North
Korea, Palestine and Israel
– Create more opportunities in
which senior Pugwash members
have discussions with YP-mem-
bers at national level.
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Written by Nobel-prizewinner and
former nuclear physicist Joseph
Rotblat, and peace advocate and
scholar Robert Hinde, War No More
provides unrivalled expert insight
into the nature of modern warfare
— including ‘weapons of mass
destruction’. If war is ever to be
eliminated, the pair argue that the
United Nations — as well as non-
governmental organizations,
religious groups, and grassroots
movements — all have an
important part to play! 
Pluto Press
August 2003 / 240pp
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Opening Remarks 
by J. Patrick Boyer, Q.C. 
at Thinkers’ Lodge Sunday July 20, 2003
In July of 1955, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto wasproclaimed. In July of 1957, the first world meeting ofscientists convened in Pugwash.
In July 2003, the 53rd World Conference and
Pugwashites return ‘home’ to Canada, to Nova Scotia, to
the Village of Pugwash. . .and to Cyrus Eaton’s Thinkers’
Lodge! 
For pioneers of the Pugwash Movement, like Joseph
Rotblat and Ruth Adams, this is truly a homecoming.
Others of you have also
been here before. 
Yet for many, today
is the very first direct
connection with the
place which gave its
name to a great cause, a
building which has been
pictured like an icon
around the globe, a
locale that has become
known to you as both a
place and a concept.
This rather humble
setting is where bridges
were built, reaching across a perilous chasm of suspicion
and confrontation, of military prowess and ideological
contention. Thinkers’ Lodge may be tiny, and the Village
of Pugwash small, but in the 1950s the idea that brought
22 participants from 10 countries and both sides of the
Iron Curtain to this place was giant: the need to “think in
a new way”. 
The World Pugwash Movement was born here as the
message in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto began to crys-
tallize. Thinkers’ Lodge shows it is neither how big a per-
son or a place is, nor how modest its scale or humble its
origins. It is always the commitment and the thinking of
the people involved that make the difference. 
This place, and what transpired here and grew
outward around the globe, is a central part of humanity’s
story. After more than half a century of peril, the people of
the world have still been spared devastation by thermonu-
clear weapons. The Pugwash Movement was no
bystander, but an active contributor, to that result.
We now have the unique experience of hearing again
here the same voices of Joseph Rotblat and Ruth Adams
as they recount, on this day when we come “back to Pug-
wash”, a perspective which only they possess because they
were in this place at the
creation of the Pugwash
Movement. 
Both Joseph Rotblat
and Ruth Adams, par-
ticipants in that inau-
gural Pugwash confer-
ence in July 1957, have
lived lives of commit-
ment to the highest
ideals of the Manifesto.
The Manifesto called
upon scientists to assem-
ble “in conference to
appraise the perils that
have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of
mass destruction”. Such a conference to discuss a resolu-
tion of that crisis would involve renunciation of war as a
social institution, learning to think in a new way, and find-
ing “continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wis-
dom.”
As we now approach the highlight for this day of
remembrance in a lifetime of commitment—the messages
of Jo Rotblat and Ruth Adams—I also express on behalf
PUGWASH RETURNS TO THINKERS’ LODGE
20 July 2003
“This is where bridges were built...”
Patrick Boyer welcomes participants to Thinkers’ Lodge.
charter enacted in 1929 by the Nova Scotia legislature,
was to improve conditions in Pugwash and beyond.
Thanks to big thinking here in the Lodge, ‘beyond’ in time
came to include the whole world.
It was not the whole world perhaps, but certainly those
who cared for it, who first came here in 1957. From that
day unto this, our cause has been propelled an inspiring
leader, a winner of the 1995 Nobel Peace prize, the Presi-
dent Emeritus of the World Pugwash Movement, an hon-
ourary member of our Pugwash Park Commission, an
original signatory to the landmark Manifesto of 1955
which still inspires our greatest deeds today. . .Sir Joseph
Rotblat. 
Reunion in Pugwash, 2003
Joseph Rotblat
It was almost exactly 46 years ago, in July 1957, when Icame for the first time to this unique place on theNorthumberland Straits, a visit that was to have an
enormous influence on me, in the second half of my life.
We came here then because the world situation was
entering a dangerous phase, with a looming nuclear holo-
caust; and extraordinary efforts were required to prevent a
catastrophe. Now, two generations later, these perils are
facing us again. There is again a need for scientists to take
steps to avert the danger.
Is there a chance that we will succeed? In my opinion,
and based on past history, the answer is yes, there is a
chance. The main fact is that we are still here; that we
managed to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, even though
we came perilously close to it on several occasions. Many
factors have contributed to this outcome, but I am sure
that the Movement of Scientists that was started here in
1957, played a role in it. We were told this by a reliable
source, the Committee in Oslo that awarded us the Nobel
Prize in 1995. So it is in a mood of anticipation rather
than dejection that I want to recall some of the events
relating to the First Conference, held here, in Pugwash, in
July 1957.
Before talking about the Conference, I have to recall
the background to that event, the political climate that
prevailed in the world at that time. It is quite possible that
without the invitation by Cyrus 
Eaton to come to Nova Scotia, there would have been
no international movement of scientists.
of Thinkers’ Lodge and our Pugwash Park Commission
our gratitude for this opportunity to share this place and
its legacy with all who come here. Visitors to Thinkers’
Lodge discover what transpired here. They grasp how
individuals of courage and people of vision confront the
discouraging work we must still do in a world afflicted yet
by a military-industrial-scientific juggernaut and by those
imprisoned in its old ways of thinking. 
When Cyrus Eaton and Joseph Rotblat, Ruth Adams,
and the cluster of leading scientists first meet here at
Thinkers’ Lodge 46 years ago this month, their mission
might easily have been abandoned in the face of such
daunting odds, had they not been galvanized by the deep-
est commitment to building new bridges, thinking in new
ways, fashioning a new reality from nothing but a dream.
My fellow Commission members and I express our
profound hope that you will find that spark of higher
inspiration that still lives in this place. One of our mem-
bers, Dr. Giovanni Benciaglia, himself a nuclear physicist
and a relative of Cyrus Eaton, was here for the second
Pugwash conference in 1959 and has remained an active
Pugwashite ever since. 
Around that same time, Raymond Szabo, another of
our Commission members, joined Cyrus Eaton as an exec-
utive assistant. Ray worked closely with Mr. Eaton until
his death in 1979, and today in the United States he chairs
the Cyrus Eaton Foundation, a benefactor of the Pugwash
Movement, and is also vice-chairman of our Commission
here in Canada. 
A third member is Bryan Jamieson, a Nova Scotia
banker and member of a notable local family that through
three generations has been closely linked with the Eaton
family. Mary Jamieson, of Pugwash, serves as our Secre-
tary and Assistant Treasurer. Kathy Langille, the elected
representative to Cumberland County Council from this
municipality, is also Custodian of Thinkers’ Lodge. 
Margaret Eaton, a poet, schoolteacher and counselor
in the neighbouring province of New Brunswick, is also a
relative of Cyrus Eaton and a student of his life and serves
as Archivist and Librarian of Thinkers’ Lodge.
For my part, I first met Cyrus Eaton here at a family
reunion in 1968, little thinking at the time that I myself
would one day be chair of the very commission he created
back in 1929, or that I would become a Pugwashite at the
invitation of Jo Rotblat to participate in a Workshop on
Education for Global Citizenship here in 1994. 
The Pugwash Park Commission’s mandate, under a
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Actually, the story began two years earlier, with a
Manifesto issued in London, in July, 1955. It was drafted
by the British philosopher Bertrand Russell and was
endorsed by Albert Einstein in one of the last acts of his
life; he signed it just before be died in April 1955. It was
subsequently signed by nine other scientists, nearly all
Nobel Laureates, from all over the world, but it has
become generally known as the Russell-Einstein
Manifesto.
It is a powerful appeal to scientists, to governments,
and the general public to take cognizance of the dangerous
situation that has arisen from the development of
thermonuclear weapons (the hydrogen-bomb), and to
make an effort to prevent a catastrophe.
Let me quote two paragraphs from the Manifesto:
“We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of
this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human
beings, members of the species Man, whose continued
existence is in doubt.”
“Here, then, is the problem which we present to you,
stark and dreadful, and inescapable: Shall we put an end
to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?”
I am now the last survivor of the signatories, and I con-
sider it my duty to keep on reminding people of the mes-
sage in the Manifesto.
The Manifesto ended with a call to scientists to get
together in a Conference to seek ways to avert the danger.
One of the first responses was the famous letter from
Cyrus Eaton, offering to pay all the expenses of the pro-
posed Conference, if it were held in Pugwash, Nova
Scotia.
But it took two years before we actually came here.
You have to recall that we were at that time at the height
of the Cold War, with all its mistrust and fears, and hostile
propaganda. In the United States, the malodorous
McCarthy witch hunt was still in the air. Anybody ready
to sit down with Soviet scientists, and talk about nuclear
weapons and disarmament, was immediately branded as a
fellow traveller, if not an actual member of the Communist
party. For many American scientists, participation in the
Conference might have spelled the end of their
professional career, let alone obtaining travel funds from
their universities. There were no foundations willing to
provide funds for such an enterprise. It was only a fearless
person like Cyrus Eaton, who broke the taboo, and made
the Conference possible.
Cyrus Eaton was a truly unique personality. He must




where a blue heron waits for the tide
and the salt boat slips from the harbour
at dusk.
At dawn mist rises from the tranquil
water,
and at noon,
beneath the blue and white United
Nations’ flag,
on the grassy slope stretching to the
shore-line,
sit multi-lingual scientists
who have heard the rhetoric of war
but understood the poetry of peace.
Sunlight reflects
from myriad miniature silver doves,
and for a split-second, just an eye-blink,
it coalesces around the invisible silver-
white head 
of the industrialist-farmer-philosopher,
still in our midst,
even though forty-six years have come
and gone
since that first July.
The light flickers there, gaining strength,
before beaming the message
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by people with left-wing views. The effect of this on the
group from Britain was peculiar, to say the least. Lord Rus-
sell, unable to come to Pugwash himself for health reasons,
wanted all the three people who helped him in the organi-
zation of the meeting to go to it. But two of these were well
known in England for their left-wing views, Cecil Powell
and Eric Burlop. Eric Burlop was by far the most militant,
and Russell felt that his participation might be harmful.
And so we ended up with the bizarre situation of Eric Bur-
lop actually being in Pugwash, and taking part in the dis-
cussion, but officially only as a member of the secretariat,
and thus not mentioned in the list of participants.
Of course, no such control could be exercised on the
participants from the Soviet Union, and the question has
often been raised whether there was any truth in the alle-
gation that the Soviet Government tried to use the occa-
sion of the Conference for their propaganda?
The answer is that attempts to use us for such a pur-
pose were in fact made, but they were rather clumsy, and
we could see through them easily. To me this became obvi-
ous even before the First Conference began here. 
Travelling to Pugwash was not then as easy as it is
now. All the participants assembled in Montreal. From
there we flew by Mr. Eaton’s private jet—still uncommon
in those days—to Moncton, in New Brunswick. From
there we travelled to Pugwash by car, a long journey
because the roads were then very bad.
In the car in which I travelled there were two other
passengers. One was Academician Alexander Topchiev,
the leader of the Soviet Group, a very senior figure in the
Soviet Union, with great influence both on science and
politics. But he did not
speak any English. This
is where the other pas-
senger came in. Mr
Vladimir Pavlichenko
came to Pugwash as
Topchiev’s translator.
But it did not take me
more than half and
hour of conversation
with him to realize that
he had another role,
besides translating. He
was in fact the KGB
man, with the task to
ensure that the party
line was being followed.
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million at a young age, lost it, and made much more soon
afterwards. But at the same time he was quite eager to go
along with the communist system in the Soviet Union, by
advocating closer relations with the Soviets at a time when
this was seen as an almost treasonable offence in the
United States. It was really extraordinary that, in one and
the same year, he was chosen US Business Man of the Year,
and awarded the Lenin Peace Prize.
And with all this, he was also a scholar. He was a vora-
cious reader, including books on philosophy. In his famous
letter to Bertrand Russell, inviting us to come to Pugwash,
he said: “I have read all of your fascinating books again
and again.”
He had a great respect for scientists. This is why he set
up an educational trust here, in the Eaton Lodge, his sum-
mer residence, for scientists to come for relaxation and to
sharpen their thinking. This is why this house is also called
“The Thinker’s Lodge”. There were some unfriendly com-
ments suggesting that he could afford it because all the
expense was tax-deductible, but I am convinced that he
would have done it in any case. However, the fact that it
was the US Treasury that was ultimately financing an
organization that was under investigation by the US Sen-
ate for anti-American activities, adds much piquancy to
the story.
I should note here that while Mr. Cyrus Eaton was a
gracious host, he did not—at that stage—interfere with the
actual running of the Conference. This was left entirely in
the hands of Lord Russell and a few of his helpers, which
included myself. All the invitations to participants were
issued from my university office in London. 
The primary aim
was to ensure the par-
ticipation of eminent
scientists from both
sides of the Iron Cur-
tain, who were also
interested in and
knowledgeable about,
the issues to be
discussed. Conscious
of the political




from the West should
not be overrepresented
Nestor Acosta Tieles and Eric Ferguson enjoying Scottish bagpiper.
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not from personal contacts. We trusted each other’s scien-
tific integrity, and we built on that trust when discussing
political issues. This was helped by our decision to con-
duct the discussions in the scientific spirit of rational
approach and objective analysis.
This Conference proved that scientists have a common
purpose, which can transcend national frontiers without
violating basic loyalties. 
A very important factor also was the relaxed and con-
genial atmosphere of this place to which our hostess, Anne
Jones, who later became Mrs. Cyrus Eaton, greatly con-
tributed with her charm, and her joie de vivre, undimin-
ished by being confined to a wheelchair. 
I hope that your visit today to this serene location will
enable you to capture some of that atmosphere, and that it
will invigorate you to continue our efforts towards a




Looking back across a lengthy span of 46 years, the1957 gathering of scientists in Pugwash still standsout for the bold and forward-looking message it
carried to the world. We remember most immediately, of
course, the international consensus of scientists it enunci-
ated in the substantive area of controlling nuclear
weapons. But no less important was the breakthrough in
On the first day of the Conference, Alexander Topchiev
made an important statement. He spoke in Russian, and
was immediately followed by Pavlichenko with the English
translation. But he managed to insert into Topshiev’s
speech some Soviet propaganda. However, he did not
reckon with the presence among the American group of
Eugene Rabinowitch, who had been born in what was
then, and is again now, St. Petersburg. So when
Pavlichenko finished, Eugene got up and said, “Mr.
Pavlichenko, this was not an exact translation”: and then
he gave a corrected version of the speech. After this,
Pavlichenko was much more circumspect. From later meet-
ings it became clear that the Soviet contingent included two
types: genuine scientists, many of them of such eminence in
science that they could afford to speak up openly at our
meetings even against official Soviet policies; and a few
aparatchiks, who came to toe the party line.
So, were we, from the West, naïve and prey to Soviet
propaganda? Looking at it now, from the perspective of
time, it seems that it actually worked the other way round.
Over the years, in many discussions in Pugwash meetings,
we managed to persuade our Soviet colleagues that some of
the policies pursued by the Soviet Government were lead-
ing to disaster. There is good reason to believe that our
Russian colleagues, many of whom carried considerable
weight in their country, were instrumental in introducing
the radical changes made by Mikhail Gorbachev. In partic-
ular, we can claim credit for the halting of the nuclear arms
race. Gorbachev told us this himself. No mean achievement
for a Movement that started here in Pugwash!
Actually, when we came here in 1957, we did not
envisage the meeting as the start of a worldwide
movement of scientists. We, the organizers, considered it
initially as a one-off event. This was so because we feared
that the Conference would not be successful. The issues
we were going to discuss were so controversial, that even
in the West there were strong divisions on them. We were
apprehensive that these divisions would become much
more exacerbated when confronted with the ideas from
the other side of the Iron Curtain.
As it turned out, these fears were unwarranted. The
Conference was a great success and we decided to carry on
with the effort by setting up a new organization to which
we gave the title: “The Pugwash Conferences on Science
and World Affairs”.
I ascribe this success to several factors. One was that it
was a meeting of scientists. Most of the participants were
physicists, who knew each other from their publications, if
53rd Pugwash Conference
Ruth Adams and Will Marshall.
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MESSAGE
TO THE 53RD PUGWASH CONFERENCE
ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS
The Honorable Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General, United Nations
Your gatheringtakes place aswe grapple
with a number of
serious issues on the
agenda of international
peace and security. As
we pursue our work in
the service of peace, we
know that our two institutions have much in
common. Both stand for human values that tran-
scend the interests of any one nation state. We
stand together in standing for all.
For almost half a century, Pugwash has made a
unique contribution by exploring ways to chan-
nel the insights and methods of science into the
service of the public good, particularly the cause
of world peace. I applaud the focus of this years
conference on the challenge of advancing human
security, which calls for fresh efforts around the
globe on a number of fronts: eliminating nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
curbing the development, production, and export
of long-range missiles; banning weapons from
space; combating terrorism; addressing threats to
the environment; and promoting social and eco-
nomic development through the prudent use of
science and technology. The number of countries
represented at this gathering is eloquent
testimony of your truly global approach to these
and other issues. I thank every one of you for
your commitment, and wish you a most stimulat-
ing conference.
the relationships and depth of communications it embod-
ied, at that time especially among scientists, across not
only international borders but social systems, political
regimes, and hemispheres. 
Globalization today has taken on other meanings as
well, some of them controversial, but most fundamentally
it refers to the outward spread to all of the world’s peoples
and to every walk of life, of that original outlook that Pug-
wash quite breathtakingly embodied. My own opportu-
nity to participate was a result of having worked with
Eugene Rabinowitch as assistant editor of the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists. Born in St. Petersburg, the tumultuous
political events of his life brought him to Chicago and the
Manhattan Project during World War II. A prolific writer
and sensitive analyst of political issues, he made important
contributions to the Pugwash movement and attended all
of its meetings during his lifetime. Published reports of the
discussions and agreements regularly appeared in the Bul-
letin. I must have been one of the youngest participants at
the original gathering. That first meeting was to shape
most of the following decades of my life. But along with
the many strands of continuity of which I remain deeply
conscious, I am no less conscious of the extraordinary
array of world changes in which we have sometimes reluc-
tantly, sometimes eagerly, participated. We need to think
today as much about the kaleidoscopic changes of context
that Pugwash and its membership have endured, adapted
to, and tried both to shape and to anticipate, as we reflect
on the community we have become and the long list of
achievements for which we can take credit.
As a young woman finding her way in the post-World
War II period, my path of convergence with the concerns
that led to Pugwash focused on human rights that were
then, as now are still, under attack. The stifling of
discourse and diversity represented by the McCarthy hear-
ings was very much with us then. Peacemaking itself was
widely regarded as suspect, under the threatening cloud of
a nuclear holocaust that was still recent enough for many
of the Cold War calculations accompanying it to come as
highly unpleasant surprises. The many scientists and
scholars who had come to the University of Chicago as
refugees had substantially transformed its character, con-
tributing directly to the establishment not only of the Bul-
letin of Atomic Scientists but later the Federation of Amer-
ican Scientists. The Iron Curtain that had descended very
soon after the war had the effect for some time of impris-
oning the values and goals of peoples on both sides. 
Then out of correspondence in 1955 came the Russell-
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Einstein appeal. To those of us in Chicago it was like find-
ing a crack in the Iron Curtain. Especially to me, and to
many of those in my generation in that setting, it gave
meaning and set a principled direction that we could fol-
low with enthusiasm. It is easy to forget now that war had
had the universal effect of concentrating science in govern-
ment laboratories, on goals and priorities set with essen-
tially no regard for scientific imperatives, and under condi-
tions of secrecy that greatly impeded communication even
among immediate colleagues in the same institution. The
‘fifties were a time when that force of obstruction was
beginning to lift, when educational and scientific institu-
tions were reasserting their independence, when the need
for open communication and cooperation on common,
great problems across all boundaries once again became
apparent. We were a part of that, and very much in the
forefront of it.
The physical sciences were still in their government-
imposed ascendancy at the time, but excitement was in
the air of coming revolutions in biology. Science in not-
for-profit and corporate settings was still largely seen as a
different kind of enterprise. But there too, coming change
was visible along a distant horizon. These enormous
changes are all around us now, parts of Pugwash’s inti-
mate environment. I hope we can find ways to embrace
them, and at the same time shape them within a frame-
work of consistent principles and values, just as we origi-
nally took leadership in finding an international basis for
confronting the nuclear peril.
Still taken as a given at our first meeting, as I reflect
upon it, was the sovereignty of the nation-states from
which we all came, and of a general acceptance of the
paramount claims which the regimes in most of those
states felt free to make upon our behavior, basic values,
and loyalty. Those paramount claims are more contested
today than they were then. The UN is no longer in its
infancy, even if the limitations of its powers are more
apparent than what we then hoped. Today there are many
international communities that embody shared values and
loyalties. They do not erase national boundaries, but they
mitigate and circumscribe their more absolutist meanings.
Pugwash is among the very best of these trans-national
communities. I look back with gratitude and pride on the
decades of my association with it.
Some of you here today are members of the third
generation since Pugwash began, and in itself your pres-
ence is dramatic evidence of the success of the Pugwash
conferences. As we reflect on our origins we pay tribute
to all the young scientists who continue to work for peace
and security.
Participants at first Pugwash Conference, July 1957.
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country where the danger and destruction of conflict con-
tinued long after fighting stopped because of the millions
of land mines seeded into the ground, how would you feel
about planting crops in those fields?
If you were an entrepreneur in Sri Lanka, or anywhere
experiencing long years of conflict and uncertain truces,
how would you feel about creating or expanding a busi-
ness to create new jobs, without the assurance of personal
or state security? Even if you wanted to take the risk,
would it be possible if roads and other basic infrastructure
were still destroyed?
Conflict causes devastation: death,
injury, disease, property loss and poverty.
What is equally true but bears repeating, is
that violent conflict stops and reverses sus-
tainable development—that delicate balanc-
ing of social, economic and environmental
elements that are essential to improving the
lives of people today, without compromising
the chances for future generations to do the
same. 
Now, I’m certain this isn’t news to peo-
ple like yourselves, who are committed to
promoting peace, human security, and sus-
tainable development. It is only relatively
recently, however, that the international community has
started to formally articulate these ideas.
In 1997, at a high-level meeting of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, or OECD, develop-
ment ministers endorsed a policy statement entitled,
“Conflict, Peace and Development on the Threshold of the
21st Century.” Canada played a significant role in the
development of these DAC guidelines, and with their 2001
supplement on “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict.”
Briefly, the DAC guidelines offer some principles to
partners engaged in international development for effec-
By Susan Whelan
Minister for International Cooperation
Good afternoon, Senator Roche, Professor Swami-nathan, Professor Cotta-Ramusino, Dr. Boutwelland everyone who worked towards making this
conference possible. It is an honour to be with you here
today. 
History and culture make the times of peace and con-
flict in every country unique. Even so, there
are clearly some constants across all the dif-
ferences. One of them is this: peace and
human security are basic prerequisites for
sustainable development.
Let’s consider for a moment the legacy of
four Balkan wars in the 1990’s. During these
conflicts, 200,000 people were killed and
three million residents were forced to flee
their homes. More than 1,000 UN peace-
keepers were killed or wounded. Material
damage was estimated at 20 to 60 billion
dollars. Buried, but not forgotten, there are
more than 300 suspected mass grave sites,
and more than three million land mines
throughout the region. Real Gross Domestic Product fell
to half of its 1989 levels.
In these horrific numbers that paint a picture of states
in conflict, it’s easy to lose sight of the challenges,
tragedies, and triumphs of the individuals caught within
them.
If you were a parent in Northern Uganda, or some
other region where 15,000 children have been killed or
kidnapped from their schools during the last 16 years to
serve as child soldiers and sex slaves, how would you feel
about sending your child to school?
If you were a farmer in Mozambique, or some other
T H E  5 3 R D  P U G W A S H  C O N F E R E N C E
Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and Politics
Halifax and Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada, 14–22 July 2003
KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
Promoting Human Security: The Experience of Reconstruction
The Honorable Susan Whelan.
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tive action in conflict situations. They recognize both the
opportunities and the limits of third-party or external
influence. Noting that all aid has political consequences,
the guidelines call on aid policy makers to try to ensure
that aid does not exacerbate tension, prolong conflict, or
reinforce or legitimize parties in conflict, all while maxi-
mizing benefits. Other principles call for: transparency;
encouraging and maintaining inclusive dialogue; reinforc-
ing local capacities; recognizing women as stakeholders
and peacemakers; working with war-affected children and
youth; acting in timely and flexible ways and thinking
long-term; and using creative, incentive-driven approaches
for constructive engagement. The benefits of peace must
be seen to be clearly preferable to the perceived benefits of
conflict. Finally, there is a call to “act on the costly lessons
learned about the need for coordinated and coherent
action and policy.” The DAC guidelines are the intellec-
tual context for Canada’s post-conflict reconstruction
assistance.
To be effective, that assistance must be part of coordi-
nated diplomatic, military, trade and aid responses. This is
something we have been doing for a number of years; but
again, it is only recently that the Canadian government
has started to articulate what we are calling the 3D
model—diplomacy, defense and development—that brings
together three different departments within the Govern-
ment of Canada. The activities of all these departments
have an impact on developing countries, and the increas-
ing policy coherence encouraged by this coordination is
essential to strengthening aid effectiveness and promoting
sustainable development.
My department, the Canadian International Develop-
ment Agency, or CIDA, has a mandate to support sustain-
able development in developing countries to reduce
poverty for a more secure, equitable and prosperous
world. It is primarily responsible for Canada’s Official
Development Assistance.
CIDA, the Department of National Defense and the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade are
increasingly working together on peace building and
human security, including conflict prevention. Canada’s
work on land mines, for example, involves the three main
players in diplomacy, defense and development, as well as
Industry Canada. 
The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, which is a joint
undertaking of CIDA and the Department of Foreign
Affairs, is another good example of collaboration. At
CIDA, the Peacebuilding Fund provides resources to
Canadian and international groups for a variety of innova-
tive projects ranging from small arms collection in
Mozambique to voter education in Afghanistan. At the
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Human Security Pro-
gram contributes to policy advocacy focused on counter-
ing threats of violence and conflict. In fact, some of the
funding for this event today came from this program, and
my colleague Minister Graham sends his regrets that he is
unable to attend.
Since the end of the Cold War, the international secu-
rity agenda has changed dramatically. Most humanitarian
crises today are in conflict zones. Places like Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq spring to mind, as do the Congo and
Liberia. Most of these conflicts occur within states rather
than between separate countries. The protracted nature of
these internal conflicts, and their impact on poverty and
human rights, has led agencies like CIDA to renew their
commitment to conflict prevention, while having to grap-
ple with the realities of post-conflict reconciliation and
reconstruction.
Canada’s Human Security Agenda is made up of five
areas: conflict prevention, governance and accountability,
protection of civilians, peace support operations and pub-
lic safety. All of these elements, including the respect for
human rights, are necessary for creating a world in which
people live free from fear.
In peace support operations, CIDA and the
Department of Foreign Affairs work with our Canadian
forces and local communities in countries that have expe-
rienced conflict to promote the transition to sustainable
peace.
CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs also
work with the Office of the Solicitor General, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of Justice
on a number of judicial and police-related activities. 
I want to focus on Canada’s work in the Balkans as an
example of our work in post-conflict peace building.
I began this afternoon with an outline of some of the
consequences of the prolonged conflict in the Balkans.
From the first, Canada was involved diplomatically and
militarily, primarily with peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herze-
govina, but also taking part in the NATO force which
acted in 1999 to halt and prevent further ethnic cleansing
in Kosovo.
Canada was also involved in getting humanitarian
assistance to people in need. Meeting basic human needs is
always a primary concern in reconstruction. Since 1999,
CIDA has supported the distribution of shelter, winter
42 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2003
clothing, medicine, food and water to more than 900,000
returning refugees and displaced persons in the region.
Safety and security is another basic need that is most
obviously lacking during conflict. Canada deployed over
250 police officers to Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia to
fill the security vacuum in the immediate post-conflict
periods. We created a $20-million mine action program.
We supported the rule of law by: deploying forensic teams
to gather evidence for the prosecution of war crimes,
developing a self-sustaining correctional service in
Kosovo, providing training to foster regional cooperation
and build capacity in police services, providing training for
judges to improve skills and promote independence and
impartiality, as well as by advising on parliamentary
reform to increase transparency and effectiveness.
We provided budgetary support to the UN mission in
Kosovo and deployed Canadians with valuable expertise
in human rights and justice to multilateral institutions
working in the Balkans. All of these activities succeeded in
providing a measure of security and stability that allowed
other reconstruction and reforms to proceed.
Canada was active in establishing the International
Crimes Tribunal to deal with those who have committed
atrocities. We also took the lead on the International
Criminal Court to ensure that perpetrators of atrocities
will be held to account by the international community. In
March, senior Canadian diplomat Philippe Kirsch, a lead-
ing figure in the recent establishment of the International
Criminal Court, was elected one of its judges and its first
President. There can be no impunity for war crimes at any
level if there is to be a substantive return to rule of law.
People must be able to see that there can be, and will be,
justice.
In order to help rebuild the quality of life and not just
ensure survival in the Balkans, we are helping to improve
the quality of health, education, energy and communica-
tion services, and we are supporting small- and medium-
sized enterprises by addressing constraints to business
development.
What have we learned from all this activity?
First, material aid is not enough. Weak or failed states
need institutions that work, and that are seen to be work-
ing so that laws are properly debated and universally
applied and obeyed. This kind of capacity-building, as
with all development, is most effective in the context of an
overarching and coherent plan for peace, reconstruction
and sustainable development.
Second, flexible delivery mechanisms are critical to the
ability of aid agencies like CIDA to respond in conflict and
post-conflict situations. For example, a Civilian Deploy-
ment mechanism allows CIDA to deploy a wide range of
Canadian expertise from the public and private sectors to
assist partner countries with peace support and reform
activities.
Third, we have a lot more to learn. Like other donors,
CIDA has struggled in the western Balkans with the bal-
ancing act required to integrate solid analysis and conflict
prevention approaches with the day-to-day challenges of
managing a development program. 
Collaboration and coordination have proven their
worth for Canadian activities in the Balkans. One example
of the 3D model is the Civil-Military Cooperation
program. Canadian Forces on the ground help local peo-
ple make connections with other individuals and organiza-
tions who can help them to accomplish their own develop-
ment goals. I had the opportunity to see for myself this
kind of cooperation in action in Bosnia when I visited that
country in May this year.
The lessons we are learning in reconstruction activities
follow some basic principles:
Local ownership, donor coordination, policy coher-
ence, and the need for good governance.
Last September, I launched a policy statement on
strengthening aid effectiveness which was based on these
same principles. They guide our work in general, and are
clearly being applied to our post-conflict reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan, for example.
Under the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, the
international community and Afghan representatives
established the interim government for Afghanistan and
the action plan for rebuilding the nation. A significant part
of that rebuilding effort involves the re-establishment of
good governance in the country.
Just over half of the assistance CIDA provided to
Afghanistan last year was in support of the government’s
operating budget and various programs related to nation-
building efforts, to promote stability and prevent further
conflict, internally and as well as internationally. This
summer, Canada becomes one of the largest troop-
contributing nations to the International Security Assis-
tance Force. Together, CIDA and National Defense will
build on our experience and success in the Balkans by
putting a Civil-Military Cooperation program into effect.
The rebuilding of Afghanistan has to be owned by
Afghans, but they need international financial support to
do it. The 1998 World Bank study “Assessing Aid: What
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Works and Why?” concluded that aid should be increas-
ingly allocated to poor countries with strong policy envi-
ronments to maximize positive results. However, it also
stated that timely reconstruction assistance can have a crit-
ical development impact. In poor-performing, low-income
countries emerging from a situation of protracted conflict,
significant amounts of well-targeted aid can have the most
beneficial impact on economic growth and poverty reduc-
tion. Without sufficient outside assistance, they risk slip-
ping back into conflict.
All of these lessons learned are also helping to guide
our reconstruction efforts in Iraq, which are only just
beginning. Canada’s focus will be assistance to rebuild
Iraqi institutions. Basic services like health care, water, and
sanitation are obviously a priority; but we will also sup-
port legal reform, judicial reform and critical elements like
police and correction services.
The most important lessons about peace, conflict,
reconstruction and development are not new ideas in the
least, but they may perhaps be the hardest lessons to learn
and put into practice. Nearly half a century ago, in his
acceptance speech of the Nobel Peace Prize, former Cana-
dian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson said:
“Just as we cannot in this day have a stable national
democracy without progress in living standards, without
too great extremes of wealth and poverty, likewise we can-
not have One World at peace without a general social and
economic progress in the same direction.”
With peace a necessary prerequisite for sustainable
development, and with the journey through peace building
and reconstruction as long and arduous as it is, conflict
prevention is all the more desirable. Very simply, it is cen-
tral to poverty reduction and sustainable development.
Development agencies must accept the risk of working on
conflict and conflict prevention, rather than around it. 
In recent years, more than 80 percent of CIDA’s
humanitarian assistance has gone to help victims of con-
flict—human-made disasters—rather than hurricanes,
earthquakes, or drought. We need to turn this power to
destroy towards more positive ends, not just to rebuild
after conflict, but to prevent it from happening in the first
place. The challenges are great, but so is our commitment
to facing them, for peace, for prosperity, for people.
Thank you.
53rd Pugwash Conference
44 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2003
Jayantha Dhanapala
Introduction
My warm thanks tothe Pugwash Con-ferences on Science
and World Affairs for the great
honour of being invited to
deliver the Dorothy Hodgkin
Memorial Lecture. I am not a scientist and must admit to
being among those who have suffered from the schism of
the ‘two cultures’ of the sciences and the humanities which
C.P.Snow famously spoke of in his historic 1959 Rede
Lecture. It is a schism which has still to be bridged in mod-
ern education even though the complexity of contempo-
rary life demands a more holistic and integrated approach
to all issues that face us today and which the ubiquity of
ICT alone cannot achieve.
I have, however, been a longtime admirer of the firm
principles and dedicated endeavours of the Pugwash
Movement which has deservedly earned you all the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1995.The Russell-Einstein Manifesto of
1955—the 50th anniversary of which will be observed in
2005—remains an awesomely prescient and inspiring doc-
ument for the peace and disarmament movement. As a tes-
tament of nuclear disarmament and the abolition of war it
will remain historic. But it is also a virtual Hippocratic
Oath for scientists confronted with the eternal dilemma of
dual use ingenuity. It is a statement of conscience and of
accountability of all scientists as human beings. As
Bertrand Russell wrote in his letter of 5th April, 1955 to
Albert Einstein, “Scientists have, and feel they have, a spe-
cial responsibility, since their work has unintentionally
caused our present dangers.” It is not only to scientists
that the Russell-Einstein Manifesto appeals but to scien-
tists as human beings faced with the extinction of their
species if nuclear weapons are ever used again. This is
where these two wise men were echoing the words of
Immanuel Kant who once wrote “Science is organized
knowledge. Wisdom is organized life”. We have, 48 years
after the Russell-Einstein Manifesto was issued, still to
make the transition from knowledge to wisdom and to
respond to its appeal that “We have to learn to think in a
new way” on questions of weapons of mass
destruction(WMD).
This lecture is in memory of Dr. Dorothy Crowfoot
Hodgkin—chemist, pioneer crystallographer, Nobel Lau-
reate and of course—as President of Pugwash—supporter
of the humanist and humanitarian cause of nuclear disar-
mament. I hope my modest contribution will be seen as an
act of homage to her memory.
The Problems
I have chosen to speak on “The Resurrection of Multilat-
eral Disarmament” before a group of very distinguished
scientists not because I am a naïve optimist or because I
seek some genetic engineering breakthrough to invent a
new clone to bring about transformational change in the
disarmament field. The multilateral system for disarma-
ment and arms limitation is widely regarded today as
moribund. The responsible approach for those of us who
remain committed to disarmament through the rule of
international law is not merely to engage in hand wring-
ing. We must do something to breathe new life into the
system. Disarmament, especially the disarmament of
WMD, is at a critical crossroad. It is true that we tend to
identify periods of time as being critical when we disagree
with contemporary trends. The Russell-Einstein Manifesto
refers to times of peril during the Cold War. It is over a
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decade since the end of the Cold War led to an illusion of
security as the prospect of global nuclear war receded into
the background. The disarmament endeavour did lead to
positive results in the past. Concrete reductions of nuclear
weapons through actual destruction of missiles followed
the INF and START I. Reductions (but not destruction) of
deployed strategic weapons followed more recently after
the Moscow treaty of May 2002 although most of us do
not consider this a disarmament treaty. As a result we do
have fewer nuclear weapons deployed today than at the
height of the Cold War. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in 1996 in a dramatic
breakthrough for the advocates of nuclear disarmament
who had long seen this as a litmus test of the political will
to disarm. These apparent successes are now not only
under siege but they stand a real danger of being over-
turned as nuclear weapons are, quite unabashedly, being
given a new rationale and the dangers of both indefinite
possession and proliferation have acquired a new urgency.
Not only has the threshold for the actual use of nuclear
weapons been lowered dangerously but allegations of
WMD possession are being trivialized as casus belli with-
out verifiable proof. The ideological basis for this existed
in some countries before the events of 11 September 2001
but today counter-terrorism has been widely cited as the
reason for massive increases in military expenditure.
Before we can revive the disarmament process let us
analyze what afflicts it. The problems confronting the
world in so far as WMD are concerned are complex. I
would like to place them in five categories. The first is the
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the
five nuclear weapon states recognized in the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT). With the South Asian nuclear
tests of 1998 we have, de facto, 8 countries with a nuclear
weapon capability (not counting the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea). A dilemma, both political and moral,
lies at the root of the non-recognition of Israel, India and
Pakistan as nuclear weapon states. And yet without their
active co-operation we are unable to make progress on
nuclear disarmament let alone nuclear abolition. In every
one of the cases of proliferation since the NPT was signed
in 1968, a recognized nuclear weapon state has either wit-
tingly (for raisons d’etat) or unwittingly (through careless
custody of nuclear material and /or technology or naïve
transfer of technology arrangements) been the source of
the transfer of this technology. The burden of guilt, what-
ever the circumstances, is clear. What are worse are the
dual standards being adopted towards proliferation with
some proliferation being regarded as benign and others as
being downrightly evil depending on the nature of the rul-
ing regime in the proliferating country. This Manichean
judgment is made in terms of the relationship of the prolif-
erating countries towards particular powers unmindful of
the fact that regimes change and with them the relation-
ships forged with the powers. The proliferation of nuclear
weapons to Israel, India and Pakistan though not formally
recognized is certainly being accepted as inevitable and
irreversible. Realpolitik has played its role in this notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 1172 in respect of
India and Pakistan. Countries who have had the capability
of going nuclear and have not done so have witnessed this
‘managed proliferation’ with concern. Some may even be
encouraged to harbour secret ambitions to go nuclear. The
publicly declared stance of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) to withdraw from the NPT
and announce its nuclear ambitions has raised the fear of
proliferation in North-east Asia beyond DPRK in a sort of
domino effect. We cannot forge a principled multilateral
response to violations of non-proliferation norms if some
members of the international community choose to look
the other way. All this is symptomatic of a weakening of
the non-proliferation norm and some cynicism regarding
the subjective manner with which it has been implemented.
The second category of problems is connected to the
first because of the failure of existing nuclear weapon
states to fulfill their promises to disarm and to achieve the
total elimination of nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear
weapon states continue to enjoy the power, deterrence
effects and influence derived directly from nuclear weapon
possession we cannot realistically expect the non-prolifer-
ation norm to hold indefinitely. This is not to cite the
record of nuclear weapon states as extenuating
circumstances for nuclear proliferation. No WMD prolif-
eration is acceptable. Our moral and indeed our scientific
position would, however, not be complete if we did not at
the same time deplore the continued possession of nuclear
weapons by those who have them. The brazen withdrawal
of DPRK from the NPT and its open admission of a
nuclear weapon programme have left the international
community perplexed as to what credible and effective
action can be taken. The IAEA has asked Iran to sign the
Additional Protocol on safeguards as a demonstration of
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good faith on Iran’s part and as a means of enabling the
IAEA to expand its verification powers. We may well have
more countries following the proliferation route either
overtly or covertly especially since it is a moot point
whether the invasion of Iraq has encouraged or deterred
more countries to acquire WMD. The ‘nth country’ syn-
drome that was widely discussed in apocalyptical terms in
the 1950s and 1960s has returned to haunt us. 
The NPT was expected to be the bulwark to halt the
trend towards proliferation and it has served that purpose
admirably for three decades with the exception of Iraq and
DPRK. Do we need fresh mechanisms now or do we need
to end forever the casteism or apartheid between the
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’? Those who have nuclear
weapons regard it as their ‘ manifest destiny’ while those
who do not, appear to be under a ‘cargo cult’— if I may
borrow a term from the cultural anthropologists who
write of the mesmerizing effect of manufactured goods
being brought into developing countries by plane. Assum-
ing that some supernatural force had endowed these devel-
oped industrialized countries with manufactured goods,
the traditional societies of Melanesia in the 19th century
prayed to the spirits of the dead to bring them cargoes of
modern goods for distribution and restore their golden age
to them. Sadly today the possession of WMD is seen as an
attribute of power and development which can ensure
independence and sovereignty. It is a quest to be ‘mimic
men’ which V.S. Naipaul writes of in one of his early nov-
els or the ‘Brown Sahib’ syndrome familiar to South
Asians like me. The attractions of nuclear weapons in par-
ticular acquire greater urgency for medium to large size
countries in conflict-ridden regional situations that have a
reasonably strong industrial base to sustain a nuclear
weapon development programme. That it conflicts with
solemn treaty undertakings and international conventions
is seen as less important than the overriding national secu-
rity interest. After all the same argument of the supremacy
of national interest is used by nuclear weapon states to
abrogate treaties, to refuse to sign other internationally
agreed conventions to protect global welfare and to actu-
ally attempt the legal invention of ‘unsigning’ treaties with
impunity.
The third set of problems arises from the serious emer-
gence of the danger that WMD may be used by terrorists
or sub-national groups for anarchist, secessionist or other
purposes. This danger predated September 11, 2001. It
was among the reasons why the breakup of the Soviet
Union was viewed with such alarm by those who cared
about the safeguarding of nuclear materials and technol-
ogy in the former Soviet states and the future of the
trained nuclear scientists there. It was the first time in his-
tory that a nuclear weapon state had imploded and we
have not learned any lessons that would make the next
break-up of a nuclear weapon state any easier to manage.
The visionary Nunn-Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduc-
tion programme has contributed greatly towards mitigat-
ing the problem but despite this too many reports of leak-
ages of material continue to be recorded. It proves not
only that the safeguards are still inadequate but also that a
demand continues for such materials with many shadowy
groups in the market. After September 11, 2001 when the
astonishing scale of the terrorist attacks in the USA were
revealed, the relief that WMD were not used was quickly
replaced by a deeper anxiety that such use was not beyond
the reach of the organizational capacity of Al Quaeda and
similarly well-funded and fanatical groups with their
global reach. That anxiety is well founded not only in
respect of nuclear weapons and the more likely danger of
a ‘dirty bomb’ (or a radiological device to disperse
radioactive material through the use of conventional
explosives) but also with biological and chemical weapons
where the detection of clandestine programmes is more
difficult.
A different category of problems exists in the paralysis
of the disarmament machinery and the weakening of the
multilateral system which provided the context for con-
structive and result-oriented multilateral disarmament
diplomacy. Twenty-five years after the First Special Session
of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament
(SSOD I) achieved its remarkable Final Document by con-
sensus we find the machinery it set up for the deliberation
and negotiation of disarmament issues in disarray. The 66
member Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD)
—a direct descendant of the Eighteen Nation Disarm-
ament Commission (ENDC)—has not even been able to
agree on a programme of work because of disagreements
on the priorities of the disarmament agenda. Some states
believe that the CD should resume work on negotiating a
Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) for which a mandate—the
Shannon Mandate—was agreed upon sometime ago. Oth-
ers argue that concurrently with negotiations for a FMT
work should also begin on the prevention of an arms race
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in outer space, on nuclear disarmament and on negative
security assurances on the basis of mandates that could be
non-negotiating if necessary. An earlier compromise for-
mula by the then Brazilian Ambassador Amorim has now
been elaborated as a proposal from five past Presidents of
the CD cutting across group loyalties. This has failed to
find acceptance and clearly the main actors in the
stalemate are the USA and China. A lack-lustre debate is
held perfunctorily when the CD meets but increasingly
member states are losing faith in the process and some
have withdrawn the Ambassadors they had specially
accredited to this important body. Misguided calls for the
abolition of the CD are dangerous. It is easier to destroy
multilateral institutions than to create them. The CD has
been idle for long periods before especially during the
Cold War and I have no doubt that when political will
reappears the CD will resume functioning.
In the cluster of deliberative bodies the First Commit-
tee of the General Assembly is the forum for disarmament
and security issues. It meets annually during the autumn
for approximately 5 weeks to go through an agenda of
items. Some of them are ‘hardy perennials’ which are
debated ritualistically and voted upon. Consensus is
reached on a few resolutions but the resolutions on
nuclear issues are invariably adopted with a division. Vot-
ing patterns have changed over the years with most of the
former Warsaw Pact countries now voting with NATO
while the countries of the Non-aligned  Movement (NAM)
are no longer as tightly-knit as during the Cold War. The
Security Council’s discussion and action on disarmament
issues has been confined to proliferation of WMD as in
the Summit held in January 1992. It has also addressed
country-specific situations as with Iraq. Another special
meeting of the Security Council to discuss WMD prolifera-
tion issues is projected for later this year with a view to
creating a mechanism analogous to the Counter Terrorism
Committee (CTC) set up in the immediate aftermath of
9/11. This, I fear, will only reignite the concerns of the
non-nuclear weapon states that the casteism of the ‘haves’
and ‘have-nots’ is being institutionalized at a time when a
more inclusive approach is needed. The more specialized
disarmament forum—the Disarmament Commission—
failed to meet in its 50th year in 2002 and this year con-
cluded its session without consensus on the two issues it
had on its agenda for four years. In addition the Working
Group set up by a resolution of the General Assembly to
agree on an agenda for a fourth special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly on disarmament (SSOD IV) failed to reach
consensus.
All these diplomatic failures are of course indicative of
a general malaise in the political arena and cannot be
blamed on the machinery itself or its individual compo-
nents. Political will is frequently cited in diplomatic nego-
tiations— the presence or absence of which can make a
vast difference. Clearly the political will of key countries is
more important than others. The generation of political
will depends largely on public opinion in democracies, on
pressures brought to bear on countries and on the policies
pursued by incumbent governments. Ultimately it is the
world view of a small group of very powerful countries
that determines whether multilateral disarmament will
work or not. It could decide to let some aspects of multi-
lateral disarmament work in a sort of ‘a la carte’ multilat-
eralist approach. This indeed appears to be present situa-
tion where on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) we
have a Programme of Action being implemented globally.
On antipersonnel landmines, the Mine Ban Convention
and the Additional Protocol of the CCW Convention are
working on parallel tracks. A change of policy of a super-
power like the USA can accelerate progress dramatically as
happened when the Clinton Administration decided,
against pressures from some vested interests, to begin
negotiations on a CTBT bringing many of its allies to the
table reluctantly. Today with the rejection of the ratifica-
tion of the CTBT by the US Senate and the current Admin-
istration’s policy the prospects for the entry into force of
the CTBT are bleak. 
Finally there is the category of problems arising from
prevailing strategic or defence doctrines. It is the pursuit of
these doctrines that influence decision-making in key
countries and until these doctrines are abandoned or
revised the current crisis in multilateral disarmament is
unlikely to end. In the time of the Cold War the doctrine
of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was well known.
The conventional arms superiority of the former USSR
resulted in that country’s adoption of the nuclear policy of
‘no first use’. This was abandoned after the Cold War
when NATO was perceived to have a conventional arms
superiority. Russian diplomats have told me that they were
instructed to mine the statements of US representatives
during the Cold War to find arguments in favour of this
volte face!! Today only China and India have ‘no first use’
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policies. It had also been expected that with the end of the
Cold War there would be a lower salience of nuclear
weapons in strategic doctrines and military strategies.
However NATO—the only surviving military alliance and
with additional members—remains wedded to the use of
nuclear weapons, admittedly as a weapon of last resort.
The efforts of Germany and Canada to have this reviewed
have failed so far and small wonder that Russia therefore
shows more reliance on nuclear weapons today.
The US, as the largest nuclear weapon state, has
recently issued its Nuclear Posture Review and National
Security Strategy. Both documents represent a fundamen-
tal change in post Cold war trends. Firstly the threshold
for the actual use of weapons is being lowered
dangerously as pre-emptive uses are planned even against
non-nuclear weapon states. The contradiction of this with
the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
in 1996 and the Security Council Resolution 984 of 1995
providing security assurances for non-nuclear weapon
states is obvious. Secondly the new policy—subsequently
ratified by Congressional budgetary approval—is to begin
research and development on ‘mini-nukes’ or low-yield
nuclear weapons for specific purposes such as ‘bunker
busters’ to penetrate hardened and deeply buried targets.
The period of notice required for a resumption of nuclear
testing has also been shortened although the Bush Admin-
istration has repeatedly stated that there is no intention to
resume testing ‘for the moment’. The other nuclear
weapon states are also reportedly modernizing their
nuclear weapons and continue research and development
with a view to developing new generations of weapons.
The new salience being given to nuclear weapons takes
place in a context of resurgent militarism as global mili-
tary expenditure reaches the heights of the Cold War years
with the USA clearly in the lead. The unilateral abrogation
of the ABM Treaty in order to clear the way for the devel-
opment and eventual deployment of ballistic missile
defence systems will also involve huge investments for a
programme that is of doubtful value especially with the
asymmetric warfare strategy of terrorist groups and the
acknowledged vulnerability of the system. The distinction
between offensive and defensive military doctrines is
becoming blurred. Doctrines which involve the pre-emp-
tive use of a weapon of mass destruction institutionalize
violence. The distinction between the civilized world bas-
ing its actions on law and reason and the world of the ter-
rorist using indiscriminate violence on the basis that the
end justifies the means must be maintained at all times.
Possible Solutions
I have laid out a litany of troubles. Now what do we do
about it? The enormity of the challenges I have discussed
in their five categories cannot be overcome with any one
magic solution. Nor can a half hour lecture hope to sug-
gest all the solutions to resurrect multilateral disarmament
the death of which has been triumphantly proclaimed by
the neo-conservatives of Washington D.C. think-tanks. I
do believe however that the time has come for us all to
‘think in a new way’ as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto has
urged us. Innovative ideas do not all come spontaneously.
They require a collective endeavour. We have had the
experience of high level commissions produce new ways of
thinking and new concepts in the post World War II era.
Institutions like the UN have also produced new ideas like
‘human development’ and ‘good governance’ and the
ongoing project on the intellectual history of the UN will
no doubt record this. But institutions have their own
bureaucratic processes and their budgetary problems. We
need a flexible and supple mechanism to seed a global
change that will encompass all the global and regional
organizations including the UN. Just as the Brandt Com-
mission sensitized us all to the North/South divide; the
Brundtland Commission gave us the concept of ‘sustain-
able development’ and the more recent International Com-
mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty—sponsored
by our host country Canada—yielded the concept of ‘the
responsibility to protect’ we could also establish a com-
mission to analyze the problems of multilateral disarma-
ment and prescribe solutions. I have therefore proposed
since April 2002, an International Commission on
Weapons of Mass Destruction to be launched with senior
political figures of influence and outstanding experts to
examine the current state of affairs and recommend mea-
sures to break out of this situation. I am delighted that the
Government of Sweden has on 3 July this year announced
the establishment of such a Commission to be chaired by
Dr. Hans Blix whose luminous integrity, unquestioned
expertise and rich experience equip him well for the task
ahead. We await further details about the Commission to
be made available in the autumn. Some argue that the dis-
armament norms created after World War II are no longer
valid in a changed global situation although they propose
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nothing to replace these norms. A global order is essential
especially in the context of globalization. We cannot
regress to anarchy or a situation where the most powerful
dictate the rules. If we need to refashion or adapt norms or
create fresh norms we must do so as a global community
seeking the co-operation of all.
The Commission that I have advocated must have a
broader mandate than nuclear weapons which was the
Canberra Commission’s mandate. Today chemical and bio-
logical weapons, despite being the subject of Conventions
totally banning their production and use, have different
levels of verification. The new threat of terrorism has
enhanced the danger of the actual use of these weapons
while the lack of universality in the two legal regimes gov-
erning these weapons is also worrisome. Civil defence pro-
grammes are increasingly preoccupied with the likely use of
these weapons. The lethality of nuclear weapons in com-
parison to chemical and biological weapons is well estab-
lished. However, for the purposes of a Commission we do
not need to establish a hierarchy of weapons as long as we
treat all WMD in one category because of their common
threat to humankind, their indiscriminate nature and our
need to ensure the survival of the human race. The collapse
of the seven year process to develop a Protocol to
strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) leaves the BWC without any effective verification
mechanisms. In addition the mandate of the proposed
Commission must include both the disarmament dimen-
sion and the proliferation aspect. To focus on one to the
exclusion of the other would cause a major problem for the
credibility of the Commission. The majority of the interna-
tional community belongs to the NPT, the BWC and the
CWC and would need to be convinced of the political
objectivity of the Commission. The dangers of terrorist
uses of WMD must also feature prominently in the man-
date of the Commission. A carefully composed Commis-
sion with due regard to political and geographical diversity
and gender balance supported if possible by a panel of
experts, could over a period of time develop a set of innov-
ative and far-reaching recommendations that could get us
all out of the present rut. I am personally aware that UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan supports the proposal in
principle and would be ready to have the Commission pre-
sent its report to him in the same way that the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty did.
This could have influential policy implications.
Apart from the establishment of an International Com-
mission the international community has a tool kit avail-
able to it for immediate action. For example, the Board of
Governors of the IAEA can begin, as it has done with Iran,
to demand that all states that plan to have nuclear power
projects for peaceful purposes must sign the Additional
Protocol to widen the agency’s verification potential in
their countries. The Article IV provision in the NPT for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy cannot be read as an
absolute entitlement. It is an incentive and should have
been more generously implemented by developed coun-
tries to fund non-power projects in areas like medicine and
agriculture. For nuclear power projects, given the thin line
separating peaceful and non-peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and the fact that existing arrangements to
safeguard declared facilities have proved inadequate, it is
reasonable for additional measures to be taken as a confi-
dence building measure internationally. Equally more
money can be pledged for non-power uses in the same way
as the G8 pledged $20 billion for Co-operative Threat
Reduction measures last year. Thus the signature of the
Additional Protocol, hitherto a voluntary measure, will be
deemed to be a pre-requisite for the supply of nuclear pro-
jects, fuel and other assistance.
There are other measures open to the international
community in the nuclear area. Strategic nuclear weapons
remain an important area for action by the nuclear
weapon states. Equally important, if not more so, is the
question of sub-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons
which must be addressed urgently. While the entry into
force of the CTBT remains dependent on the political will
of the USA we can legitimately expect India and Pakistan,
who promised to do so in 1998, to sign the CTBT as a first
step and as evidence of responsible behaviour. On a FMT
while the CD remains deadlocked it is important that
informal discussions commence among the 8 nuclear
weapon capable countries so that when negotiations in the
CD do begin they will have a basis to build on. Another
measure that is now being recognized is the need for more
funding for the IAEA and the OPCW to conduct their ver-
ification responsibilities as well as to take special measures
against terrorist uses of WMD. The strengthening of the
Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Mater-
ial, greater circumspection in the transport of nuclear
material and the multilateralisation of the Co-operative
Threat Reduction programme are among other measures
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that can be taken without delay.
In the chemical weapons area, the OPCW under its
energetic new leadership and with strong US support now
must prove that its unique verification powers under the
CWC can in fact be implemented. This would instill confi-
dence in verification procedures and in disarmament
treaties amidst the propaganda about the virtues of ‘paper-
less disarmament’ and the dangers of placing too much
faith in treaties. Countries like the Russian Federation
with genuine financial difficulties in fulfilling their treaty
obligation to destroy chemical weapons will need to be
assisted. In the biological weapons area the agreement
reached at the resumed BWC Review Conference in 2002
augurs well for the prospects of national legislation imple-
menting the BWC and for the eventual criminalization of
the violation of the BWC under domestic laws. Several
other areas will be explored in the three annual meetings
that will take place before the next Review Conference
and this is a healthy sign of a multilateral process at work.
The salvaging of the BWC Review Conference is itself
an illustration of how multilateral disarmament diplomacy
can be kept alive. It is no secret that creative diplomacy by
the European Union helped to forge a compromise which
the US tacitly accepted and the NAM acquiesced in out of
a realization that it was the best result that could be
obtained in the circumstances. We need more of these
bridge-building exercises across political groups if multi-
lateralism in disarmament is to remain robust and produc-
tive. Group solidarity is understandable but in
circumstances where total failure is so self-evidently
destructive of the multilateral process, individual diplo-
mats with stature and credibility as well as individual
countries with broad acceptance must activate themselves
in the search for compromises. The approach that suggests
that nothing can be accomplished until political circum-
stances are more propitious is essentially myopic and ulti-
mately harmful to the cause of disarmament.
A long-term strategy that was identified in the UN Sec-
retary-General’s Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters
was the need for disarmament and non-proliferation edu-
cation to ensure an informed public opinion especially in
the current context of indifference. This led to a General
Assembly mandated expert study of the subject and a
report with a number of many useful recommendations
endorsed by the General Assembly in 2002. These recom-
mendations are in the process of being implemented by the
United Nations but they require the combined
commitment and resources of the entire global community
for the results to be seen.
The Role of the Scientist
It is in this context that the role of the scientist in terms of
the Russell-Einstein Manifesto assumes great importance.
The urgent need for a code of ethics to govern scientists
working in the defence sectors in all countries cannot be
overemphasized. The inherent ambiguities in dual use
technology are of course difficult and complex. Despite
this or precisely because of this, a code of ethics and a sys-
tem of mentoring younger scientists can help to ensure
moral clarity where legal precision may be difficult to
achieve. Research and Development programmes in the
weapon industry have to depend on scientists. As long as
the right to self defence remains guaranteed by Article 51
of the UN Charter and the provisions for the collective
defence of international peace and security can be
exercised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
Charter we will have armies and we will have weapons
which nations will seek to modernize. A weapon-free
world is therefore a Utopian ideal which the scientist can-
not expect any more than others. However all of us can
legitimately expect a lower reliance on weapon based secu-
rity given its obvious limitations in comparison to the
more durable human security that sustainable human
development can achieve through non-military means. We
can demand that lower levels of arms be achieved to
assure security. Thus the pressure from military-industrial
complexes throughout the world for more resources for
weapons development must be resisted by scientists. The
latest Yearbook released by the prestigious Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveals that
global military expenditure is running at $128 per capita
after the acceleration we witnessed globally in 2002 osten-
sibly because of 9/11. While the USA accounts for 43% of
global military expenditure collectively USA, Japan, UK,
France and China total 62% of what the world spends on
arms. The statistics quoted for 2001 reveals interesting
regional variations in military spending with the Middle
East (6.3%), North America (3%) and Central and East-
ern Europe (2.7%) above the global average of 2.3%
while Latin America (1.3%), Africa (2.1%), Asia (1.6%)
and Western Europe ( 1.9%). While political tensions
undoubtedly contribute towards these figures scientists
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engaged in R&D can play a decisive role in rejecting mili-
tary solutions to political disputes. We shall never achieve
the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations
at current levels of military expenditure.
Existing treaties like the NPT, CWC and BWC
together with political commitments solemnly made in the
final documents of conferences make it abundantly clear
that all states are obliged to achieve the total elimination
of WMD. We are thus faced with the threat of burgeoning
conventional weapons and the possible development of
new types of weapons including those based on new physi-
cal principles. Here the need for a code of ethics becomes
vital for application across national boundaries. It will
prohibit scientists from engaging in any activities that con-
travene existing treaties and conventions in the arms limi-
tation and disarmament field. Where new weapons or
refinements of existing weapon technologies are contem-
plated the principles of humanitarian law and the protec-
tion of civilians must be the guideline. National scientific
bodies such as Academies of Sciences and international
scientific organizations must take responsibility for har-
monizing codes of ethics and for their implementation. If a
plaint is filed against a scientist for violating the code of
ethics an inquiry must be instituted and if the verdict is
guilty the withdrawal of professional membership and
recognition must follow. It is only by maintaining the
highest standards that we can ensure that scientists do not
allow their skills to be subverted or exploited. Where sci-
entists, especially those in dictatorships, have been
coerced, whistle-blowing should be encouraged within the
code of ethics as part of our common responsibility to pro-
tect humanity. With the functioning of the International
Criminal Court it would follow automatically that any
scientist found guilty would automatically be struck off
professional rolls and be disqualified from pursuing his or
her scientific career.
Verification technology is an area where a great deal of
good work has already been accomplished. The state of
the art technology installed in Vienna and other parts of
the world by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the
CTBT and IAEA’s technical equipment and expertise in
implementing safeguards agreements are some outstand-
ing examples. More needs to be done in order to remain
several steps ahead of violators of treaties and to detect
clandestine programmes. Satellite imagery has been devel-
oped to a remarkable level of accuracy. Although national
intelligence agencies do not divulge their high resolution
imagery even to the UN, commercially available imagery
has enabled NGOs like the Federation of American Scien-
tists and others to monitor disarmament related develop-
ments and inform the general public of their findings.
Greater availability to the public of high resolution satel-
lite imagery and improvements in the quality and the read-
ing of this imagery will make the detection of clandestine
programmes by both states and terrorist group more
likely. It will also make for a better informed public at a
time when civil liberties are being curtailed and
transparency sacrificed in the campaign against terrorism.
The benefits also include greater confidence in the verifia-
bility of disarmament agreements and greater confidence
that cheats do not get away with their bad faith actions.
Other verification devices and aids could be invented and
popularized as a confidence-building infrastructure to the
web of treaties and conventions that restrain the unbridled
pursuit of weapon development. Radar and early warning
systems are also technological areas by which conflicts can
be prevented. Their potential has to be exploited through
the collective work of scientists. A Canadian proposal for
a peacekeeping satellite—PAXSAT—remains
unimplemented for lack of funds while billions of dollars
are spent on new weapons. Scientists can be at the fore-
front of public campaigns demanding more resources for
peaceful research to ensure a safer and better world. 
Finally there is the task of education in the disarma-
ment and proliferation area to which I have referred ear-
lier. The dangers of the arms buildup and of proliferation
can best be explained to younger generations by the scien-
tific community in terms that are clear and irrefutable. It is
an investment in our future. It is a responsibility they have
to their fellow human beings. In the words of the Russell-
Einstein Manifesto “Remember your humanity”.
Jayantha Dhanapala is a former United Nations Under-
Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and a former
Ambassador of Sri Lanka
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
ment and the elimination of WMDs
are concerned, is far from
reassuring—just as the status of con-
flicts and hostilities, particularly in
regions where nuclear weapons or
other WMDs are present, is also far
from reassuring. Much of our activi-
ties of the last year has been devel-




Let us recall that the 2000 NPT
review conference concluded with the
approval of 13 “immediate” steps for
systematic and progressive efforts to
implement article 6 of the NPT, that
mandates the nuclear weapons states
“to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to ces-
sation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear
disarmament.”
These steps included: entry into
force of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT); the banning of the
production of fissile material; the
unequivocal undertaking by nuclear
weapons states to accomplish the
total elimination of nuclear arsenals;
the preservation and strengthening of
the (now defunct) ABM treaty; the
reduction of non-strategic warheads,
the reduction of the operational sta-
tus of nuclear weapons and increased
transparency; the principle of
irreversibility applied to nuclear dis-
armament; diminishing the role of
nuclear weapons in security policies;
and the achievement and
maintenance of a nuclear weapons-
free world. Most of these steps have
been dismissed since 2000.
These are difficult moments for the
arms control regime:
• It has been shown that treaties such
as the ABM can be disposed of
when no longer needed;
• New treaties present a very weak
idea of disarmament: the Moscow
Treaty projects 1700-2200 strategic
(only) warheads per party by 2012; 
• There is little limitation to nuclear
testing, since we do not have any
foreseeable date for entry into force
of CTBT; 
• We do not have any instrument of
verification for the BWC.
Moreover, there is a newly
proclaimed utility of nuclear
weapons:
• New (smaller) nuclear weapons are
needed (the USA);
• In its National Strategy to combat
WMD, the “US will continue to
make clear that it reserves the right
to respond with overwhelming
force—including resorting to all its
options—to the use of WMD
against the US, its forces abroad,
and its friends and allies”;
Paolo Cotta-Ramusino
Secretary General
Throughout its 46 years ofexistence, the main goal ofPugwash has been the elimi-
nation of all nuclear weapons and,
more generally, of all weapons of
mass destruction which have brought
the risk of annihilation to mankind.
Scientists (including those who
worked on these instruments of
destruction), policy makers, and mili-
tary people, as well as those actively
involved in supporting
disarmament—people of different
nationalities and political opinions—
have been brought together over the
years for the purpose of seeking ways
of controlling and eliminating the
most deadly weapons and promoting
cooperation and peace. After the end
of the Cold War, many of the prob-
lems related to nuclear weapons and
WMD did change, but the weapons
themselves and the relevant risks did
not disappear. In the last period, the
issues related to nuclear weapons and
more generally to WMDs have in fact
been at the core of many political ini-
tiatives, military interventions and
planning, and decisions of various
nature on the international scene, but
unfortunately most of these actions
and decisions were made in
directions that many of us regret. The
overall situation, as far as disarma-
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• The lack of progress in
disarmament affects all nuclear
power states: their arsenals remain
unchanged. And these states con-
tinue to consider their nuclear arse-
nals as an essential instrument of
their military (and not only
military) policy. 
The security concerns of non-nuclear
states have also increased:
• There is no security guarantee for
non-nuclear-weapon states and, in
fact, there is even talk about possi-
ble preventive attacks against
WMD assets before these weapons
are used;
• We witnessed the instrumental use
of the need to fight WMD as a jus-
tification for military intervention
aimed at regime changing; 
• We witnessed the weakening of
international institutions, including
those which should oversee the
implementation of the NPT and the
control of nuclear activities. The
war on Iraq was based on the idea
that international institutions could
not be trusted. 
There is the impression that those
responsible for nuclear proliferation
get away with it:
• Nuclear proliferation did take place
significantly, and the consequences
for the states involved were man-
ageable. India and Pakistan
acquired good-sized nuclear arse-
nals, and pressures against them
(sanctions) did not last long. Israel
of course gets away with its unde-
clared nuclear status due to its so-
called exceptional situation;
• Even a comparison between the
treatment reserved to countries that
may work for nuclear weapons and
to Iraq, shows that being closer to
nuclear capability does not neces-
sarily imply being subject to a
stronger pressure. 
To quote the very candid statement
by CIA Director George Tenet (Feb-
ruary 2003):
We have entered a new world of pro-
liferation…. This is taking place side
by side with the continued weakening
of the International non-proliferation
consensus. Control regimes like the
NPT are being battered by develop-
ments such as North Korea’s with-
drawal from the NPT and its open
repudiation of other agreements. The
example of new nuclear states that
seem able to deter threats from more
powerful states simply by brandish-
ing nuclear weapons, will resonate
deeply among other countries that
want to enter the nuclear weapons
club. Demand creates the market.
The desire for nuclear weapons is on
the upsurge….. ..The domino theory
of the 21st century may well be
nuclear.
The risk of nuclear war
The end of the Cold War certainly
did significantly reduce the risk of
nuclear conflicts. But this risk is far
from being eliminated.
• The nuclear weapons of the two
former antagonist superpowers are
still targeted at each other, and a
significant part of them are still
kept on high-alert status, so that
today we still have the spectre of
nuclear war by mistake or miscal-
culation.
• New nuclear states are in situations
where the risk of conventional con-
flict and nuclear escalation is signif-
icant. The relations between India
and Pakistan (both nuclear-armed)
have several times brought both
countries to the verge of conflict.
There is high tension in North-East
Asia, where a possible new nuclear
actor is present. And the large
Israeli nuclear arsenal is a continu-
ous reminder that any conflict in
the Middle East may very well
become nuclear.
• There is an abundance of fissile
material available worldwide, and
its disposal is progressing slowly
and with limited resources. There is
still a very serious concern that
some fissile material may be
acquired by nuclear-proliferating
countries or seized illegally by sub-
national groups. If one were to
have available a sufficient amount
of fissile material, then building a
rudimentary nuclear weapon for
terrorist use would be a very easy
task.
The war on Iraq
The war on Iraq was motivated in
part by the claimed need to combat
WMD. The activities of the interna-
tional inspectors in the country were
halted by the decision of the US to
intervene militarily no matter what
the result of the inspections. The US
decision was based on what soon
appeared to be false claims of Iraqi
activities to acquire nuclear weapons,
exaggerated claims about its CBW
capabilities, and unproven connec-
tions with the international terrorists
of Al-Quaeda.
Even though the government of
Saddam Hussein will be hardly
missed, the use of the motivation to
combat WMD as a justification for a
military intervention which is in real-
ity otherwise motivated, is objectively
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weakening the international consen-
sus to eradicate such weapons. If the
elimination of WMD is used as a
false excuse for a war, the credibility
of the fight against WMD is put
under strain. 
Moreover, the war on Iraq high-
lighted other important problems.
First, the dramatic situation in Iraq
after the conquest of Baghdad has
demonstrated up to now that there is
a crucial difference between winning
a war militarily and being able to put
in motion all the necessary mecha-
nisms to reconstruct a country, eco-
nomically, politically and socially.
The issue of reconstruction, of secur-
ing necessary international guaran-
tees and contributions, and of imple-
menting the necessary steps to
democratize the country (hardly the
semi-spontaneous phenomenon, with
its domino effect on neighboring
countries, that was promised in some
pre-war fairy tales) will be issues that
remain with us for a while.
Secondly, the war on Iraq exacer-
bated the already tense relations
between the west and the Arab/Mus-
lim world. Many Muslims feel that
they are the target of an international
campaign that depicts them as, de
facto, the main source of
international terrorism. The
sentiment in many Muslim countries
is that Muslims are on the losing/
oppressed side in the international
political arena. Accusations that
Muslim countries harbor the goal of
acquiring WMD is juxtaposed with
the fact that the West and Israel
openly possess such weapons and
have no intention of giving them up.
Thirdly, the war on Iraq has
brought to international public atten-
tion a basic question: is the will of
one nation alone the basis for the
new international order? And what is
the role of existing international insti-
tutions? The controversy between
unilateral vs. multilateral initiatives
from the point of view of the only
existing superpower may be one of a
choice between two courses of
actions that need to be compared on
the basis of actual results. But for
other nations and peoples of the
world, the alternative is between hav-
ing the right to influence world
affairs or being merely passive sub-
jects. Moreover, it is particularly
ironic when unilateral initiatives are
imposed on the rest of the world with
the proclaimed goal of spreading
democracy.
Pugwash activities in the past year
Pugwash has been working for 46
years towards the goal of eliminating
nuclear weapons and other WMD.
For those 46 years Pugwash has been
promoting dialogue between coun-
tries on opposite fronts, even when
dialogue was most difficult. The end
of the Cold War represented a dra-
matic change in that Russia and the
US were no longer facing each other
as adversaries. But other countries
with smaller nuclear arsenals
confront each other and, as always
with nuclear weapons, there is the
risk that there may be a shift from
tensions and hostility to conventional
conflict and to nuclear escalation
(whether planned or inadvertent).
This is the case with India and Pak-
istan, as mentioned before. Pugwash,
which has eminent members from
both India and Pakistan, has been
very active during the last year in
promoting analyses, offering sugges-
tions for the resumption of the dia-
logue (at any level) in the Indian sub-
continent, and questioning various
aspects of nuclear policies and strate-
gies that are of particular concern
since they contribute to making
nuclear confrontation more likely..
There are of course many difficult
unresolved issues which are at the
Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Foreign Minister Bill Graham
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core of the confrontation in the
Indian subcontinent. The issue of
Kashmir is one of the most difficult.
Pugwash promoted in the past year
and will do so in the future a frank
discussion about Kashmir and other
issues and will cooperate with other
forces in the promotion of dialogue
and stability in the subcontinent.
Another critical region is the Mid-
dle East, where nuclear weapons are
also present and the risk of nuclear
proliferation is significant. Having
been involved in the region for a long
time, Pugwash in the past year has
been focused on the idea of promot-
ing a stable dialogue on security
aspects in the whole middle eastern
area. This means not only Israeli and
Palestinians, but the Arab and non-
Arab countries of the Middle East.
The Arab (Saudi) plan for the estab-
lishment of normal relations between
countries of the Middle East was the
subject of a specific workshop in
Amman. The Arab plan is the first
significant recognition by all the
Arab states (with no exceptions) of
the right of Israel to exist in peace
inside the 1967 border, together with
the Palestinian State. It is an impor-
tant element in the future peace
architecture of the Middle East that
has not received enough attention
and recognition. The goal of a
nuclear weapons-free zone in the
Middle East is also very important,
both in general and for Pugwash.
This can be attained only in a general
framework of significantly reduced
confrontation in the Middle East,
and the Arab plan is an important
tool for that goal. 
Iran is a vitally important country
in the Middle East and Pugwash has
been active in promoting dialogue
between Iran and other countries
(including western countries). In ref-
erence to allegations about plans for
developing military nuclear capabili-
ties in Iran, Pugwash welcomes the
prospect that Iran may sign the IAEA
additional protocol and is very much
interested in working to promote this
important development. 
North Korea and Iran are coun-
tries that in different frameworks
have been mentioned as countries
with potential or actual nuclear pro-
grams. Avoiding a further spread of
nuclear weapons is one of our funda-
mental objectives. But we need to
understand the security needs of
those countries that are thinking
about acquiring a nuclear weapon
capability. If we want to prevent
nuclear proliferation, then a climate
of cooperation needs to be
established. Military actions to
enforce counter-proliferation are nei-
ther effective nor just. Pugwash has a
standing program for cooperation
and dialogue in Northeast Asia that
developed slowly in the last year for
various reasons (SARS included). But
we are very much committed to
pushing forward this program in the
coming year. 
We have to acknowledge that the
structure of arms control is in crisis.
Helping to promote the arms control
and disarmament process in all areas
where this is more feasible and where
there is hope of obtaining results is
an important task to which Pugwash
is fully committed. The idea of pre-
venting the weaponization of space is
one such endeavor. It is a goal where
international cooperation can likely
be achieved and which could attract
the attention of the public opinion.
Non-weaponizing space means to
prevent aggressive behavior in space,
and to prevent dangers to the scien-
tific and technological developments
that require the use of space. It means
to limit anti-satellite activities and the
spread of ballistic missile defense. It
means to avoid the spread of activi-
ties that are dangerous from many
points of view, ranging from the risk
of polluting space with increased
debris to the risks associated to desta-
bilizing current useful military
activities. 
Another important activity con-
ducted by Pugwash over the years
has been the continuous monitoring
of arms control activities related to
chemical and biological weapons.
Two workshops are held annually on
these issues which directly affect the
work that is being done by the inter-
national institutions that deal with
chemical and biological weapons, by
providing analyses, proposals and by
promoting dialogue. 
Since 2001, Pugwash has been
also active in seeking to promote
understanding of the various aspects
of the new evolution of terrorism.
This Pugwash interest, I would say
with particular emphasis, also
extends to the consequences of the
present antiterrorist campaign (the
so called “war against terror”). We
want to understand how much the
present anti-terrorist policies affect
human rights worldwide and the
mutual understanding of cultures and
peoples, and also how such policies
in reality affect the evolution of ter-
rorist activities. As an example, it is
obvious that invading a country with
the reported goal of eliminating the
risk of terrorism, and then not effec-
tively carrying on its reconstruction,
is most likely to backfire in term of
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terrorist activities. 
One of the risks to which
Pugwash has been very active in call-
ing the attention of public opinion
has been the risk associated with a
possible terrorist use of WMD in gen-
eral, and of nuclear weapons in par-
ticular. The Pugwash approach has
focused on the fact that, in order to
prevent nuclear terrorism, one imme-
diate goal is to effectively control and
dispose of all the fissile material that
comes from the dismantling of
nuclear weapons and from other mil-
itary and civilian activities. If the
nuclear powers want to help to
reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism,
they do not need to keep their
nuclear arsenals intact, as they are
doing now. Nuclear weapons are
irrelevant to preventing nuclear ter-
rorism. What matters is that no
group (either a sub-national group or
a critical nation) should have access
to uncontrolled fissile material. In
this sense Pugwash has been promot-
ing various initiatives to accelerate
the disposal of the most dangerous of
all fissile materials, Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU). One of these initia-
tives has been supported by the
Swedish Foreign Ministry, which
organized a case study analyzing a
possible European role in the
disposal of excess Russian HEU. 
One of the fundamental goals of
Pugwash has been, since its founda-
tion, the elimination of all nuclear
weapons. In this moment we feel that
Pugwash is one of the few voices that
are still demanding nuclear disarma-
ment and the full implementation of
article 6 of the NPT. It is ineffective
and unjust to demand that smaller
countries give up their nuclear
options when the more powerful
countries refuse to proceed in the
same direction. To this end, Pugwash
organized a workshop on the feasibil-
ity of No First Use, and participants
discussed how declarations of No
First Use can be part of a general
awareness that nuclear weapons are
totally ineffective in addressing con-
crete military and political problems
and in fact serve no other role than in
preventing others to use nuclear
weapons first. This approach to
nuclear weapons, which is in fact a
time-honored approach, is very much
at odds with present trends in which
the idea is to build new types of
(smaller) nuclear weapons for tactical
purposes and to think of resuming
nuclear testing. 
The goal of eliminating nuclear
weapons brings to mind the general
problem of the social responsibility
of scientists and the more general eth-
ical problems which are associated
with many types of scientific activity.
Pugwash began as a group of
(mainly) physicists who were
concerned about their responsibility
in bringing to life the risk of nuclear
annihilation. Today, other risks have
been brought to life by scientists in
many areas, most obviously in biol-
ogy and biotechnology. On these
issues Pugwash has started an initia-
tive for dialogue in Paris which will
continue in the future.
Summary
In conclusion, Pugwash is a small but
very active community, which is
spread over all the continents. We are
truly an international NGO, with a
variety of interests and a variety of
approaches. We are very much aware
that we were born as a community of
natural scientists, concerned about
their social responsibility, but we are
happy that the evolution of the last
46 years has brought more and more
political scientists, diplomats, policy
makers, and military experts into the
Pugwash community. Thus, our
approaches are diverse and concern
many different things, as the list of
topics addressed in the last year (and
before) shows. But we are very con-
scious that the risk of nuclear annihi-
lation, the risk of war, and the need
to prevent war with dialogue and the
promotion of cooperation, are a
common denominator for all the
members of the Pugwash community.
On this common denominator we
built our activities in the last year and
we will continue doing so for the
foreseeable future.
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The Nuclear Issue: Pugwash and the Bush Policies
“You are either with us or against us”. This was initially
applied to the campaign against al-Qaeda, but it puts all
those who do not fully agree with the Bush policies into
the category of villains. There are many, perhaps a major-
ity in the world, who are strongly against terrorists, and
ready to join in actions against them, but are not happy
with the Bush policies. These policies are seen by many
outside the United States as aiming at establishing a US
hegemony in the world, and treating international under-
takings with contempt, to be adhered to only if they suit
the interest of the United States.
What I find so repugnant about these policies is their
blatant hypocrisy. The USA proclaims itself as the cham-
pion of democracy in the world, while actually imposing
its will in a dictatorial manner. It is supposed to uphold
the rules of law, yet violates legal commitments under
international treaties. It castigates members of the United
Nations for exercising their rights under existing rules but
takes military action against a member state without the
authority of the United Nations.
A central criticism of the United Nations made by the
Bush team is that it is ineffective, a useless and enfeebled
organ, incapable of taking decisive action. This sort of
criticism has traditionally been leveled at democracies by
totalitarian regimes. Long discussions and protracted
negotiations are an inherent feature of a democratic sys-
tem, in which the needs and aspirations of many groups or
nations have to be reconciled in a peaceful manner. The
Bush Administration has no truck with such approaches,
even though it professes to champion democracy.
In my view, such policies are unacceptable in a civilized
society because in the long run, they would spell the ruin
of civilization.
The pursuit of these policies was evident in the cam-
paign against Iraq. The stated justification was to disarm
Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, but others see it pri-
Sir Joseph Rotblat
President Emeritus, Pugwash Conferences
This paper is mainly concernedwith the nuclear issue, specifi-cally with the dangers to the
world that may arise from the nuclear
policies of the George W. Bush Admin-
istration. But in order to put these
policies into a proper perspective, I have to start with
observations on the general doctrines and strategies of this
Administration.
I should declare, from the start, that I am strongly criti-
cal of the present US Administration in its conduct of
world affairs. In the highly charged political climate of the
recent months—largely related to the Iraq debacle—any-
one criticizing the Bush Administration has immediately
been branded as anti-American, and placed in the defen-
sive position of having to begin with a statement that one
is not anti-American.
So let me say this clearly: I am not anti-American. On
the contrary, I submit that it is the policies of the current
Administration that should be called anti-American,
because—in my opinion—they do no represent the views
of the majority of the American people. I am convinced
that these policies would not have been pursued if Al Gore
had won the election in 2000. You will remember that—
even with the distraction of Ralph Nader—Al Gore had a
majority in the national vote, and it was only through
some questionable manoevres that he was deprived of the
Presidency. It seems to me very unlikely that, had he been
elected, Al Gore would have alienated so many to such an
extent.
It is important to note that the current polarization of
the world is largely the consequence of the Bush slogan:
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marily as an attempt to increase the US influence in the
Middle East. There is plenty of documentary evidence to
support the thesis that the main reason for bringing down
the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq—and making similar
threats against Syria and Iran—was to change the political
configuration in the Middle East so as to give the United
States political, economic and military control of that
region.
The history of these endeavours, is now general knowl-
edge, but I want to recall some salient points.
Even during the Cold War years, various right wing
groups in the United States—who have become known as
neo-conservatives—advocated strong aggressive foreign
policies. These groups had considerable sway during the
Reagan Presidency, but is was after the end of the Cold
War—and the outcome of the first Gulf War, which they
saw as having left the business unfinished—that they
became really active. In the spring of 1992 a document
was produced, called Defense Policy Guidance, which was
stunning in the clarity and ambition of its vision of a new
US foreign and military policy. It called for US dominance
by preventing the rise of any potentially hostile power, and
for a policy of pre-emptive military action against states
suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. The
document was written by two relatively unknown func-
tionaries in the Pentagon’s policy department. They were
Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby; their boss at the time
was Dick Cheney, then Secretary for Defense. All three are
now prominent members of the Bush Administration.
In July 1996, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and
Political Studies issued a document entitled “A Clean
Break: a New Strategy for Securing the Realm”. The head
of the Institute was Richard Perle—for years known as the
Prince of Darkness, for his extreme views, and strong sup-
port of the Israel lobby. The document called on the then
Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to adopt a
radical change in policy, starting with a repudiation of the
Oslo Accords, and to be followed by a campaign to elimi-
nate Saddam Hussein and destabilize the governments of
Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.
In February 1998, Richard Perle wrote an Open Letter
to President Clinton, demanding a full-scale drive for a
regime change in Baghdad. It had 25 signatories, including
many who are now in the Bush Administration, e.g.:
Donald Rumsfeld—now Defense Secretary, and Paul
Wolfowitz—now Deputy Defense Secretary.
The al-Qaeda attack of September 11 provided the
opportunity for these policies to be put into practice. The
case for a Pax Americana had been set out, and its first
stage was implemented in the war against Iraq.
The prolonged squabbles over UN Resolutions and
inspections, aiming at giving legitimacy to the war, seem to
have been just a charade, intended to create the impression
that it was not the USA alone but a coalition that was
involved in the anti-Iraq campaign. The decision to over-
throw the Saddam Hussein regime having been taken
much earlier, it was only the time for its implementation
that had to be chosen. This was probably dictated not by
the outcome of the Hans Blix inspections, but by the need
to assemble the necessary military strength.
The military strength of the USA is truly awesome.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Americans have built
up an enormous military potential. Making use of the lat-
est advances in science and the achievements in technol-
ogy—and supported by budgets of astronomical dimen-
sions—the United States has become the greatest military
power that ever existed; nearly exceeding in sophistication
all other nations combined. Against this might, the Iraqi
army, with antiquated tanks and no air-power to provide
cover, did not stand a chance.
Of course, the fact that Saddam Hussein’s regime was
rotten, and was kept from falling apart entirely by the ter-
ror imposed by a small number of thugs, contributed to its
rapid demise. The claim by Rumsfeld et al that Iraq posed
a threat to other nations, including the United States, was
just laughable.
Indeed, the official reason for the military attack on
Iraq—the removal of weapons of mass destruction—has
proven to be completely indefensible, since no such
weapons have so far been found, despite the intense search
carried out by large groups of experts appointed by the
USA. As time goes on, and the WMDs are not found, there
will be an attempt to play down the importance of finding
them, but this will not alter the fact that the war was
started on false premises.
All the same, it would be hypocritical for those of us
who were against the war not to rejoice over the downfall
of a tyrannical regime, and not to admit that this would
not have come about so quickly without military interven-
tion. But the price we paid for this is far too high: it has
reinstated in world affairs the old maxim that the ends
justify the means.
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The events of the recent months are a severe setback to
those who believe that morality and adherence to the rules
of law should be our guiding principles. For the time
being, the rule seems to be: might is right, and in submit-
ting to this rule, the governments of many countries may
be driven to adopt a pragmatic policy; they may be forced
to acknowledge that there is now a single superpower;
they may feel obliged to accept the role of the United
States as the world’s policeman.
But this cannot be a permanent solution. Even if the
Americans were less arrogant in pursuing that role than
they are now, a system with a built-in inequality is bound
to be unstable. It is bound to create resentment, a resent-
ment that will find expression in various ways, including
an increase in international terrorism. This in turn will
force the “policemen” to take countermeasures, which
will make the inequality even more acute. Democracy in
the world, as we know it today, would be ended.
This is a possible scenario, but it need not happen. My
main hope is that the opposition to it will come from
within the United States itself. At present, Bush is very
popular and carries a majority of public opinion: this is
the usual wave of patriotism which comes with a military
victory, but it is already decreasing significantly. I believe
that the strong anti-war demonstrations that we saw ear-
lier are a true reflection of the views of the majority of the
American people. Somehow, I do not see the American
people accepting the role assigned to them by the clique
that has hijacked the Administration. Public opinion is
bound to turn when the dangers associated with the cur-
rent policies become apparent. My main worry is that in
the meantime these dangers may lead to catastrophic
results. The greatest dangers derive from the nuclear doc-
trines pursued by the Bush Administration.
These new doctrines have been comprehensively
analysed by Steven Miller in a paper, “Skepticism
Triumphant”, an updated version of a presentation he
made at the Pugwash conference in Agra last year. He con-
trasts the views of the “Skeptics”, by which he means the
Bush Administration, against those of the arms
controllers. His conclusion is that arms control is dead.
This conclusion is probably correct, but is does not fol-
low from this that we have to accept fatalistically the new
doctrines. Arms control and unilateral policies are not the
only options. In his paper, Steven Miller was mainly con-
cerned with contrasting these two, and therefore he left
out from consideration another alternative to arms con-
trol, namely, nuclear disarmament.
In Pugwash we faced, from the beginning, the dilemma
of the two approaches: arms control versus disarmament.
A few years ago we spent much time, in the Council and in
special workshops, discussing the pros and cons of the two
approaches.
This dispute has now been brought to an end by the
entry onto the scene of the new approach. Arms control is
now dead. But, as discussed earlier, the policy of the Bush
Administration, envisaging US world dominance, is unac-
ceptable. I submit that this leaves only one option for Pug-
wash: to pursue nuclear disarmament.
The elimination of nuclear weapons has always been
the goal of Pugwash, following the call in the Russell-Ein-
stein Manifesto. We have pursued this goal for moral rea-
sons, because ethical issues have always played a major
role in Pugwash: any use of nuclear weapons has been
seen as immoral. But we have also seen in our goals a
basic purpose: survival. Any use of nuclear weapons
would carry the danger of escalation and a threat to our
continued existence.
But the use of nuclear weapons is explicitly
contemplated in the policies of the Bush Administration.
These policies have been promulgated in a number of
statements, most of them made during the last year. The
following documents are of particular importance:
• Nuclear Posture Review. January, 2002
• The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America. September, 2002
• National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction. December 2002
• National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense. May
2003
These policies seem to have two aims: one, a defensive
strategy to make the USA invulnerable to an attack from
outside; the second, an offensive strategy, to threaten an
unfriendly regime with military action, including the use
of nuclear weapons, if it attempts to acquire WMDs for
itself.
For the first purpose, the decision was made to give a
high priority to missile defence. As a first step, the USA
abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which had
been previously considered the bedrock of the arms con-
trol system. A hugely increased budget has been provided
for a missile defence project, which is said to be essential
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in a world of potential threats from weapons of mass
destruction.
But it is in the offensive aspect that the biggest changes
have occurred. The new Nuclear Posture Review spells out
a strategy which incorporates nuclear capability into con-
ventional war planning. The previous doctrine of deter-
rence, by which the actual use of nuclear weapons was
seen as a last resort, when everything else had failed, has
been thrown overboard. In the new doctrine, nuclear
weapons have become a standard part of military strategy;
they would be used in a conflict just like any other explo-
sives. This represents a major shift in the whole rationale
for nuclear weapons.
The main reason for this change seems to be the fear
that states seen as unfriendly to the USA may acquire
weapons of mass destruction: “We will not permit the
world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten
us with the world’s most destructive weapons”. 
In this pursuit, the Bush Administration is prepared to
go very far, including pre-emptive strikes: “We must be
prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients
before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass
destruction against the United States and our allies and
friends.” And it goes on: “To forestall or prevent such hos-
tile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if neces-
sary, act pre-emptively.”
The implementation of this policy has already begun.
The United States is designing a new nuclear warhead of
low yield, but with a shape that would give it a very high
penetrating power into concrete, the “robust nuclear earth
penetrator”. It is intended to destroy bunkers with thick
concrete walls in which weapons of mass destruction may
be stored, or enemy leaders may seek shelter.
To enable this project to go ahead the US Senate has
already decided to rescind the long-standing prohibition
on the development of low yield nuclear weapons. Other
types of warheads are also contemplated.
The new weapons will have to be tested. At present
there is a treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons
(except in sub-critical assemblies), the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, which the United States has signed but not rat-
ified. Given the contempt of the Bush Administration for
international treaties, little excuse would be needed to
authorize the testing of the new weapon. Indeed, the need
to resume testing is now openly advocated.
If the USA resumed testing, this would be a signal to
other nuclear weapon states to do the same. China would
be almost certain to resume testing. After the US decision
to develop ballistic missile defences, China feels vulnera-
ble, and is likely to attempt to reduce its vulnerability by
modernizing and enlarging its nuclear arsenal. An opinion
is building up that: “China should realize that the present
minimum nuclear arsenal is inadequate to meet the new
challenges, and therefore should greatly expand its nuclear
force to the extent that it can be actually used in different
scenarios”. At present this is a minority view, but it may
become significant should the USA resume testing. Other
states with nuclear weapons, such as India or Pakistan,
might use the window of opportunity opened by the USA
to update their arsenals. The danger of a new nuclear arms
race is real.
Another worry about the development of the new
bomb is that it would blur the distinction between nuclear
and conventional weapons. The chief characteristic of a
nuclear weapon is its enormous destructive power, unique
even in comparison with current chemical or biological
weaponry, also designated as weapons of mass
destruction. This has resulted in a taboo on the use of
nuclear weapons in combat, a taboo that has held out
since Nagasaki. But if at one end of the spectrum a nuclear
bomb can be manufactured which does not differ quanti-
tatively from ordinary explosives, then the qualitative dif-
ference will also disappear; the nuclear threshold will be
crossed, and nuclear weapons will gradually come to be
seen as a tool of war, even though the danger they present
to the existence of the human race will remain.
For the USA, the distinction between nuclear and con-
ventional weapons has already been eroded, as was made
clear in the Nuclear Posture Review, but the situation has
become even more threatening with the additional disposi-
tion to act pre-emptively.
The danger of this policy can hardly be over-empha-
sized. If the militarily mightiest country declares its readi-
ness to carry out a pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons,
others may soon follow. The Kashmir crisis, in May last
year, is a stark warning of the reality of the nuclear peril.
India’s declared policy is not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons. But if the United States—whose nuclear
policies are largely followed by India—makes a pre-emp-
tive nuclear use part of its doctrine, this would give India
the legitimacy to similarly threaten pre-emptive action
against Pakistan. George Fernandes, India’s Minister for
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Defence, said recently: India had “a much better case to go
for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the United
States has in Iraq.” More likely perhaps is that Pakistan
would carry this out first.
Taiwan presents another potential scenario for a pre-
emptive nuclear strike by the United States. Should the
Taiwan authorities decide to declare independence, this
would inevitably result in an attempted military invasion
by mainland China. The USA, which is committed to the
defence of Taiwan, may then opt for a pre-emptive strike.
And we still have the problem of North Korea,
described by Bush as one of the “axis of evil”. Under the
Bush dictum not to allow the possession of weapons of
mass destruction by any state considered to be hostile,
North Korea will be called upon to close down all work
on nuclear weapons. It is by no means certain that Kim
Jong Il will submit to these demands, and a critical situa-
tion may arise in that part of the world.
A major worry in this respect are developments in
Japan. So far Japan has been kept out of the nuclear
weapons club by Article 9 of its constitution:
“…the Japanese people forever renounce…the threat
or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”
However, partly at the urging of the USA, strong ten-
dencies are now appearing—with the backing of the Prime
Minister, Junichiro Koizumi—to revise the constitution so
as to make it legal for Japan to become a nuclear-weapon
state.
Altogether, the aggressive policy of the United States,
under the Bush Administration, has created a precarious
situation in world affairs, with a greatly increased danger
of nuclear weapons being used in combat.
Moreover, if the use of nuclear weapons is made legal,
it would preclude passing of laws to prevent the develop-
ment of new types of weapons, with even greater destruc-
tive potential than current WMDs—a truly horrifying
prospect. Sir Martin Rees, the British Astronomer Royal,
gives civilization a 50/50 chance of surviving this century.
Others believe that this is optimistic.
What should be the Pugwash stand on this matter?
Does the new situation call for a corresponding change in
our activities?
Let me first state that I fully support the efforts made
by the Secretary-General towards the resolution of local
conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. His success in
bringing together personalities from opposing camps
encourages us to continue these activities; they may pre-
vent a regional crisis from getting out of control.
But it is the central issue that I am concerned about. A
year ago, in La Jolla, we have adopted the Goals of Pug-
wash for the next five years. The relevant document states:
“Pugwash is strongly committed to the goal of abolishing
all nuclear weapons. It is imperative that Pugwash con-
stantly remind the international community of the
immorality, illegality, and peril inherent in nuclear
weapons, and to propose concrete steps towards their
elimination.” In the second year of the Quinquennium it is
high time to take these steps.
Any attempt to achieve our goals by persuading the
Bush Administration to change its policies through logical
persuasion, or by appealing to moral instincts, would be
hopeless and a complete waste of time. But it may not be a
waste of time if such an appeal is made to the general pub-
lic. As I said earlier, hope lies in a change of public opin-
ion, particularly in the United States, to rise in opposition
to the current policies, and throw them out in the process
usually employed in democratic countries, namely, in free
elections. Therefore, my suggestion is that the Pugwash
effort should be towards an acceleration of that process in
a campaign to influence public opinion, a campaign based
on principles of morality and equity.
Immorality in the use of nuclear weapons is taken for
granted, but this aspect is very seldom raised when calling
for nuclear disarmament. We are told that a campaign
based on moral principles is a non-starter, and we are
afraid of appearing naïve, and divorced from reality. I see
in the use of this argument evidence that we have allowed
ethical considerations to be ignored for far too long. We
are accused of not being realistic, when what we are trying
to do is to prevent real dangers, the dangers that would
result from the current policies of the Bush Administration.
The public at large is ignorant about these dangers and
we urgently need a campaign of public education.
The other basic principle is adherence to international
law. It is a sine qua non of a civilized society that nations
fulfil their legal obligations and respect international law.
World peace cannot be achieved without adherence to
international treaties.
There is much deliberate obfuscation and brainwash-
ing in this respect. Let me illustrate this with the example
which happens to be at the heart of the problem, the prob-
lem of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
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Pugwash was very much involved in this treaty, in its
earliest years, when we saw it as an important measure
towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Let me recall
the salient facts about the NPT, to which 98 percent of
nations have subscribed. In accordance with the treaty, all
non-nuclear states that signed it undertook not to acquire
nuclear weapons in any way. At the same time, the five
states which officially possessed those weapons—by virtue
of the fact that they had tested them by a certain date—
undertook to get rid of theirs. The relevant Article VI reads:
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and com-
plete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.”
By signing and ratifying the NPT, the nuclear member
states are legally committed to nuclear disarmament. The
hawks in those states, in an attempt to retain nuclear
weapons, utilized an ambiguity in Article VI, which makes
it appear that nuclear disarmament is linked with the
achievement of general and complete disarmament. But
the NPT Review Conference—an official part of the
implementation of the NPT—at its session in 2000,
removed this ambiguity in a statement issued by all five
nuclear weapons states. It contains the following:
“…an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon
states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all
States Parties are committed under Article VI.”
This makes the situation perfectly clear. The Bush pol-
icy, which is based on the continued existence (and use) of
nuclear weapons, is in direct contradiction to the legally
binding NPT.
But the Bush Administration seems to have managed
to convince the public that only a part of the NPT, the part
that applies to the non-nuclear states, is valid, and that
therefore states which violate it—as Iran now stands
accused of doing—must be punished for the transgression.
The part concerning the obligation of the nuclear states is
deliberately being obliterated. Let me cite two items which
recently appeared in British national newspapers:
“At a meeting of the IAEA today, the US will urge it to
declare Tehran in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. The treaty seeks to confine nuclear weapons to
Russia, Britain, France, China and America.”
I have emphasized the second sentence because it dis-
plays the complete reversal of the purpose of the NPT.
The other newspaper—none other than The Times—
reports similarly:
“It [the NPT] was established to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons beyond the original declared nuclear
powers of the US, China, Russia, the UK and France.”
There is no mention of the obligation of the latter.
We are being told all the time how dangerous nuclear
weapons are and that they must not be allowed to fall into
the hands of undesirable elements or rogue regimes:
“Weapons of mass destruction … nuclear, biological,
and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and ter-
rorists, represent one of the greatest security challenges
facing the United States.”
What we are not being told is that these weapons are
just as dangerous in the possession of friendly nations. We
are not being reminded that—with the realization of these
dangers—even the United States has undertaken to get rid
of its own nuclear arsenal. We are facing here a basic issue
in which the ethical and legal aspects are intertwined. The
use of nuclear weapons is seen by the great majority of
people in the world as immoral, due to their indiscrimi-
nate nature and unprecedented destructive power. Their
possession—and therefore likely use—is thus equally
unacceptable, whether by “rogue” or benevolent regimes.
The elimination of nuclear weapons has been the
declared aim of the United Nations from the beginning,
and resolutions to this effect are passed, year after year, by
large majorities of the General Assembly. These
resolutions are ignored by the nuclear weapon states, as
are all attempts to discuss the issue by the organ set up for
this purpose, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
There is a need to keep hammering home the point
that America’s stand on the NPT issue is iniquitous. It has
signed and ratified an international treaty which commits
it to get rid of nuclear weapons, yet it is pursuing a policy
which demands the indefinite retention of these weapons.
We have to keep on highlighting the fundamental
inconsistency in the US policies. The USA must make a
choice: if it wants to keep nuclear weapons, then it should
withdraw from the NPT (which would probably result in
a massive increase in the number of nuclear weapon
states). Otherwise, it must abide by the terms of the NPT
and get rid of its nuclear arsenals. Tertium non datur.
There is no third way.
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I believe that a campaign to educate and influence pub-
lic opinion, centered on the issue of the NPT, would stand
a good chance of being successful.
The task of influencing public opinion is far too big for
an organization like Pugwash to undertake by itself. Col-
laboration with other organizations would be essential.
This would go against our traditional modus vivendi;
Puwash has often been accused—perhaps justifiably—of
being an exclusive club. But even if our mode of work has
been justified in the past, I believe that the time has come
to open up. I am not advocating that Pugwash should
become a mass movement; what I am suggesting is that we
should be more willing to collaborate with other organiza-
tions in the sense of spearheading a large effort to provide
information to the general public. Pugwash is a movement
of scientists, but the job of the scientist is not only to do
original research; education is an essential element of it.
And this is in essence what I propose.
An initiative in this direction has already been started
by the British Pugwash Group. In setting up a “Nuclear
Weapons Awareness Project”, the British Pugwash Group
is collaborating with about a dozen other British organiza-
tions, ranging from BASIC (the British American Security
Information Council) to MEDACT (Medical Action), from
CND to Greenpeace. An account of this Project is
presented by John Finney in paper submitted to this Con-
ference. I suggest that the Pugwash Council should take it
up and find ways to implement it on an international scale.
Let me now conclude with some simple observations
of a more general nature, but relevant to the problems I
have raised in this paper.
I believe in the inherent goodness of Man. What would
be the point of keeping the human species if this were not
true! But then our task must be to ensure that this belief
gains general acceptance.
We still conduct world affairs on the outdated princi-
ple that our survival demands being militarily strong. This
is a remnant of our early history, when Man had to resort
to violence in order to survive or to ensure continuation of
the species. It completely ignores the radical changes that
have occurred as a result of the advances in science and
technology, changes which make such a stand no longer
necessary. If equitably distributed, our resources could be
sufficient to meet the basic needs of the world population,
despite its huge increase.
Moreover, thanks largely to the fantastic progress in
technology, our world is becoming more and more inter-
dependent, more and more transparent, more and more
interactive. Inherent in these developments is a set of
agreements, ranging from confidence-building measures to
formal international treaties; from protection of the envi-
ronment to the clearance of mine fields; from Interpol to
the International Criminal Court; from ensuring intellec-
tual property rights to the Declaration of Human Rights.
Respect for, and strict adherence to, the terms of interna-
tional agreements are at the basis of a civilized society.
Without this, anarchy and terrorism would reign, the very
perils President Bush is allegedly committed to eradicate.
While he intends to tackle this issue by military means,
we must strive to achieve it by peaceful means. While the
Bush Administration plans to act unilaterally, we have
to ensure that world security is entrusted to the United
Nations, the institution set up for this purpose. And we
must link our respect for the law with strong moral
principles.
Many of you are professional people, trained to look
at problems in a detached, realistic, non-sentimental
approach. But we are all, primarily, human beings, anx-
ious to provide security for our nearest and dearest, and
peace for fellow citizens of our nation and the world. We
want to see a world in which relations between people and
between nations are based on compassion, not greed; on
generosity, not jealousy; on persuasion, not force; on
equity, not oppression.
These are simple, some will say romantic, sentiments,
but they are also realistic necessities. In a world armed
with weapons of mass destruction, the use of which might
bring the whole of civilization to an end, we cannot afford
a polarized community, with its inherent threat of military
confrontations. In this technological age, a global, equi-
table community, to which we all belong as world citizens,
has become a vital necessity.
Sir Joseph Rotblat is co-recipient, with the Pugwash Confer-
ences, of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize. A signatory of the Rus-
sell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955 and one of the founders of
the Pugwash Conferences, he attended the first meeting in
Pugwash, Nova Scotia in July 1957, and later served as the
organization’s President.
64 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2003
UN Peace Monitoring: 
An Emerging Global Watch?
Dr. A. Walter Dorn1, Canadian Forces College
eral relatively powerless to monitor
situations of conflict. Still it was a
bold experiment in international
organization that proved extremely
useful in the design of its successor. 
The advent of the United Nations
in 1945, at the end of the Second
World War, was a major step in inter-
national organization. The UN began
dispatching increasingly ambitious
missions to the field, with greater fre-
quency and more functions than did
the League. Its many field operations,
offices and missions have served as
the organization’s “eyes and ears” in
conflict areas. The UN Charter
empowered the Secretary-General to
bring concerns directly to the atten-
tion of the Security Council, a role
that went well beyond the role speci-
fied in the League Covenant. The Sec-
retary-General has, over time,
become not only a vital
“clearinghouse” of information from
nations on the state of the world but
also an important monitor of the
world’s conflict situations through
his own representatives in the field.
True, during the Cold War, the Com-
munist world, led by a veto-wielding
Soviet Union determined to maintain
secrecy behind an iron curtain, held
the UN back from much investiga-
tion and action, but the organization
still gained a great deal of experience
in fact-finding and peacekeeping
operations. With the end of the Cold
War another “evolutionary step” was
taken.
The United Nations now conducts
monitoring on an unprecedented
scale and in new fields, covering an
ever-growing range of security con-
cerns for both nations and individu-
als. In addition to verifying peace
agreements and documenting human
rights abuses, the organization has
been monitoring elections, tracking
arms shipments, identifying sanctions
busters, overseeing military and
police forces, inspecting for weapons
of mass destruction, exposing terror-
ists, warning of incipient crises, and
gathering evidence for international
criminal tribunals. 
It is appropriate that President
Woodrow Wilson, the League’s prin-
cipal founder who set out the initial
plan for international organization,
should have given voice to such a far-
reaching vision for worldwide moni-
toring. The United Nations, as we
shall see, is moving towards a global
watch to fulfill its growing realm of
responsibility. The UN is now the
world’s chief information-gathering
instrument for actual or potential
threats to the peace. From the halting
baby steps of the League, to the slow
march of the UN during the Cold
War, the world organization now
Introduction: “An Eye That Does
Not Slumber”
The League of Nations ... should be
the eye of the nations to keep watch
upon the common interest, an eye
that does not slumber, an eye that is
everywhere watchful and attentive.
—US President Woodrow Wilson,
Paris, 25 January 1919
President Wilson articulated this
aspiration for a global watch at the
very dawn of international organiza-
tion for peace, when the nations of
the world were recovering from the
throes of the First World War. The
national leaders who had gathered in
Paris in 1919 to negotiate a peace
were only partly committed to the
idea of a new system of international
rules and collective action. Nonethe-
less they created the world’s first
international organization for peace,
the League of Nations. Though the
League was a important step forward
for international relations, it never
became the “everywhere watchful
and attentive eye” that Wilson envi-
sioned. Its investigative bodies
proved slow and cumbersome; its
procedures for dispatching missions
rudimentary and subject to veto by
member states, and its Secretary-Gen-
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finds itself in a fast run as it tries to
keep up with world events that affect
peace and security. With the end of
the Cold War, the United Nations
began monitoring peace and conflict
in ways that would have surprised
and pleased its originators, Wilson
included. A decade and half after the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the bipolar
world that it symoblized, it is worth-
while to take stock of this progress.
Expanded Information-Gathering
The new and expanded monitoring
activities of the United Nations in
various countries make for a long
and impressive list, including: track-
ing the distribution of humanitarian
aid in combat zones; supervising the
disarmament and demobilization of
ex-combatants; monitoring elections;
monitoring and training police and
military forces during reform
processes; following domestic court
proceedings to verify that they are
conducted with due process; follow-
ing and encouraging the growth of
civil society; patrolling the borders
of states to prevent spill over from
aggressive neighbours; determining
responsibility for the initiation of
wars; delineating borders between
and within states; reviewing the
implementation of arms control
treaties, and many other novel
activities.
In addition to verifying and con-
firming positive, peace-promoting
activities, the UN must also carry out
monitoring to detect a host of illegal
or negative activities: observing
attacks and the movements of fight-
ers in combat zones; searching intru-
sively for hidden weapons, including
small arms, bio-weapons and nuclear
bomb-making materials; tracking
planes in no-fly zones or trespassing
into foreign airspace; uncovering
clandestine arms shipments through
the cascade of arms brokers; catching
sanctions busters, especially groups
selling illegal commodities that fuel
wars (e.g., “blood diamonds”);
revealing secret bank accounts and
exposing front companies of orga-
nized crime and terrorist groups;
identifying forged documents that aid
the illegal movement of people and
arms across borders; determining if
national secret agents have violated
international laws; exhuming the
bodies of persons killed by paramili-
tary groups; identifying deliberate
attacks against civilian targets; gath-
ering evidence for war-crimes trials;
uncovering assassination plots before
they hatch and warning of impending
violence.
This tremendous expansion of
UN monitoring tasks is paralleled by
the creation of a host of new UN
bodies, offices and operations with
monitoring mandates. In peacekeep-
ing, where international military and
civilian personnel are deployed to
conflict areas to help keep or create
peace, the number of operations saw
a tenfold increase in the 1990s com-
pared to any previous decade. The
thirty-five new operations in the one
decade is double the number created
in the previous 45 years of the orga-
nization. Monitoring is a principal
function in all peacekeeping opera-
tions, and in most of them (observer
missions), monitoring is the principal
function. While there are definite lim-
its to information-gathering or “intel-
ligence” activities in peacekeeping,
the 1990s saw an expansion in the
use of overhead reconnaissance,
radio message interception, and tech-
nological surveillance (e.g., using
night-vision and radar), as well as
more controversial activities such as
deploying peacekeepers out of uni-
form (briefly) and employing paid
informants from the local
population.2
The 1990s also witnessed the cre-
ation of over a dozen missions of a
new type, called “political and peace-
building missions,” deployed to the
field to monitor and assist with phys-
ical reconstruction and social recon-
ciliation in countries coming out of
war and even to prevent conflicts in
the first place.3 The Special Represen-
tatives of the Secretary-General
(SRSGs), who work in trouble areas
or on special issues and who are
often in charge of peacekeeping oper-
ations, currently number over thirty,
more than at any other time. 
In the human rights field, the Spe-
cial Rapporteurs who report to the
UN’s Human Rights Commission on
specific countries or themes (types of
rights violations) have multiplied,
going from six in the 1980s to 17 in
the 1990s. In the first two years of
the new millennium alone, five new
posts of this type were added. In
addition, the new position of High
Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNHCHR), heading an office of the
same name, was created in 1993.
UN-sponsored Truth Commissions
(or similarly named bodies) saw their
advent in the 1990s, first in Central
America, then Africa and Asia. In
Guatemala, for instance, a “Histori-
cal Clarification Commission” was
created in 1994 on the principle that
the Guatemalan people had the
“right to know the truth” concerning
acts of political violence and viola-
tions of human rights in their country
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for some thirty years. This was com-
plemented by an ongoing mission to
monitor human rights using in-coun-
try fact-finding teams. 
Sanctions committees, with
responsibilities to monitor the imple-
mentation of specific sanctions
imposed by the Security Council,
have also proliferated. Only two
were established prior to 1990 (for
sanctions against Rhodesia and South
Africa), while ten were created in the
1990s and two have already been
established in the first two years of
the new millennium. These bodies are
making increased use of expert pan-
els and special monitoring
mechanisms, which have broken new
ground in the realm of international
investigation. The expert panels have
published detailed documentary evi-
dence to identify and then “name and
shame” individuals, organizations
and governments (including heads of
state) caught violating Security Coun-
cil sanctions or not doing enough to
catch sanctions-busters (or terrorists).
In addition to catching sanctions-
busters, the UN has tried on numer-
ous occasions to assess the impact of
sanctions to determine any unwanted
effects that sanctions may create,
especially affecting innocent citizens.
Similarly, in the disarmament
field, monitoring and inspection
agencies have flourished in recent
years. For decades the only agency in
the UN system conducting on-site
inspections was the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), head-
quartered in Vienna. This “nuclear
watchdog” has been sending inspec-
tors to declared nuclear facilities in
about 70 countries to verify that
nuclear material has not been
diverted for unlawful or prohibited
purposes, in particular to produce
nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, sev-
eral new international verification
bodies for arms control were estab-
lished. A sophisticated system for the
detection of nuclear tests in all envi-
ronments (underwater, underground
and above ground) was developed
and tested by the preparatory Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty Organiza-
tion (CTBTO). It employs an array of
advanced seismic, hydroacoustic,
infrasound and radionuclide
technologies at stations around the
globe which feed information back to
headquarters at the Vienna Interna-
tional Centre. 
UN investigations of chemical
weapons use were first carried out in
1984 in Iran and Iraq by teams sent
out by the Secretary-General, provid-
ing conclusive evidence that Iraq had
used chemical weapons extensively in
its war with Iran, in violation of its
treaty (Geneva Protocol) obligations.
The Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
established in The Hague in 1996 as
part of the UN system, conducts hun-
dreds of inspections each year to ver-
ify compliance with a comprehensive
ban contained in the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Under its
“challenge inspection” procedure,
the OPCW is authorized to carry out
inspections on an “any time, any
site” basis upon request of a party.
The 1972 Biological Weapons Con-
vention, covering the third category
of weapons of mass destruction, has
no similar inspection system, though
most states are in favour of finalizing
a verification protocol and instituting
a global monitoring and confidence-
building system. 
Under the 1997 Anti-Personnel
Mines Treaty, the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral is responsible for organizing fact-
finding missions, upon request, to
investigate allegations of non-compli-
ance with the treaty. Also, the Secre-
tary-General receives annual reports
from parties on the measures they
have taken to implement the treaty,
including the locations and quantities
of any and all mines.4 Instead of cre-
ating a new and costly organization
to administer the treaty and perform
inspections, civil society was
entrusted with the task of monitoring
implementation of the ban. The
Landmine Monitor, created by the
Sen. Douglas Roche, Sen. Landon Pearson, Geoffrey Pearson, and Walter Dorn
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International Campaign to Ban Land-
mines (ICBL), is a network of experts
and activists who analyse reports
submitted by nations to the UN and
compare them with other data gath-
ered in the field. The annual report,
Landmine Monitor, provides exten-
sive new information with frank and
objective assessments of national
compliance. This is a good demon-
stration of how civil society can be
freer to make accusations of non-
compliance than governmental orga-
nizations and can work well with
progressive governments and the UN
to uphold a treaty. A similar partner-
ship is developing around the small
arms issue. 
For decades, the UN has been the
clearing-house for arms control
reports sent to it by governments, for
instance, in accordance with the
1968 Outer Space Treaty and the
1972 Biological Weapons Conven-
tion (and its review conference decla-
rations). At the request of the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Secretary-General
has also established voluntary regis-
ters of military expenditures (1980)
and of conventional arms (1992). For
the latter, there is a surprisingly high
number of submissions, typically 80-
90 states reporting annually on their
possession of conventional weapons
in seven major categories: battle
tanks, armoured vehicles, large cali-
bre artillery systems, combat aircraft,
attack helicopters, warships, missiles
and missile launchers. Small arms are
not included, but are the subject of a
number of important UN and NGO
studies. There are international
attempts to create a UN register for
small arms as well. 
This expansion of international
monitoring has demonstrated that, as
more responsibilities are given to the
UN, new precedents are set, new
lessons are learned and new practices
are put in place. Certainly there have
been set-backs and misadventures
(some of them instructive), but the
enormous growth of international
organization, from the League to the
post-Cold War UN is indisputable.
Still, many could correctly point out
that the UN remains far from the
lofty ideals that guide it.
While the evolution applies pri-
marily to information gathering, to a
lesser extent a growth has taken place
in information analysis and dissemi-
nation.5
Information Dissemination
Gathering information on this wide
range of targets and situations,
though an enormous challenge, is
only half the battle for the UN. The
organization then needs to analyse
the information and then disseminate
the conclusions, either in private
meetings, at informal or formal meet-
ings of bodies like the Security Coun-
cil, or at official or public meetings,
including the daily press conferences
of the spokesman of the Secretary-
General. The UN has become a
major centre for information dissemi-
nation crucial to the world’s well
being. The UN and its agencies pro-
vide us with many of the statistics
that paint a sobering picture of our
troubled world. 
From various parts of the UN sys-
tem, we learn about conflicts that are
raging around the world, some
already making the front pages of
newspapers, others in long-ignored
parts of the world. The annual
Report of the Secretary-General usu-
ally provides a survey and analysis of
conflicts that are dealt with by the
UN. Other UN agencies and offices
provide telling details about the
tremendous human toll of modern
conflict. 
For instance, UNICEF tells us
that in the last decade of the 20th
century, 2 million children were
killed, 6 million injured or
permanently disabled and 12 million
left homeless because of conflict. In
addition, “conflict has orphaned or
separated more than 1 million chil-
dren from their families states”,
states UNICEF’s State of the World’s
Children report for 2002.6 Even
more tragically, an estimated
300,000 children were forced or
induced into combat in 2001. 
Yet another UN agency, the
United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), tells us that
there are an estimated 35 million
refugees and internally displaced peo-
ple (IDP) in the world7, about one for
every 160 persons on earth. About
80 per cent are women and children,
fleeing conflict or persecution. The
number of people assisted by
UNHCR has been about 21-22 mil-
lion annually in the years 1998-
2001.8 This figure includes12 million
refugees (55%), 0.9 million asylum
seekers (4%), 0.8 million returned
refugees (4%), 6 million internally
displaced of concern to UNHCR
(27%), 0.4 million returned IDPs
(2%) and 1.7 million others of con-
cern (8%). Behind each statistic lie
millions of face and desperate human
beings. Asia has the greatest number
of persons “of concern” to UNHCR,
with nearly 8.5 million, followed by
Africa with 6.1 million and Europe
with 5.6 million people. Another UN
organization, the United Nations
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Relief and Works Agency for Pales-
tine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), keeps tracks of and
assists the 3.8 million registered
Palestine refugees in Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip.
The Food and Agricultural Orga-
nization issues famine alerts, and the
UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) issues
international appeals for help, con-
taining telling details about the con-
ditions in areas of complex emergen-
cies. The situation reports of UN and
governmental agencies, as well as
NGOs, are often posted in OCHA’s
excellent website Reliefweb. Further-
more, OCHA developed its own
news service under the motto of
“bridging the information gap” for
conflict areas of greatest need:
regions of Africa (West, East, Cen-
tral, Great Lakes, Horn, South), Cen-
tral Asia and recently Iraq. The
reports, often with accompanying
photos, are filed under the name
IRIN or the Integrated Regional
Information Network, which is a
“UN humanitarian information unit”
within OCHA, funded mostly by
national development agencies in
Europe, Australia and Canada.
The UN also provides us with a
picture of the arms holdings and
transfers. From its voluntary arms
register for major conventional arma-
ments, we learn that the US accounts
for about half of the global trade in
these arms (tanks, planes, ships, and
weapons of calibre larger than 100
mm) and the permanent five mem-
bers of the Security Council account
for well over four-fifths.9 More star-
tling, perhaps, is the statistic that
more than 68 per cent of the arms
trade was absorbed by the developing
world, which can ill afford the cost, in
terms of both finances and human
life.10
Small arms are the main killer in
the world, having caused millions of
deaths in the past decade. In a 1999
press release titled “the UN takes aim
at small arms”11, UNICEF and the
UN Department for Disarmament
Affairs report that small arms have
caused more than 3 million deaths in
the past decade, with the vast major-
ity of victims being civilians. 
We also learn from UN reports of
hopeful signs of disarmament, espe-
cially in countries coming out of con-
flict. Cambodia destroyed 15,000
weapons in public ceremonies in
March and June 1999 alone. South
Africa has pledged to destroy all sur-
plus small arms, including about
260,000 automatic rifles and
hundreds of tons of ammunition. In
1998, China undertook strong steps
to confiscate illicit small arms, result-
ing in the destruction of some
300,000 weapons.12
The most extensive international
survey of firearm effects and regula-
tions was prepared for the UN’s
Commission on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice in 1998. The
“United Nations International Study
on Firearm Regulations”13 includes
data and narratives from 69 Member
States on such issues as firearms-
related deaths and injuries, firearms
legislation and relevant initiatives in
firearms regulation at the regional
and interregional levels. The
researchers sought to ensure equitable
geographical representation of coun-
tries around the world but were ham-
pered by lack of statistics for many.
The later fact only supports the over-
all conclusion that small arms are not
yet under proper regulatory control
in most parts of the world.
Finally we learn about the human
condition through the UNDP’s flag-
ship report, the Human Development
Report. It is not only valuable for the
extensive statistics provided on devel-
oping and developed nations, but
also in its path-breaking analysis of
these figures and the introduction of
new concepts (such as the terms
“human development” and “human
security” themselves). The reports
show an unfortunate, though logical
correlation between underdevelop-
ment and conflict. Of the 35 nations
listed under the category of “low
human development” in the Human
Development Report 199914 about
half (18) have experienced civil war
or fought in international wars in the
past decade. If one includes nations
with neighbours that have
experienced such wars, the number
rises to a startling 33 of 35 states!
The Need for Knowledge 
To carry out its many responsibilities,
old and new, for international and
human security, the UN requires
accurate and timely information.
Finding itself in war zones and in the
midst of aggressors, the UN needs
background information on the his-
tory and culture of the local powers
and personalities, as well as informa-
tion on the current military and politi-
cal situation, including both the capa-
bilities and intensions of the parties.
Without such information, the UN
places its military and civilian staff in
the field at great risk. These risks can
prove unacceptable, as witnessed with
the truck-bombing of UN headquar-
ters in Bagdad. With this information,
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the UN can operate safer and be a
more effective power for peace. 
The various goals and roles of the
UN can be conceptualized on a sim-
plified timeline of conflict, as in Fig-
ure 1. As the conflict begins, the UN
will seek to prevent an escalation.
During the intensity of combat, the
major UN goal is to mitigate the
severity of the conflict and the impact
on the civilian population. As the
conflict de-escalates, the UN will seek
to prevent another peak by moving
the conflict into termination phase.
Finally, once the fighting has stopped,
the rebuilding can occur in earnest.
For each UN role, specific infor-
mation is required. For early warn-
ing, the UN needs to know who is
seeking to escalate violence, and spoil
the peace process, and how they are
planning to carry it out. To react
through preventive diplomacy and
deployment, it is vital to identify the
key players and means of influence,
and to understand the locations,
strengths, goals and vulnerabilities,
political and military, of potential
“spoilers.” UN officials mediating
talks between combatants should
identify areas for quick agreement
and discern the more difficult prob-
lems to address in the long term. For
humanitarian assistance, detailed
information about the locations and
needs of the affected populations,
and about supplies and delivery
routes is required. Peacekeeping
involves constant patrols to monitor
the level of security in the area of
operation and identify potential haz-
ards. Peacebuilding necessitates a
wide range of economic, social and
development indicators to decide
which sectors and organizations are
the most receptive and resistant to
assistance. 
To establish an effective sanctions
regime, it is necessary not only to
identify and catch “sanctions
busters” through careful border mon-
itoring but also to prepare impact
assessments on the effectiveness of
sanctions, including both wanted and
unwanted effects. When the UN
finally finds itself, as a last resort,
engaged in military enforcement or
authorizing it, the organization
should have detailed military infor-
mation, including targeting informa-
tion (to minimize, if not avoid, inno-
cent deaths) and information on the
defensive and offensive military capa-
bilities of the targeted forces. Finally,
when the UN authorizes a coalition
to use military force, it should be able
to monitor the coalition’s actions to
ensure they are strictly in accordance
with their UN mandate and accord-
ing to the rules of international
humanitarian law. 
In war zones, where “truth is the
first casualty of war”, there is a con-
stant need for independent reporting.
Even warring parties spouting propa-
ganda appreciate a source of objec-
tive information, however much they
may seek to bias it. After a peace
agreement is signed, the objective
voice of an independent outside body
can make the difference between a
lasting peace and a temporary cease-
fire, as the UN has shown many
times. Just as a referee is indispens-
able in a professional sports match,
an impartial arbiter is essential for
verifying and promoting the rules of
a peace agreement. Usually, the two
sides (conflicting parties) are so dis-
trustful of each other that bilateral
adversarial verification is problem-
atic, if not impossible. 
Outside monitoring itself can
change behaviour. If the parties know
that their illegal activities will be
exposed they are often more careful
not to engage in them. If they know
that their positive actions will be veri-
fied by an independent agency, they
will be more eager to undertake
them. Thus monitoring provides a
way for a feedback that builds confi-
dence of the parties. Should one side
attempt to subvert a peace agree-
ment, it is important that the other
side should know about it. False alle-
gations can be disproved and true
accusations placed in the public light.
The “fog of war” is gradually
replaced by the “transparency of
peace.”
In practice, peace agreementsFigure 1. The predominant goals and roles of the UN at different stages in the timeline of conflict.
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have loopholes, nuanced clauses and
provisions that are subject to widely
differing interpretation. This is
another reason why it is vital to have
an impartial body that can provide
outside assistance in dealing with the
complexities of implementation. 
Countless times, the UN has used
its monitoring functions to defuse
potentially explosive situations.
Whether it be UN military observers
in the Middle East stopping a local
dispute from escalating, UN control
teams in Cambodia identifying assas-
sination plots, UN civilian police in
Central America preventing local
police from extorting money, or tradi-
tional UN peacekeepers inserting
themselves between two armies, mon-
itoring the actual or potential com-
batants is a common and key element. 
Lack of Information 
When the UN is information-
deficient, it invites a host of maladies
and political disasters. First, it can
appear weak and out of touch,
thereby losing credibility and author-
ity. If the UN officials appear igno-
rant of realities on the ground or the
real issues on the negotiating table,
they cannot make good mediators.
Naive UN field personnel can be
taken advantage of by combatants
long accustomed to using trickery,
disinformation and deception to gain
an upper hand at the negotiating
table as well as in the battlefield.
For lack of information, great
blunders have been committed in UN
history. In 1950 in Korea, the UN
General Assembly and the Secretary-
General, Trygve Lie, fully endorsed
the advance of UN forces, led by the
American General Douglas
MacArthur, across the 3815 parallel
(and all the way to the Chinese bor-
der) in an effort to take North Korea
by force, while ignoring the clear
warnings that China would
intervene. Over two years of war
between China and UN forces
ensued, leaving four million dead.
Before the 1973 Yom Kippur War,
the UN (along with the US and Israel
for that matter) failed to recognize
Egyptian preparations for its surprise
attack on Israel. In 1982, Secretary-
General Pérez de Cuéllar was caught
unawares of the impending Argentine
invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands, despite his familiarity with
the region and the dispute. In 1993,
the Security Council established UN
Safe Areas in the former Yugoslavia
without a proper assessment of the
vulnerabilities of these areas. Indeed,
the President of the Security Council
at the time, Ambassador Diego Arria
from Venezuela, later complained
that the United States was not shar-
ing information that was essential for
proper decision-making. The tragic
massacres within the “protected”
areas of Srebernica and Gorazde in
Bosnia are a testament to lack of
foresight, political will and commit-
ment. As we shall see, foresight to see
coming tragedies and political will to
react to them are intimately
connected. 
Some major “intelligence
failures” occurred in areas where UN
peacekeepers were actually deployed,
bringing great embarrassment to the
organization. Examples occurred:
• in South Korea in 1950 prior to the
invasion from the North, in which
UN observers were unable to warn
of the attack (though they provided
important confirmation once it had
happened)
• in Lebanon during the 1958 civil
war, when the US accused UN
observers of being blind to an
influx of fighters and material; 
• again in Lebanon prior to and dur-
ing the 1982 Israeli invasion, which
caught the UN by surprise; 
• in Namibia in April 1989 when
guerrilla fighters “invaded” unex-
pectedly and the UN found itself
forced to sanction the release of
South African forces (garrisoned
under a peace accord) which pro-
ceeded to massacre of several hun-
dred guerrillas; 
• in Iraq in 1990 when peacekeepers
failed to report on the impending
invasion of Kuwait, leaving the Sec-
retary-General totally off-guard
when the attack occurred; 
• in Somalia in 1993 during the ill-
fated manhunt for General
Mohammed Farah Aideed; 
• in Rwanda in 1994 prior to and a
the beginning of the genocide, when
clear warning indicators were
ignored;
• in Zaire in 1996 when the UN
aborted a peacekeeping operation
amidst confusion about the number
and conditions of refugees being
attacked; 
• in East Timor in September 1999
when the reign of terror caught the
UN off-guard and unprepared,
forcing it to evacuate and forego
pledges to the Timorese people. 
In some cases, the blame for UN
ignorance belongs to field officers; in
others responsibility lies with UN
headquarters and the Security Coun-
cil. Usually, blame is spread rather
widely but ultimately it can be traced
back to the UN member states who
do not provide the UN with the
resources, finances staff and author-
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ity to carry out the much needed
information gathering and analysis.
Far from discrediting the roles and
goals of the United Nations, these
failures show how important it is for
the organization to possess the means
to predict and prevent emerging con-
flicts. The above examples only sup-
port the call for a stronger UN to be
able to deal proactively with
conflicts. Through a lessons-learned
approach, the UN can discover ways
to avoid repeating past errors and
invest in new approaches and
resources to head off future disasters. 
The UN Secretaries-General have
constantly complained that there is
insufficient information to make the
best decisions. “The pool of informa-
tion available to the SecretaryGeneral
is wholly inadequate,” wrote Secre-
tary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
in his 1991 Annual Report on the
Work of the Organization. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali even recommended
that the UN develop an
“intelligence” capability, a proposal
which was greeted with a chorus of
nays from member states because the
“intelligence” word, sometimes asso-
ciated with nefarious undercover
operations, had been used. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan has made a bold
and valiant effort to establish an
Information and Strategic Analysis
Secretariat (ISAS) within the Secre-
tariat, as proposed in the widly-
acclaimed Brahimi Report16. But this
initiative is being resisted by a num-
ber of developing states who fear that
the UN might pry into their internal
affairs. With the new emphasis on the
protection of UN field workers, after
the tragic Baghdad bombing, a sys-
tem for realistic threat assessments
may finally be created.
The UN and the Information
Technology Revolution
Fortunately, a host of new develop-
ments are helping the UN overcome
the natural and political barriers to
information-gathering and to make it
a significant player in the informa-
tion age. Foremost among them is
rapidly advancing technology. It is
making information easier to access,
store, analyse and disseminate. The
primitive teletype machines of the
1980s used by the UN offices to print
sequential reports from a few wire
services are replaced with desktop
computers for UN officials, permit-
ting them to draw upon a huge num-
ber of sources, including dozens of
wire services, using specialized soft-
ware (e.g., NewsEdge). The Internet
has increased the accessibility, scope
and depth of information from
sources world-wide. The World Wide
Web, which is estimated to be dou-
bling every year or so, offers new
opportunities for both information-
gathering and dissemination. As indi-
viduals and civil society in the devel-
oping world have begun to post
copious amounts of information on
the Internet, a new and special source
of information becomes available
globally, including to the UN. On a
typical day, the UN receives over
200,000 requests for pages from its
web sites. 
Electronic mail has made global
communications easier, cheaper and
faster. It is quickly gaining a foothold
in developing countries, thereby pro-
viding UN officials in New York with
individual contacts at the grass roots
level in countries far away. In addi-
tion, as UN information becomes
more easily accessible to more groups
from around the world, the UN bene-
fits from feedback on its work. The
greater world-wide access to UN doc-
uments, which were previously not
widely circulated outside the UN cen-
tres in New York, Geneva and
Vienna, and the subsequent analysis
and commentary helps in the creation
and improvement of new reports and
action plans. For instance, the Inter-
net site Reliefweb.int, operated by
the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA),
allows the UN to pool information
resources from the myriad of UN
agencies working in the field, as well
as local and international non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and even
national aid agencies. Field reports
that previously would have remained
strictly within the confines of one
department or agency are now avail-
able routinely in a timely fashion to
virtually anyone in the world at
www.reliefweb.int.
The wealth of electronic informa-
tion would be overwhelming and
impenetrable were it not for the
excellent search engines on the Inter-
net—“Google” being the search
engine of choice among many
experts, surfers and researchers.
These search engines permit the web
surfer to scan vast sections of the
Internet—Google searches over three
billion web pages—in a fraction of a
second in order to produce results
(“hits”) corresponding to the search
terms, however specialized these
terms may be. For instance a search
on the term “United Nations moni-
toring” gives 1,500 web pages in
0.18 seconds.17
Still, the concomitant problems of
“information overload and under-
use” are common in the UN, as they
are all over the world. With an ocean
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of information available, more time
and insight is required to sift through
the mounds of news and background
information that are constantly piling
up, and less time seems to be avail-
able for analysis and reflection. 
The growth of the Internet has
other potential weaknesses for the
world and the United Nations. It fos-
ters a dependency on a system subject
to break down and misuse. Examples
of the latter include unwarranted sur-
veillance by governments of electronic
communications (including those of
the UN), the propagation of computer
viruses, the use of the medium for
crime, corruption and other nefarious
purposes, the invasion of privacy in
the form of junk e-mail, etc. 
But the overall effects are clearly
positive. In this electronic revolution,
it is harder for governments to con-
trol or suppress the flow of informa-
tion. It is easier for people to span
intercontinental distances using elec-
tronic communications. The global
village is getting smaller. And the UN
gains because of it. 
Conclusion 
True to Wilson’s vision in 1919, the
monitoring capability of the interna-
tional community is slowly evolving
into a global watch. The faltering but
pioneering efforts of the League pro-
vided the UN with a foundation on
which to build. The end of the Cold
War allowed the UN to acquire
expanded roles in many new fields to
meet the needs of a very unpeaceful
world. From early warning to peace-
building, from disarmament verifica-
tion to a terrorist watch, there are
new and expanded responsibilities
for the UN. 
The evolution of international
organization in the past decade is
manifested in many forms, but it is in
its monitoring functions that we see
the greatest growth of roles and
responsibilities. How has this come
about? Was it the result of a planned
strategy or sporadic progress driven
by the immediate needs of the day?
The answer would appear to be
“clearly both”, as evidenced by
numerous case studies. Creative UN
leadership at specific times of interna-
tional need, if not desperation, per-
mitted the development of significant
innovations that brought both
progress and precedence to UN mon-
itoring. An enhancement of the UN’s
capacity for observation was a nat-
ural step in the information age, and
a much needed one, as the global
body could report more impartially
and objectively than national govern-
ments, especially governments
involved in conflicts. 
But how permanent is this
progress and this process? The UN’s
evolution has been far from linear; it
follows a path strewn with many
obstacles and can be characterized as
“two steps forward and one step
backwards.” Some capabilities and
functions may again be lost (as hap-
pened with some League mechan-
isms). But much will remain in the
form of permanent capabilities, new
mandates and new procedures. Once a
new role has been successfully demon-
strated, the international community
usually finds new applications, espe-
cially in an age when global govern-
ance mechanisms are sorely needed.
The monitoring of national elections,
peace agreements, sanctions, human
rights, etc., gradually covered more
countries as the value of these prac-
tices were proven and the UN’s own
expertise grew. Even still, the applica-
tion of monitoring is not uniform. The
choice of countries and conflicts that
are monitored is still based more on
national politics (especially from the
Permanent Five members of the Secu-
rity Council), and less on needs of the
affected populations. 
It is important to identify forces
that have sought to undermine, or at
least slow down the evolution of UN
monitoring. There are many such
forces. Some are natural and, indeed,
helpful; others are hostile and
obstreperous. Many developing
countries are reluctant to allow the
UN to monitor their activities for fear
of negative publicity or the exposure
of domestic incompetence, corrup-
tion, complicity or other wrong-
doing. This also holds true for the
activities of the most powerful coun-
tries as well. The United States is
careful not to allow the UN to
threaten its dominance in the intelli-
gence arena, especially on matters
where its intelligence reports might
be challenged (e.g., on the presence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq)
or US covert intelligence operations
might be exposed (e.g., Contra arma-
ment in Nicaragua, assassination
attempts on Prime Minister
Lumumba in the Congo, complicity
with Duvalier regime in Haiti, etc.). It
has opposed a general purpose arms
verification capability for the UN and
kept the UN hobbled through its fail-
ure to pay its annual dues for about
three decades. There are factions
within the US right-wing that are
openly hostile to the UN and para-
noid elements hold that the UN is
actually heading a conspiracy to
overthrow the US government!
Are there legitimate pitfalls and
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prohibited zones for a UN global
watch? The issues of privacy, confi-
dentiality, misuse of information
must all be examined. Some fear the
creation of an Orwellian UN in
which “big brother is watching.”
Those studying the UN and those
knowledgeable about its capacities
(and limitations) know that such a
fear is unfounded. In the distant
future, however, perhaps 2084
instead of 1984, could such concerns
be validated? In human history,
whenever and wherever power was
over concentrated, such a concern
has arisen, including in the Roman
Empire, when the question was fre-
quently asked, “Who will watch the
watchman?” But the very nature of
the UN, with its diverse membership
and international civil service makes
it difficult to keep secrets or to over-
step the bounds imposed by its mem-
bers or to take action that would
dilute its moral authority. And with
more democratic nations than ever
before in history (both in absolute
numbers and as a percentage of the
whole), a dependable system of
checks and balances could easily be
set up to regulate UN monitoring. 
On a practical level, what
concrete steps can be taken to pro-
duce a better system in the near
future? Some feel that it is feasible for
the UN to negotiate information-
sharing agreements with
governments so that it can receive a
regular feed of information from a
diverse set of nations (which would,
presumably, reduce the dangers of
bias). The present author is in favour
of such agreements as well as other
bold initiatives: to create a new legal
status for new UN investigative pow-
ers within states; to curtail a state’s
“right of refusal” of fact-finding
teams on certain issues such as
human rights, to develop a UN Open
Skies treaty, which would allow the
UN to overfly national territories as a
confidence-building measure (similar
to the treaty regime that is now in
force between NATO and the former-
Warsaw Pact countries). While these
proposals may seem radical it is not a
departure from the historical devel-
opment but a natural and fruitful
outcome of present trends.
It is clear that UN monitoring
should be conducted where conflict is
most prevalent or most likely to
break out, but should the monitoring
system be applied equally to the
developed (first) world as well as to
the developing (third) world? Should
the UN monitor those states who act
(or claim to act) as “enforcers” of
UN decisions and resolutions,
whether they be duly-authorized or
self-appointed “coalitions of the will-
ing”? What practical means have
been adopted to keep track of such
enforcers to make sure that human
lives are not lost needlessly or care-
lessly (as “collateral damage”) and
that human suffering is reduced to a
minimum. This type of UN monitor-
ing lags well behind the others both
in UN practice and in academic
study. It would be well for academic/
activist groups like Pugwash to
examine the means of monitoring
enforcers and further explore the
notion of an emerging global watch.
As an “eye that does not slumber”,
the UN could serve the world, not as
“big brother”, not as a “big bother”
(as some might think it) but as "big
helper" that would make both peace
and justice more accessible on the
planet. 
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Ironically, improving UN rapid
deployment has proven to be a slow
process. We have been at it for more
than a decade with national studies,
multinational initiatives, interna-
tional commissions, panels of
experts, even conference workshops. 
Yet rather than rapid deploy-
ment, by 1997 routine delays of four
to six months became the norm. By
their nature, emergency situations
usually require prompt responses.
And, earlier this year, a representa-
tive from Sierra Leone reminded us
about the consequences of slow
responses, warning that delays often
frustrated the combatants, encour-
aged re-armament, created security
vacuums, provoked ceasefire viola-
tions, and further prolonged armed
conflicts.1
Last year, the report of the Inter-
national Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, The Responsi-
bility To Protect, revitalized wider
interest in the use of force to protect
civilians threatened by genocide and
mass ethnic cleansing.2 While helping
to initiate a new international norm,
it also raised questions about ‘how’
to protect and ‘with what’, establish-
ing the need to identify and elaborate
upon the alternatives.
Increasingly, we hear of ‘coali-
tions of the willing’, of ‘regional
arrangements’ and of ‘mercenary
armies’ as the new preferences. There
is little doubt that the ‘international
community’ will exhaust every dubi-
ous option before returning to the
one universal institution devoted to
‘saving succeeding generations from
the scourge of war’. There is also the
questionable notion that the UN can-
not handle robust operations or oper-
ations that entail authorization for
the limited use of force under Chap-
ter VII. Everyone knows that the UN
has had difficulties and several seri-
ous failures. The successes are seldom
heralded. Yet it is noteworthy that
many of the recent UN operations
have had a robust composition and
often a mandate authorizing the use
of force (East Timor, Sierra Leone,
the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Kosovo). 
This is not to suggest that the
new EU rapid deployment force or
the NATO rapid reaction forces are
to be dismissed; they may be quite
useful in particular circumstances.
At best, however, these are temporary
‘stop-gap’ measures, not viable long-
term options for preventing, manag-
ing or resolving armed conflicts
worldwide. Given the universal
membership and wider legitimacy of
the UN, this paper will argue the
UN must be better prepared for
assigned tasks in diverse peace oper-
ations, including protection of
civilians. 
It is relatively easy to see a rela-
tionship between rapid deployment
and the protection of civilians.
Almost anything can happen to civil-
ians when a deployment is delayed by
4 to 6 months. If the objective is to
protect, you need to get the mission
in place quickly with a credible
presence.
Preparing the United Nations for Rapid
Deployment to Protect Civilians 
H. Peter Langille, University of Victoria
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Once again, speakers at this year’s
opening session of the UN Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Opera-
tions stressed that rapid response was
the key to saving lives and reducing
costs.3 Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan concluded his report to this
year’s committee urging member
states to intensify their attention and
response, particularly in the area of
rapid deployment.4
What is new here? The UN Secre-
tariat has fulfilled its share of the bar-
gain to modernize and reform. The
onus is now very much on the mem-
ber states, particularly those from the
wealthier developed world who
demanded the reforms as a precondi-
tion to further participation. 
Although further, more
ambitious changes are required, there
are indications of recent progress and
complementary reforms.5 Five are
noteworthy. 
Recent Progress
First, it is encouraging that the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions— DPKO—has been substan-
tively expanded to facilitate planning,
management and support. At least,
there is a new HQ structure, new
offices and 50% more staff. That
recruitment process is now largely
complete. Since the UNTAEAS mis-
sion, wherever both possible and jus-
tified, robust deployments have been
the norm. 
Second, already, we hear that
there are sufficient Strategic Deploy-
ment Stocks at UN logistics base,
Brindisi to provide the basic
infrastructure and kits for prompt
start-up of an operation.
Third, the on-call lists for a
rapidly deployable military mission
headquarters attracted sufficient
response to fill each of the 154 posi-
tions with at least two nominations.
It remains to be seen whether this
model will provide a coherent head-
quarters on short notice. That redun-
dancy of personnel listed will likely
be needed.
Fourth, the UN Stand-by
Arrangement System (UNSAS) has
been refined and expanded. As of
February, seventy-five Governments
indicated their support for this sys-
tem, with conditional commitments
of personnel and equipment listed;
conditional as in what the member
states might provide. 
A fourth ‘rapid deployment’ level
for formed units was added to the
system last summer to encourage
MOUs for self-sustainment and clar-
ify contingent owned equipment,
largely to assist in movement plan-
ning and avoid administrative delays.
It is early going, but so far only two
countries, Jordan and Uruguay have
committed to this level.
Within the standby arrangements,
however, there are still shortages of
enabling units and there is still a need
for strategic lift capacity. 
The Secretariat has also called for
more sophisticated military capabili-
ties that can deter and respond to
threats by uncontrolled armed
groups. This is easier for some than
others, but we already have one rela-
tively good model.
Fifth, the SHIRBRIG was
designed to complement the UN
stand-by arrangement, with a multi-
national Stand-by High Readiness
Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN opera-
tions. It has been operational since
1999 and although it has yet to
demonstrate rapid deployment, the
intent is to provide the UN with
approximately 5000 troops within
15-30 days. There are now 15 mem-
ber states participating in both the
headquarters and the brigade pool. It
has quite broad representation,
although it needs to attract more. It
succeeded in its first traditional mis-
sion in Eritrea and Ethiopia and it
managed a fairly quick exit, if not a
quick entry. In December, the partici-
pating member states agreed, in prin-
cipal, that they would consider more
robust operations on a case-by-case
basis, effectively suggesting a jump
from the former stipulation for
Chapter VI peacekeeping to remain
relevant in the current operations,
which often entail authorization
under Chapter VII for the limited
use of force. 
Would 5000 well-trained, well-
equipped troops be enough to make a
difference? Of course, it depends on
the scope and scale of the particular
conflict, but 5000 is the number
Major-General Dallaire cited as being
sufficient to stem much of the geno-
cide in Rwanda. The British didn’t
need to deploy that many to have a
calming influence on the savage vio-
lence in Sierra Leone. Arguably, a
coherent brigade group could be very
useful in protecting civilians. 
The SHIRBRIG is the most
advanced mechanism to date for UN
peace operations. However, it will
have to be modified if it is to remain
relevant and ready for new tasks.
Given Canada’s current Chairman-
ship of the SHIRBRIG, there is a
unique opportunity to take a lead
role in preparing military capabilities
for the protection of civilians. If it is
to be ready for robust operations,
including the protection of civilians,
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the SHIRBRIG will need to expand
its membership and the pool of avail-
able resources. 
Notably, the Brahimi report (the
Panel on UN Peace Operations)
encouraged member states to cooper-
ate in developing coherent brigade
groups that could be made available
to the UN at short notice.6 To date,
the SHIRBRIG is alone. It has
expressed a willingness to share expe-
rience and assistance with others who
might consider a similar partnership.
Coalitions in other regions are
exploring partnerships to emulate
this model of cooperation (including
the AU, SEEBRIG, ECOWAS and
SADC). 
Aside from the political challenge
of attracting additional commitments
and capabilities, a major effort will
be required to address the current
void in understanding how to
prepare military forces to protect
civilians. At present, there is lack of
appropriate doctrine, tactics, training
and exercises. 
A Preliminary Foundation
Combined, these five related efforts
now provide a basic institutional
foundation for peace operations. This
is also a foundation that should facil-
itate the establishment of further,
more ambitious developments and
additional building blocks. Arguably,
if it is to succeed, it will have to.
Potential Limitations
To date, this is not a foundation
capable of ensuring rapid deployment
or the protection of civilians. Why?
These arrangements still depend
upon political will, prompt national
approval and funding, as well as
appropriately-trained, well-equipped,
national units—conditions that fre-
quently stymie and slow responses.
This is evident in the UNSAS and
even in the SHIRBRIG, which also
depends upon the political will of the
participating member states and their
prompt national approval, which in
turn is frequently far from reliable. 
Repeatedly, even in resolutions of
the UN Security Council, there are
warnings of a commitment-capability
gap as numerous Member States con-
tinue to deny the UN sufficient per-
sonnel, mechanisms and funding.
That does not bode well for peace
operations, for protecting civilians or
for overcoming an increasingly
divided, militarised and risky world.
Further, we all know that for
many affluent Western member
states, the political will to contribute
declined markedly with donor
fatigue, fear of casualties and appre-
hension over extended commitments,
costs and stretched resources. 
For example, Canada, which was
formerly a leading troop contributor
now ranks about 32nd with just over
240 military personnel in UN mis-
sions.7 But the problem is systemic.
Western defence establishments have
a strong preference for the big league,
big budget, advanced technology,
war-fighting roles and a bias toward
coalition operations with American
forces. This preference is now also
reflected in Foreign Affairs, although
the new emphasis appears to be on
NATO peace operations.
Such preferences are not without
consequences. In the past four years,
the heavy burden in carrying UN
operations has been quietly shifted
onto developing countries, which
now provide over seventy percent of
the personnel for UN peacekeeping.
As a result, there are widespread con-
cerns about an increasingly unrepre-
sentative, two-tiered system that is
far too selective and slow.
In short, we finally have an insti-
tutional foundation for peacekeep-
ing; it has improved in the past two
years with the Brahimi reforms and it
might help speed deployments. But
due to the preferences of the member
states, this foundation was predicated
on existing arrangements, not new
effective structures. Hence, there is
no guarantee of reliability and no
assurance of rapid deployment—
irrespective of how desperate the
emergency may be and irrespective of
what is actually happening to civil-
ians.
Renewed interest in a new
‘standing’ mechanism?
So the wider challenge remains, as
does the need for more ambitious
building blocks and new structures.
One can cite a long list of political
and financial impediments, but it is
also apparent that the political envi-
ronment is changing rapidly in a
manner that might be conducive to
the development of options formerly
dismissed as naïve ‘long-shots’.
To cite one example, last month,
U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld informed a group of
defense industry leaders in Washing-
ton that he was considering the devel-
opment of a standing international
peacekeeping force.8 This would be a
major departure from the ad hoc sys-
tem of requesting national approval
for national assistance and personnel
once a crisis arises. Unlike the condi-
tional and quite unreliable standby
arrangements, a standing force is a
coherent formation, maintained in
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readiness with pre-trained, well
equipped personnel, available for
immediate deployment once autho-
rized. 
However, as reported, Rumsfeld’s
initial idea was to have the U.S. to
organize, train and lead this new
force, effectively reallocating respon-
sibility for peacekeeping to the Penta-
gon, not the United Nations. 
Last week, it was also reported
that President Bush met with UN Sec-
retary-General Kofi Annan and the
Under-Secretary-General for Peace-
keeping Operations, Jean Marie Gue-
henno, to discuss, among other
things, options for global peacekeep-
ing and the possibility of training a
‘ready cadre’ of people from around
the Globe.9
While many may see the Bush
administration’s new interest in a
standing peacekeeping force as a des-
perate policy reversal, a ‘trial
balloon’, if not another diversion
from current problems, Pentagon
officials claim it is being taken seri-
ously, even in discussions with other
governments.10
If that is the case, officials from
various member states may soon get
a call requesting assistance, if not
advice. This might provide an oppor-
tunity for supportive governments
and organizations to revitalize wider
interest in other options and indicate
support, albeit only if the focus is re-
directed toward the UN. Fortunately,
reports indicate the American admin-
istration is still thinking this through
and not yet fixed to a particular pref-
erence.
One of the central findings of the
Canadian study on developing a UN
rapid deployment capability, includ-
ing a UN standing force, remains
valid: a force alone may be insuffi-
cient.11 As most peace operations are
now complex multidimensional mis-
sions, involving military, police and
civilian personnel, there is a need for
both robust security forces and useful
services that address human needs
and provide hope. These must be
incorporated in both planning and
deployments at the earliest stages.
A UN Emergency Service
A multidimensional UN Emergency
Service—a UN ‘911’ composed of
military police and civilian
volunteers—would correspond to
these diverse operational
requirements of contemporary, as
well as future UN peace operations. 
The model of a UN Emergency
Service is projected to require a total
of approximately 13,200
personnel.12 This number includes all
deployable elements, base support
and administration, as well as the
operational headquarters. The latter
would be expected to ensure two tac-
tical-field headquarters (mission
headquarters) were fully functional
and capable of assuming operational
control over one of the two forma-
tions of deployable elements. The
deployable elements assigned to each
mission headquarters would be iden-
tical, including a military brigade
group, three companies of civilian
police, as well as civilians skilled in
diverse humanitarian, peace-building
and conflict resolution tasks. These
various elements would be within a
modular structure allowing deploy-
ments to be tailored to the specific
demands of diverse assignments.
Each package could carry a credible
military presence, provide unique
support and services, and potentially
fulfill a wide array of tasks.
There would be no shortage of
individuals willing to volunteer for
service on a paid, full-time basis, sim-
ilar to that of UN civil servants.13
Each would be recruited and selected
on the basis of specific expertise and
skills, as well as dedication to the
principles of the UN. To ensure uni-
versal representation, applicants
would be encouraged from all mem-
ber states.14
According to Kofi Annan and his
Under-Secretary-General for Peace-
keeping, Jean Marie Guehenno,
improving UN rapid deployment
remains a priority task; one the UN
and various NGOs are still pursuing,
despite a lack of tangible support
from governments and foundations.
That must change!
In his seminal 1957 study, A
United Nations Peace Force, William
R. Frye provided an insight that is
worth recalling: that which is radical
one year can become conservative
and accepted the next”.15 We have
yet to achieve Frye’s objective. The
challenge remains, as does the urgent
need. We should prepare
accordingly!16
Notes
1 Cited in UN, “Rapid Response By UN
Key To Saving Lives And Reducing
Costs, Speakers Stress In Peacekeeping
Committee, As General Debate Con-
cludes”, Press Release, GA/PK/178,
March 4, 2003.
2 See: Report of the International Com-
mission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty, The Responsibility to Protect,
(Ottawa: International Development
Research Centre, December 2001).
3 UN, “Rapid Response By UN Key To
Saving Lives And Reducing Costs…”
4 UN, Report of the Secretary-General to
the General Assembly, “Implementation
of the recommendations of the Special
78 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2003
53rd Pugwash Conference
Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations”, A/57/711, January 16,
2003, para. 92, p. 26.
5 For more detailed analysis, see H. Peter
Langille, Bridging the Commitment-
Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements
and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid
Deployment, (Wayne, NJ: Center for
UN Reform Education, 2002).
6 United Nations, Report of the Panel on
UN Peace Operations, A/55/305-
S/2000/809, para 115.
7 In Canada, it is noteworthy that peace
operations have been dropped almost
to the bottom of the human security
agenda with officials placing their
emphasis on gender and expert civilian
deployment. 
8 See Esther Schrader, “U.S. Looks at
Organizing Global Peacekeeping
Force”, Los Angeles Times, June 27,
2003.
9 Howard LaFranchi, “Bush may forge
new model for global peacekeeping”,
The Christian Science Monitor, July 14,
2003.
10 For further analysis of this option see,
H. Peter Langille, “A global emergency
force?”, The Toronto Star, July 4,
2003.
11 See, Government of Canada, Towards
a UN Rapid Reaction Capability,
Ottawa, September 1995.
12 See Langille, Bridging the
Commitment—Capacity Gap, pp. 127-
128
13 An excellent review of the arguments
for and against such a development is
within, Stephen P. Kinloch, “Utopian or
Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military
Volunteer Force”, International Peace-
keeping, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996.
14 This option was outlined in Towards a
Rapid Reaction Capability for the
United Nations. Further elaboration
was provided in H. Peter Langille,
Maxime Faille, Carlton Hughes and
Major James Hammond, “A Prelimi-
nary Blueprint of Long-Term Options
for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction
Capability”, in Davic Cox and Albert
Legault, (eds), UN Rapid Reaction
Capabilities: Prospects and Require-
ments, (Cornwallis: Pearson Peacekeep-
ing Press, 1995), pp. 179-200. Both
inspiration and ideas were derived from
Sir Brian Urquhart, “For a UN Volun-
teer Military Force, The New York
Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 11, June
1993, pp. 3-4 For an early response to
the Urquhart proposal see: Lord
Richard Carver, “A UN Volunteer Mili-
tary Force: Four Views”, The New
York Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 12,
June 24, 1993. 
15 William R. Frye, A United Nations
Peace Force, (New York: Oceana Publi-
cations, 1957), p. 77.
16 This is an appropriate time for an in-
depth, independent, transnational study
to identify the general and specific
requirements for starting, maintaining
and operating a UN Emergency Service.
This study should provide a review of
diverse options and assess their poten-
tial for addressing probable tasks and
contingencies. It should also offer guid-
ance into appropriate composition,
structure and organization.
Bella Americana: Some Consequences for the
International Community 
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The view that the United Nations is
“dead” (Richard Perle) is not new.
For rigid supporters of international
peace enforcement—peace by mili-
tary means wherever required—the
organization had served its turn
already in 1956 when it failed to put
an end to the Soviet occupation of
Hungary. Serious disappointments
would follow: Tibet, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Afghanistan, East Timor, to
mention just a few. The UN’s major
concern has always been inter-
national security in its prime meaning
of the avoidance of war, while all that
refers to “positive peace”—in the
sense of peace with justice—is seen as
subservient to that strategic thrust. It
was only after the end of the Cold
War that some new optimism could
arise regarding a corrective role for
the UN in cases of major aggression
and grossly oppressive regimes; yet,
what followed were the disappoint-
ing 1990s, that period of missed
opportunities.
Strikingly, it is precisely that “ide-
alistic” peace enforcement discourse
that is now employed by the so-called
realists who declare the UN to be
dead again. It is true, of course, that
Saddam Hussein constituted a major
dilemma to the international commu-
nity, as Tony Blair put it to the House
of Commons. However, in such
dilemmas between human rights,
democracy and disarmament on the
one hand, and international security
on the other hand, it used to be the
latter that tipped the balance. This
was probably in line with the inten-
tions of the 51 states that had signed
the Charter of the United Nations on
24 October 1945, a more realistic
design than the “softie” Pact of the
League of Nations. “Negative
peace”, in other words, was
grounded in that primary emotion
of 1945: Never Again!
Yet, what happened in Iraq can-
not be simply interpreted as a victory
of American peace idealists against
the realism of a Security Council in
line with the UN’s founders. One
should rather speak of a new type of
realism, based on unilateral economic
interests—the oil supply to the
North, for example—and, above all,
a unipolar view on power. In the Dec-
laration of 7 June 1997, signed by
men like Dick Cheney, Donald Rums-
feld and Paul Wolfowitz, this new
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American realism had already been
made explicit. An appeal is made to
accept America’s unique role in the
world and to maintain an
international order conducive to its
security, welfare and principles. In his
State of the Union message of Janu-
ary 2002, George W. Bush based his
presidential doctrine on the following
three principles: active global Ameri-
can leadership, regime change in the
case of “rogue” governments and
global promotion of neo-liberal
democracy. During the past years the
United States has acted in conformity
with that line, showing time and
again that they are with the UN only
when it suits them. Instances coming
to mind include the Kyoto Protocol
and the International Criminal
Court. Bypassing the Security Coun-
cil in a pre-emptive war fits into also
that picture. Not surprisingly, the US
dealt with the “rogue” issue in the
Middle East. Above all, however, in
its forceful opposition to the already
heavily weakened Iraqi state, Bush
had an excellent opportunity to
demonstrate American supremacy as
the foundation of a new international
political order. How to assess the
consequences of that “New American
Century” in respect of the United
Nations, and how to react?
In the search for a new foreign
policy, e.g. in the European Union,
reference is sometimes made to a Pax
Americana. With that term, compar-
isons come to mind with the Pax
Romana at the start of the first mil-
lennium and the Pax Britannica in the
19th century. Notably, these
hegemonies served “negative peace”,
particularly in the case of the British
Empire outside Europe.2 The Ameri-
can obsession with “axes of evil” and
regime change, however, primarily
implies war: a series of Bella Ameri-
cana. Strikingly, since 9/11 the United
States considers itself as being “in
war”.
A first reaction, then, that merits
serious consideration is Tony Blair’s
attitude of “If you can’t beat them,
join them!” While not his official
political line—which moved from the
dangers of weapons of mass destruc-
tion deployable within 45 minutes to
“just war” against regimes that cause
their own subjects unnecessary suf-
fering—it would at least be a strategy
one could understand. In the new
century, American military supre-
macy is a fact of life, and the only
way to contain its consequences with
regard to the international political
order is to stay within the Atlantic
alliance. Unfortunately, however, it is
not the coalition but the mission that
decides policies (“the mission must
determine the coalition, the coalition
must not determine the mission”3).
Illustratively, when Blair seemed to
face trouble in his parliament,
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld rushed
to point out the possibility of “going
it alone”. In Washington today, even
NATO is seen as an impediment to
the necessary flexibility. As for the
European Union, “disaggregation”
appears to be the core of American
foreign policy, as a State department
official recently declared.4
The price one pays for the “join
them” formula is its enhancement of
the position of the current American
administration in the struggle for
international legitimacy. We are
touching upon a complicated notion
here, and one that in international
debate is often overlooked. Even
when power is “a fact of life”, it is
still confronted with the need for
reception by those affected by its exe-
cution. The ruled, in other words,
have to accept the rule of the rulers.
The new American leadership recog-
nizes this; hence the “imbedding” of
journalists in their war machine. In
our modern world, legitimacy is the
inescapable condition for holding
power without repressing one’s own
people. Apparently, the legitimation
effort of the Bush II administration
appears to be focused on a combina-
tion of ideological persuasion and an
emphasis on outcome: “All ’s well
that ends well.” However, legitimacy
is a matter of three things: the right
principles and institutions, the right
processes and the right outcomes. As
to the principles, the new American
leadership no longer recognizes the
United Nations’ Charter as an Inter-
national Constitution. Here, a politi-
cal philosophical battle has to be
fought with all possible force, based
on a combination of realism and
moral conviction. As to the former,
world peace through world law5 is,
indeed, not yet a fully realized option
and most probably never will be. In a
global context, formation and execu-
tion of power without a solid legal
base remains inevitable. But wherever
that takes place, its objectives and
focus have to be questioned continu-
ously, and a real effort has to be
made to incorporate not only politi-
cal, but also military and economic
power, in an international legal set-
ting. Insofar as global power forma-
tion cannot be based on principles of
representative democracy, power
sharing constitutes the next best
option. Essential in this respect is not
the incorporation of primarily “the
willing”, but precisely the incorpora-
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tion of opposing forces. Military
power may, indeed, provide security,
but it can also attract danger and
new threats6, as illustrated today in
post-war Iraq. International law, as
positivized in the Charter of the
United Nations and further
developed through decades of UN
practice, is based on the primary
principle of non-intervention.
Notwithstanding the international
character of human rights obligations
as obligationes erga omnes, humani-
tarian intervention cannot be based
on unilateralist action.7 It is the prin-
ciple of the rule of law, so vigorously
defended domestically in the United
States, that have to be extended to
global forms of governance: limited
government, government by law and
respect for subjective rights, both of
individuals and of groups. 
Fortunately, this political philo-
sophical confrontation of the “New
American Century” position, based
as it is on the wrong principles, is
already becoming part of the daily
debate within the United States.
Europe, that birthplace of interna-
tional law, also has to join in the
debate, refuting the attempts at “dis-
aggregation”. International civil soci-
ety will doubtless take part, too:
watch the coming World Social
Forum IV in Bombay, January 2004.
For Pugwash International, an inspir-
ing role seems an obvious
consequence of our strategic thrust in
international affairs, with the Annual
Conference as a prime opportunity.
No less important is the international
corporate world. An increasing focus
on “corporate responsibility” may
well result in a global interest in these
matters, too: watch the coming
World Economic Forum in Davos,
January 2004. Genuine universality
exists in market-related rights and
values, rather than in the fundamen-
tal freedoms and entitlements follow-
ing from the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights whose quinquennial
celebration is loudly announced every
five years. The People deficit in the
new triple value approach—People,
Planet, Profit—in global business
might worry the participants at the
World Economic Forum as much as it
does the non-governmental commu-
nity at the World Social Forum.
(Rather urgent, by the way, is the
establishment of structural connec-
tions between these two principal
global fora.) 
In respect of global legitimacy, a
discussion of the right principles is a
great deal easier than an examination
of the right institutions. There is a lot
of well-founded criticism on the UN,
and here it is worth listening to the
current American administration as
well. (Evidently, a focus on legitimacy
implies that, in terms of their military
supremacy, the United States is not
necessarily right, but nor is it neces-
sarily wrong.) Inefficient and ineffec-
tive bureaucracies, irrelevant discus-
sions, and endless procedures
undermine the organization. The
point is that the right processes, the
next major element in establishing
legitimacy in the realm of global
power, are necessarily connected with
the United Nations, and it happens to
be that the UN itself suffers from a
lack of democratic legitimation in its
decision-making processes. This
applies to the United Nations as such,
but also to connected agencies such
as the World Trade Organization. An
impression is created that whatever
has been decided in the upper levels,
corrections downstream are never
possible. Operational structures will
have to be found to facilitate decent
and credible association with civil
society at both the global and the
local level. It is true, of course, that in
their exclamation, “Thank God for
the death of the United Nations”,
Richard Perle and the likes have to be
convincingly confronted. But that
battle has to be fought with more
than words alone; it is, indeed, high
time for a revitalization of the United
Nations in line with its new tasks.
Hence, Kofi Annan’s immediate reac-
tion on the war that bypassed the
international community—you stum-
ble, you fall, you rise, and then you
walk again—misses the seriousness of
the current crisis in the international
political order.8
A revitalization of the UN is to be
founded in the three grand projects
with which the organization started
after World War II: international
security, human rights and develop-
ment. The major challenge today is to
create an approach that integrates
across these ventures’ three separate
institutional settings: the Security
Council, with its international politi-
cal focus; ECOSOC and the human
rights institutions with their juridical
focus; and the United Nations Devel-
opment Program, the specialized
agencies and the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions with their economic focus.
When the Roosevelt Academy in
Middelburg (NL) gives out its “four
freedoms awards” it nominates not
only four prize winners for the free-
dom of speech, the freedom of wor-
ship, the freedom from fear and the
freedom from want, but the Academy
also awards a fifth: for the four
together.9
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In all three major fields of inter-
national governance—international
security, human rights and develop-
ment—a re-engineering seems well in
place. If the current crisis were to
contribute to such an undertaking, it
might even be seen as positive. 
Finally, there remains the issue of
outcome. In the three areas of this
international mission, our world
today is confronted with huge
deficits. The international security
deficit expresses itself in endless man-
ifestations of intra-state collective
violence. Grave instances of complete
failure of the international commu-
nity come to mind here (Rwanda,
Srebenica). The realization of human
rights suffers from a huge deficit too,
which is all too often submerged in
the general euphoria over human
rights declarations, conferences, com-
mittee meetings and workshops.
Despite the International Criminal
Court (confronted by the United
States with its “Hague Invasion
Act”), a virtually worldwide struggle
has to be fought against the impunity
of state-related perpetrators of civil
and political rights. Moreover, other
human rights problems continue to
exist: there is an apparent lack of
protection offered to minorities; a
continued public-private divide,
which paralyzes the struggle against
domestic violence; and daily non-
implementation of economic, social
and cultural rights in a world in
which so many people’s basic needs
remain denied. There is an enormous
development deficit, too, manifesting
itself in gigantic inequalities between
countries and between people. In
spite of all progress made since the
UN’s foundation, these deficits are
still far from being effectively tackled.
Confronting these deficits will
require a different style in
international politics at all levels. This
style will need to be tuned to the con-
sultation and involvement of people,
rather than geopolitical maneuvering,
and it will need to deal primarily with
the real threats, such as lack of water,
rather than outward manifestations
of power like the possession of
weapons of mass destruction.
Within an international setting
tuned to negative as well as positive
peace, a special position for the
United States, with its impressive
power in terms of military, financial
and human resources, will have to be
accepted. Essential in that respect is a
legal framework based on a re-engi-
neering of international principles
regarding sovereignty and the prohi-
bition of violence. To further this
goal, the old principle of proportion-
ality applies: even justified interests
are not to be pursued with means that
result in disproportionate damage to
people outside the actual conflict. 
Obviously, then, in the current
crisis in the international political
order, much more is at stake today
than just international security in a
narrow sense. Indeed, it is not merely
a revision of the Security Council and
a discussion on the prohibition of
violence between states that are part
of the agenda, but also at stake is the
role of the United Nations in conflict
prevention. For those working on
that agenda, the realism of the United
Nations’ founders may offer
profound inspiration, but their ideals
may ultimately prove to be even more
crucial. 
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Introduction
The end of the Cold War led to vastly
reduced tensions between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. Yet the new millen-
nium has been marked by the contin-
uance of NATO—indeed its great
expansion—as well as increased
American tendencies to resort to uni-
lateral and isolationist measures.
While many people think of the UN
as a fifty-year old institution in need
of reform, NATO is also a middle-
aged organization in need of reform.
Wholesale reform will not work.
Reforms must be cumulative, built
gradually on existing foundations.
For instance, the decision to invite
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into
the alliance was one kind of reform.
The establishment of the Euro-
Atlantic Council and the NATO-
Russia Founding Act were others.
But NATO needs a much greater
transformation of its structures and
procedures if it is to serve the com-
mon security interests of the allies
and others. Today’s ongoing tumult
of change necessitates that traditional
policies be seriously reconsidered
and, perhaps, drastically reevaluated.
As September 11th, 2001 made evi-
dent, old ways of thinking no longer
apply to the world we live in. This
article suggests strategies to reform





toward pre-emptive nuclear war
Many Europeans and Canadians fear
that the Bush administration will
resort to using nuclear weapons in a
future conflict. Although Russia,
China, France, and Britain officially
retain the use of strategic nuclear
weapons, American development of
new theatre and battlefield nuclear
weapons (including the ‘robust
nuclear earth penetrator’) is frighten-
ing many because of the US adminis-
tration’s apparent willingness to
resort to their use. As the Bush
administration declares:
“Given the goals of rogue states
and terrorists, the United States can
no longer solely rely on a reactive
posture as we have in the past. The
inability to deter a potential attacker,
the immediacy of today’s threats, and
the magnitude of potential harm that
could be caused by our adversaries’
choice of weapons, do not permit
that option. We cannot let our ene-
mies strike first….To forestall or pre-
vent such hostile acts the US will, if
necessary, act pre-emptively.”1
The development of nuclear
weapons-related technology and pos-
sible acquisition by terrorist groups
or “rogue states” means the use of
nuclear weapons seems more ‘credi-
ble’ now than it has been since the
Cuban missile crisis. Whereas it is
certainly true that the Americans can-
not sit idly by while their security is
undermined, the route they are tak-
ing—asserting nuclear credibility—
will result in a more insecure world
with a greater, not less, likelihood of
nuclear war. The Western alliance’s
concepts of nuclear deterrence and
nuclear pre-emption must move away
from the traditional notion of
‘defending’ against threats—such as
strategic/tactical nuclear weapons,
rogue states or terrorists—towards
an emphasis on minimal deterrence—
and eventually nuclear abolition. But
if the US continues on its present tra-
jectory—threatening to respond or
pre-empt a nuclear, biological or
chemical attack with nuclear
weaponry—they will incite an arms
NATO Reform: New Strategies to Advance
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race where states will also seek to
deter or pre-empt using new types of
weapons like “enhanced radiation
weapons”, “space control satellites”
and “nuclear-survivable communica-
tions systems.” The costs for the
world will be enormous as countries
compete to design weapons for possi-
ble use against undeterrable terror-
ists, on rogue-state battlefields or in
outer space. As a new statement on
nuclear weapons policy issued by the
board of the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation states:
“It is the US insistence on retain-
ing a nuclear weapons option that
sets the tone for the world as a
whole, reinforcing the unwillingness
of other nuclear weapons states to
push for nuclear disarmament and
inducing threatened or ambitious
states to take whatever steps are nec-
essary, even at the risk of confronta-
tion and war with the United States,
to develop their own stockpile of




States has suddenly become for other
governments a country to be deterred
rather than, as in the Cold War, a
country practicing deterrence to dis-
courage aggression by others.2
Reassessing NATO’s reliance on
nuclear deterrence strategy
Curiously, the NATO allies continue
to profess their reliance on the strat-
egy of nuclear deterrence while the
US moves toward a pre-emptive
‘first-strike’ strategy that promises to
retaliate with nuclear weapons even
in the event of a ‘limited’ chemical or
biological attack. The situation is
similar to the 1960s when the allies
continued to rely upon mutual
assured destruction (MAD) even as
the US developed ‘flexible response’.3
While NATO recently conducted a
review process, its reexamination of
the Strategic Concept simply
reaffirmed its central tenet—that
nuclear weapons are “essential”.
Although NATO decision-makers
assert that the “Paragraph 32”
process is finished, the door needs to
be re-opened to further engagement
on the question.4
We need to remember that efforts
to change NATO’s deterrent policy
can begin at the nation-state level.
The thrust for NATO’s recent review
essentially began because Canada’s
parliament released a report calling
for a re-examination of NATO’s
reliance on nuclear deterrence and
the Strategic Concept. 5 The Cana-
dian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axwor-
thy committed his department to
attempt to change NATO’s nuclear
doctrine—for which he was often
labelled a ‘nuclear nag.’6 Yet in the
final analysis, even American diplo-
mats at NATO headquarters were
impressed with the Canadian initia-
tive and the determination of the For-
eign Minister and his diplomatic
aides, particularly the Deputy
Ambassador Robert McCrae.7 In a
similar fashion, working together
with other like-minded countries,
such as Germany and Norway, it





One of the main assumptions the
allies need to ask themselves in their
reforging of doctrine is whether
nuclear weapons protect the alliance
by deterring potential aggressors
from attacking. During the Cold War,
strategists assumed that by threaten-
ing massive retaliation, nuclear
weapons could credibly prevent an
enemy from attacking. September
11
th
demonstrated there are no guar-
antees that the threat of retaliation
will succeed in preventing an
attack—indeed, it may be difficult to
retaliate against a sub-state
opponent, like a terrorist group. Also
traditional arguments against deter-
rence still hold true. There are many
ways that deterrence could fail,
including misunderstanding, miscal-
culation, poor communication, irra-
tional leadership, and accident.
But, of course, even if some allies
seriously question the efficacy of rely-
ing upon deterrence, there may
appear to be little likelihood that
hard-line strategists will come to the
same conclusion, in part because it is
difficult to give up on long-held
assumptions. Will this generation of
NATO decision-makers have to retire
or die before the allies can relinquish
their convictions about deterrence? In
each of Christopher Columbus’s four
voyages between 1492 and 1504,
Columbus believed that “he had
reached Asia, he was in Asia, and it
was from Asia he returned. No one,
nothing, to the day of his death, ever
made him relinquish that cherished
conviction.”8
On the other hand, recent
evidence indicates that, in the wake
of the September 11th crisis,
decision-makers in the highest eche-
lons of American decision-making—
including President Bush and his clos-
est advisors—are coming to doubt
the efficacy of deterrence and try to
think more about this strategy. At a
National Security Council on Octo-
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ber 9, Vice President Cheney and Sec-
retary of Defense Rumsfeld discussed
the possibility that bin Laden (whom
they referred to as UBL) might have
weapons of mass destruction. “UBL
might not be deterrable,” said
Cheney. “Well,” the president said,
“sponsoring nations of UBL, those
that support him, might have some
influence with him. Should we send
some messages, private or public?”
We need to think some more about
this, said Rumsfeld.9 Clearly strong
advocates of deterrence from the
‘New Right’, like Bush, Cheney, and
Rumsfeld, now recognize that deter-
rence may fail to work with sub-state
actors and many more alternatives
are needed.  
Since all the NATO allies depend
on a relationship of ‘extended deter-
rence’ with the US (even if they pro-
fess to be nuclear-weapon free on
their own soil), it is incumbent upon
each of them to re-examine
deterrence strategy with a view to
generating a cornucopia of alterna-
tive strategies ranging from reassur-
ance to coercion. Verifiable treaties,
well-funded inspection regimes, cut-
ting-edge technology, strong
sanctions, and enhanced control over
fissile materials are needed in every
region of the world. But history
shows that the first steps towards a
regional—then global—approach can
be taken by the leaders of individual
nation-states through regional orga-
nizations like NATO and the EU.
Each NATO ally needs to reconsider
its reliance on extended deterrence in
light of the new types of threats and
challenges the international commu-
nity now faces. 
NATO in the Aftermath of the
Wars against Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq
The lack of consensus about
NATO’s collective security
guarantees
The NATO allies responded swiftly
to the September 11 terror attacks,
invoking Article V—the collective
defence provision—of the 1949
Washington Treaty the next day.
According the US Department of
Defense’s report on allied contribu-
tions, the European allies in NATO
deployed AWACS aircraft to the US
by October 9. The UK and France
contributed support aircraft to the air
campaign over Afghanistan,
deployed ground troops inside the
country before the Taliban was over-
thrown, and dispatched naval forces
to the Indian Ocean for maritime sur-
veillance/interdiction operations.
Other NATO nations, most notably
Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands,
also sent naval forces to the Indian
Ocean; Canada, Denmark, Germany,
and Norway deployed special forces
inside Afghanistan; and the Czech
Republic deployed a chemical
defence unit to the region. The
NATO allies also provided the bulk
of the 16-nation International Secu-
rity Assistance Force in Kabul.10
Apparently all the NATO allies were
in agreement about the necessity of a
collective response to the attack on
America. But the atmosphere of con-
sensus dissipated by March 2003
shortly before the US attack on Iraq. 
In March 2003, Belgium, France,
and Germany imposed a veto on the
commencement of military planning
to defend another member state,
Turkey, in the event of hostilities with
Iraq. To date, the effects of the
Franco-German ‘dovishness’ have
been considerable. For example, the
former members of the Warsaw Pact
that either have joined or hope to
join the alliance are asking whether
France and Germany might be pre-
pared to veto NATO counter-
measures to help them in the event of
a crisis? These countries are particu-
larly dependent on NATO’s collective
security guarantee because they are
being asked to give up much of their
‘all-round’ and ‘outdated’ defensive
capabilities in order to contribute
‘specialist’ skills. All the allies need to
engage in a discussion about when
and how Article V provisions will
protect them during a crisis.
Coping with American
heavy-handedness
Another fall-’out of the war against
Iraq relates to perceptions of Ameri-
can heavy-handedness. US Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld threatened to
pull NATO headquarters out of Brus-
sels unless Belgium agreed to repeal a
law which gives its courts universal
jurisdiction to try cases of genocide,
war crimes and human rights viola-
tions. While Belgian parliamentarians
did agree to change the law to cases
in which either the victim or the
accused were residents of Belgium,
war crimes lawsuits had already been
filed against US President George
Bush, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair,
US Secretary of State Colin Powell,
General Tommy Franks, and Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.11
The new US propensity to
threaten others with extreme mea-
sures is, perhaps, most telling in the
United States’ recent decision to sus-
pend military assistance to six
nations seeking NATO membership
because they failed to exempt US citi-
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zens from prosecution in the new
International Criminal Court (ICC).
As the deadline passed for govern-
ments to sign exemption agreements
or face the suspension of military aid,
Bush issued waivers for 22 countries
but he did not include Bulgaria, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. It is not yet clear whether
these countries will sign bilateral
waivers in order to obtain military
aid; but what is clear is that the Bush
administration is taking a more
aggressive approach than has ever
been seen in NATO corridors. The
allies should respond to aggressive
bullying just as schools and mature
adults respond—with a heavy
emphasis on non-violence and
respectful confrontation.12
New Types of Threats to
Allied Security
Reconsidering the Nature of the
Threat
NATO needs to reconsider and
reevaluate perceived threats to the
international community. Who is
threatened, by whom, and how? For
a while, the fact that there was no
longer a significant Soviet threat
implied that security could be
preserved at much lower levels of
defence spending. Now the threats
from Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin
Laden, and Saddam Hussein have led
to calls for greater defence spending.
US President Bill Clinton planned to
increase the defence budget in his last
year in office by hundreds of billions
of dollars, the largest hike in peace-
time history.13 Then in the wake of
September 11, US President George
Bush announced his plan to increase
the defence budget in 2003 to $380
billion, more than double that of the
rest of NATO combined. By one esti-
mate, the US is now spending 45 per-
cent more on nuclear weapons activi-
ties than at the end of the Cold War.
And many American diplomats are
eager to lecture Europeans and Cana-
dians about the need to increase their
defence spending.14 The NATO allies
need to discuss whether American
plans to increase defence spending to
such high levels are a greater threat
to the world’s security than small-
scale tyrants like Saddam.
In any discussion of whether the
US itself now poses the most serious
threat to allied security, some facts
need to be highlighted. After all, it is
better to judge a nation by what it
does, not what it says. The US has yet
to take its nuclear arsenal off the high
alert status of the Cold War. It has
not renounced first use of or threat to
use nuclear weapons under all
circumstances. It opposes the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
and it has withdrawn from the ABM
treaty. Plus it is making plans to
shorten the time needed to resume
testing of new and more usable
nuclear weapons. The situation is
similar to a boy’s gang where the
leader is hell-bent on a dangerous
course. Do the other boys follow him
blindly or do they call a meeting to
argue about the club’s rules and prin-
ciples? Being a member of the NATO
club does not entail unquestioning
allegiance to the club’s leader.
Rather than respond in a knee-
jerk fashion to the United States’
remonstrations, NATO should imple-
ment new kinds of defence prepara-
tions that are considered vital to
NATO—and concomitantly the
international community’s—
concerns. Governments needs to
think carefully about how they will
spend their defence dollars and
where: Is there any need to prepare
for high-intensity conflict, as NATO
did during the Cold War, and still
does? When and how should the
NATO allies contribute to UN-sanc-
tioned mid-intensity conflicts, such as
the Gulf War, or NATO-sanctioned
mid-intensity conflicts, such as the
war over Kosovo? What kinds of
American defence preparations in
Europe (e.g. in Turkey) might be per-
ceived as offensive and provocative,
rather than defensive and necessary? 
Sharing alternative threat
assessments and intelligence
For decades, NATO’s assessment of
the threat has been shaped and influ-
enced by American military threat
analyses. While Prime Minister Tony
Blair has been exonerated for taking
American intelligence at face value so
much so that he was able to argue,
fairly convincingly, in favour of
attacking Iraq, citizens will not
accept this sort of back-handed logic
in future wars. In future, domestic
publics will demand to see hard evi-
dence of a country’s professed tran-
gressions, even if the Americans
argue they have the evidence but it
cannot be released for security rea-
sons. Some of the lessons of the war
against Iraq are that the NATO allies
need to undertake more of their own
independent military threat
analysis.15 They need to institute the
infrastructure and procedures neces-
sary to carry out their own indepen-
dent threat analyses and share their
findings. In conjunction with UN
monitoring agencies and
international watchdog institutes,
NATO could unite with like-minded
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nations to provide the UN Security
Council with timely and accurate
threat assessments based on new
information (and possibly conflicting
analyses of the threat). Such alterna-
tive threat assessments might play a
valuable role in ameliorating tensions
and defusing arms spirals in the
weeks and months preceding possible
multilateral or unilateral actions,
such as air strikes.
Promoting an atmosphere of
conciliation through NATO
Naturally, critics will retort that shar-
ing intelligence—especially contrary
evidence as to the nature of the
threat—will not necessarily harness
the Bush administration from under-
taking pre-emptive or unilateralist
measures. For many American diplo-
mats at NATO, the lessons of the
Kosovo campaign in 1999 and the
Franco-German rebuff in 2003 rein-
forced their belief that NATO is far
too cumbersome and bureaucratic.
Now that targets have to be
approved by a consensus of all 25
members of the NATO club, “coali-
tions of coalitions” may seem more
practical16, as exemplified by the
United States’ ‘coalition of the will-
ing’ in Iraq. Even if one or more of
the NATO allies puts forward con-
tradictory evidence about the nature
of the threat, the US and members of
its ‘fast alliance’ may choose not to
accept evidence stemming from alter-
native sources. A great deal will
depend on the quality of the intelli-
gence and in this respect, the more
independent European partners in
NATO (France, Germany and the
UK) could have a lot to offer. NATO
headquarters should inculcate a cul-
ture where competing interpretations
of threats are encouraged among the
25 allies. On the other hand, such an
atmosphere of conciliation and
acceptance may take a long time and
patient nurturing. As the Ditchley
Foundation concluded in a recent dis-
cussion of NATO’s future role: 
“Whatever the underlying causes,
most of us agreed that this level of
transatlantic insult had not been seen
before and that it had contributed to
an unnecessary crisis, the effects of
which would be with us for some
time. There was a good deal of bro-
ken crockery about.”17
Threats to North American Security
The decline of the Soviet threat previ-
ously meant that the North American
Aerospace Defence Command
(NORAD) was no longer as impor-
tant to North American security. But
now some argue that preparing for
possible warfare in space is necessary,
and the US (probably in conjunction
with Canada) will work through
NORAD to develop space-based
interception capabilities. In his
annual report released on 10 June,
the Chief of Canada’s Defence staff,
General Ray Henault, stated that
Canada had a common interest with
the US in developing a missile defence
system.18 In Europe, concerns have
long been raised about the European
allies’ possible contributions to the
US military’s global surveillance,
warning, and communications sys-
tems.19 As many Europeans have
pointed out, the American govern-
ment needs to be especially careful
that it is not perceived to be intent
upon erecting some kind of ‘Fortress
America.’ NATO governments
should maintain official positions of
nonparticipation in active missile and
space-based defence programs. The
allies should re-emphasize their com-
mitment to the basic tenets of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(although the US and Russia chose to
abandon the ABM Treaty) and work
to ensure that aspects of the missile
defense program associated with
NORAD do not violate the ABM
Treaty’s basic principles.
New Threats and Challenges to
NATO and the World’s Security
The Threat of Russian Nuclear
Proliferation
The possibility of Russian nuclear
weapons and fissile material falling
into the wrong hands is great.
Desperate conditions exist in nuclear
cities and biological institutes across
Russia. Many weapons scientists and
engineers are not being paid. The sale
of nuclear weapons, materials, tech-
nology, and the flight of nuclear sci-
entists to other countries is inade-
quately monitoried. A sharp drop in
weapons research spending has left
thousands of scientists, engineers,
and technicians in near poverty.20
NATO should work with other like-
minded states through the Interna-
tional Scientific and Technical Center
(ISTC) in the former Soviet Union to
provide Russian scientists with more
long-term research grants and pro-
grams that promote alternative civil-
ian employment.21 NATO should
also propose that an international
registrar of scientists be set-up
through the UN to track the research
activities of all scientists in the world.
Similar to the UN Arms Registrar,
cooperation would have to be volun-
tary (in order to preserve academic
freedom). However, over time such a
registrar could contribute to






What can be done through NATO to
further enhance Russia’s nuclear sta-
bility? Much of the problem stems
from Russia’s weakness, not its
strength. NATO should press Russia
to continue to centralize control of its
nuclear arsenal and consolidate
nuclear weapons on Russian soil.
More technological and monetary
assistance for Russia is necessary.
Estimates are that only 37 percent of
the potentially vulnerable nuclear
material in the former Soviet Union is
being adequately protected. The
NATO allies can help with more
funds in order to avoid a nuclear
tragedy from occurring. They might
also issue a challenge to other rich
nations, such as Saudia Arabia and
Japan, to contribute substantial
amounts. With like-minded nations,
NATO could also sponsor anti-leak-
age programs at Russian nuclear
facilities. As non-nuclear players,
allies such as Belgium, Canada, and
the Czech Republic could be
perceived as neutral third parties gen-
uinely interested in reducing leakage
of information and nuclear materials
from Russian nuclear storage and
launching sites.
North Korea’s Nuclear Program
The announcement by the Democra-
tic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) of withdrawal from the Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was dis-
turbing but still more frightening is
recent news that North Korea is
developing technology that could
make nuclear warheads small enough
to be placed atop the country’s mis-
siles, which could put Japan at risk.
The DPRK claims it decided to with-
draw from the NPT “to preserve its
sovereignty and defend the country
against the continuous moves from
the USA to isolate it.”22 It would
appear that this is a conflict between
the US and the DPRK which should
not concern the other NATO allies
(except Canada, which would be
within range of a threatened nuclear
attack by North Korea on Seattle).
But the Great Powers (US, Russia,
China, UK, and France) and smaller
European allies cannot absolve them-
selves of responsibility for the present
hair-trigger situation. The failure of
the nuclear weapon states to imple-
ment their NPT obligations under
Article VI of the NPT means many
countries like North Korea have the
excuse they seek to obtain nuclear
arsenals of their own. 
The Threat of Conventional
Weapons Proliferation
The United States is the largest con-
tributor in the world to the arms
trade and arms trafficking. Compared
to the other Great Powers, it has an
over-sized military industry that pro-
motes American wares with zeal. The
Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions
are engaged in regional arms races
and eager to obtain American
weapons systems. Countries like
Saudia Arabia are flush with petro-
dollars and demand American
defence products. American compa-
nies such as General Motors, are con-
tributing to the worldwide arms race
in acquiring conventional weapons.
All the NATO allies, particularly the
United States, need to actively dis-
courage their own domestic manufac-
turing industries from seeking mili-
tary contracts in the Asia-Pacific and
Middle Eastern regions. Negative
inducements could include the elimi-
nation of government subsidies and
grants and the closure of loopholes
that permit tax breaks for research
and development for military pur-
poses. Government trade missions
and foreign service officers should
also be actively discouraged from
promoting significant military indus-
try contracts overseas. Each ally must
take action so as not to become an
important supplier of assemblies,
components, and sub-components to
arms manufacturers in the United
States.
Future Rounds of NATO
Enlargement
Delay Further Rounds of Expansion
The first round of NATO expansion
took place in the spring of 1999
without widespread Russian
approval. Although Russian Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin conceded at the
last moment to the idea of inviting
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland into NATO, all the Russian
parties and most Russians were
opposed to NATO’s enlargement
from 16 to 19 nations. The second
round of expansion, agreed upon in
2002, also runs the risk of inciting
old hatreds and new insecurities. The
seven former Soviet bloc nations due
to join the alliance next year are: Bul-
garia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. At
25 members, NATO will have diffi-
culty forging a consensus and the US
has already expressed interest in
working closely, if necessary, with a
few close allies, not the entire
unwieldy apparatus.
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The alliance should postpone any
decisions about soliciting newer
members (such as Japan23) to avoid
further tensions with Russia, a strong
opponent of NATO expansion and
the air wars against Yugoslavia and
Iraq. The United States and the other
NATO allies should delay opening
the door to further NATO enlarge-
ment until the Russian leadership
considers that it is an integral part of
Europe’s emerging security
architecture.
Include Russia in NATO
NATO’s first priority should be not
to create new dividing lines. A
reformed NATO, which did not aim
to include the most powerful country
in Europe, Russia, would be fatally
flawed. The NATO allies should
strive to engage NATO and Russia in
an active, cooperative relationship
that would form the cornerstone of a
new, inclusive security structure in
Europe. The allies must act strongly
through NATO, the UN and other
multilateral institutions, such as the
G-8 and the International Monetary
Fund, to invite Russia into Western
security and economic structures. 
NATO’s air attacks on Serbia,
Kosovo, and Afghanistan, make it
even more imperative that the alliance
make a supreme effort to welcome
Russia into European decision-mak-
ing circles. During the Kosovo war,
Russia suspended all contacts with
NATO and took its soldiers in Bosnia
from under NATO command. Rus-
sia’s decision to step back from
involvement in NATO, within hours
of the attack on the former
Yugoslavia, indicated that the provi-
sions of the NATO-Russia Founding
Act were insufficiently attractive for
Russia to remain engaged in discus-
sions at Brussels. Russia needed more
incentives and more reassurances.
Then during the war on Afghanistan,
Russia supported the US war against
terrorism. But the recent controversy
about attacking Iraq revealed that,
even despite its desperate need for US
funding, Russia was against attacking
Iraq without the UN Security Coun-
cil’s approval. The US went ahead,
despite opposition from Russia,
China, Canada, and a host of other
countries. It is still too early to say
what the damage has been but evi-
dently Russia needs to be consulted,
not ignored. More incentives could
include formally embedded consulta-
tion mechanisms, a mutual non-
aggression pledge, and a promise
to develop non-offensive defence
systems.
The NATO Allies’ Approaches
toward Worldwide Defence
Spending
Maintain Low Levels of Defence
Spending
Since 1997, high-level Americans,
such as the US Ambassador to
Canada, have repeatedly emphasized
the need for other NATO members to
increase overall military spending.24
Overall, the non-US NATO members
spent an average of 1.9 percent of
GDP on defence in 2001 as
compared to 2.0 percent in 2000.
The Czech Republic, France, Greece,
Italy, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom ranked at or
above this average. All other 11
NATO members fell below this aver-
age, highlighting that American
remonstrations to spend more are
failing to convince.
For example, Germany is making
drastic cuts in equipment and slim-
ming down its organizational struc-
tures; its focus has switched to peace-
keeping, crisis management, and the
war against terrorism, rather than
defending itself from Cold War
attacks. On the other hand, Canada
has recently increased its defence
spending on capital and equipment
sharply. Although Canada’s continu-
ing fiscal problems, and its prom-
inent role as a proponent of disarma-
ment, should constrain its spending
on defence, the country is setting a
poor example which other states
could follow. Increasing defence
spending is not an option for respon-
sible policy-makers. 
Many European defence lobbyists
bemoan the continent’s low level of
spending on defence but domestic
publics will not tolerate higher levels
of spending. The newer allies will
have a tough time coming up with
the money to bring their militaries up
to NATO’s basic standards of inter-
operability.
One defence official noted that
Hungary promised to meet 14 of its
initial 48 goals by its acceptance in
March 1999 but as of June 2000 had
completed only six. “The reason is
not our commitment; the reason is
money,” that official said.25 Taking a
strategic view, however, Hungary’s
geographic location allows NATO to
project into Eastern Europe, and
Hungary has played an active role in
the Bosnia and Kosovo operations as
a host nation supporting NATO’s
deployments and logistics. Similarly,
Poland is playing a useful role in
charge of NATO’s peacekeeping mis-
sion in Iraq. At a meeting in Brussels
in June 2003, Spain and Ukraine
each committed to head a brigade of
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an 8,000-strong multinational divi-
sion to help stabilize Iraq, which will
be led by Poland with NATO’s
support.
Calculate each ally’s defence
spending fairly
In forthcoming analyses of the allies’
abilities to meet an agreed-upon set
of capabilities pledges—the “Prague
Capabilities Commitments”—the
newer NATO allies need to factor
into the equation alternative sorts of
commitments (e.g. to UN and
NATO-sponsored peacekeeping)
because they also improve the
alliance’s military preparedness and
close the spending gap between the
US and its European allies. Even the
EU’s efforts to field a rapid-reaction
force of 60,000 personnel by 2003
should count as a monetary contribu-
tion to NATO’s security. After all, US
calculations of their percentage of
GDP spent on NATO include all US
defence spending worldwide—includ-
ing US spending in the Middle East
on defence and American foreign mil-
itary assistance to Columbia—so it
makes sense to silence critics ques-
tioning whether NATO’s European
members have the will to deliver on
their spending promises by asking
NATO officials to calculate spending
estimates on all types of defence
expenditures. Individual countries
should also consider threatening to
halt payment for the costs of NATO
enlargement until the United States
agrees to its fair share of assessed UN
dues. If high-level American officials
admonish the allies for reduced
spending on defence, Europeans and
Canadians should remind them of the




NATO overhaul emphasizes rapidly
deployable capabilities
Most of the NATO allies, including
the United States, are participating
more heavily in peacekeeping under
NATO auspices than in the past.
NATO foreign ministers announced
two new missions this year:
commanding the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force in Afghanistan
and assisting in Poland’s command of
a NATO-supported peacekeeping
force in Iraq. NATO is also improv-
ing its ability to act far beyond
Europe and North America through
a major restructuring that includes
cutbacks at NATO headquarters in
Belgium and a stronger presence in
the United States. A new command
centre in Norfolk, Va will oversee
this modernization. More robust,
rapidly deployable capabilities will
change NATO into “a much more
nimble, deployable, action-oriented
organization.” According to Cana-
dian Defence Minister John McCal-
lum, such a “major streamlining” is
“a cultural change that will be
significant.”26
The most significant change
affects NATO operations, which
were formerly divided between a
European and an Atlantic command.
The two will be merged under Allied
Command Operations, based in Bel-
gium and under the authority of US
General James Jones. A new entity
called “Allied Command Transfor-
mation” is also being created to
supervise changes to NATO’s mili-
tary capabilities, including efforts at
joint training between alliance mem-
bers. The most significant develop-
ment will be a 20,000-strong ‘NATO
Response Force,’ ready to deploy
within days after its creation in 2003. 
At the same time as these peace-
keeping initiatives are being planned,
the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)
is contributing between 25,000 and
32,000 alliance and non-alliance
troops. The Stabilization Force
(SFOR, formerly IFOR) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina includes about 13,000
NATO and non-NATO troops.
Finally, NATO members have been
patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean
since the terrorist attacks of 2001, a
mission called Operation Active
Endeavour.
But the risk is that as NATO
involves its allies in more “out-of-
area” operations, similar to Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, the rest of the
world will come to perceive NATO
peacekeepers as defenders of the
American empire. There needs to be
a return to the UN as the chief guar-
antor of safety because of the wide-
spread perception that the ‘NATO
club’ consists mainly of Northern,
‘rich’, ‘white’ nations based in North
America and Europe. 
Return to the UN with increased
funding and contribute to the
SHIRBRIG
The UN continues to experience a
funding crisis due to member states’
failure to honour their financial
obligations. Member states of the
UN invest an average of $1.40 in
UN peacekeeping activities for every
$1000 spent on their own armed
forces. For example, for every dollar
that it has invested in UN peacekeep-
ing, the United States has tended to
spend over $2000 on its own
military.27 The NATO allies need to
contribute more money and person-
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nel to UN peacekeeping or run the
risk of being accused of trying to
maintain the status quo through
NATO peacekeeping. One effective
way to do this would be to contribute
stand-by forces and equipment to the
UN’s Standby High Readiness
Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Fifteen coun-
tries are contributing to the brigade,
which successfully monitored the
ceasefire between Eritrea and
Ethiopia, but more contributors and
resources are needed. SHIRBRIG
aims to provide the UN with a jump-
start, rapid deployment force of as
many as 5,000 troops within 30 days
notice.28 While NATO’s new ‘Rapid
Reaction Force’ will be perceived as
US-led and status-quo oriented, each
participating state in SHIRBRIG
reserves the right to decide whether
to deploy national personnel on a
case-by-case basis. Canada currently
holds the chair and presidency of the
brigade. And there is some hope that
it could be deployed to avert geno-




NATO could do more to help mem-
ber states adjust to their peacekeep-
ing responsibilities. Peacekeeping
duties now include the monitoring
and administration of elections, pre-
ventive deployment, humanitarian
and human rights functions, the
enforcement of UN Security Council
resolutions, and nation-building
mandates. The burden of peacekeep-
ing for NATO has dramatically
increased and many NATO allies
have valuable experience and knowl-
edge that could be used to reshape
NATO and other multilateral institu-
tions in the new era. However,
NATO’s institutions and peacekeep-
ing infrastructure remain much the
same as they were during the Cold
War, despite the explosion of new
operations. The promising concept of
the Lester B. Pearson Canadian Inter-
national Peacekeeping Training Cen-
tre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia must
be fully developed and implemented
as its original architects intended.30
The Pearson Peacekeeping Training
Centre is currently only a shell of
what it could be. The Chretien gov-
ernment arguably implemented it
purely for electoral purposes, not to
make real changes to the military’s
approach to peacekeeping. The
Canadian government must ensure
that the Pearson Peacekeeping Train-
ing becomes widely regarded as one
of the best peacekeeping training cen-
tres in the world, an invaluable
resource for the Canadian Forces,
NATO, and peacekeepers worldwide.
It must become a centre of learning
for all ranks—not just a place for
officers and civilians to share peace-
keeping ideas and experiences.
Conclusion
NATO has limited time and a small
window of opportunity to take
advantage of its fairly benign reputa-
tion. It is highly unlikely that this
regional military alliance will be seen
in such a positive light ten years from
now. Indeed, NATO is well-situated
to make the important changes pro-
posed thus far in this article because
the NATO allies did not acquiesce to
American pressure to join the war on
Iraq. It was evident from France,
Germany, and Canada’s reluctance to
join the war that not everyone could
agree on the best methods and most
efficient means of achieving
commonly-valued objectives, includ-
ing the ouster of Saddam Hussein.
One important lesson is that every
NATO ally—not just the current
hegemon—have a duty and responsi-
bility to put forward new ideas and
proposals to enhance international
and national security. As Professor
James Eayrs suggested over thirty
years ago in Fate and Will in Foreign
Policy:
“Force is the monopoly of the
Great Powers, for all the good it does
them. But Great Powers enjoy no
monopoly over ideas. The foreign
minister of a small state may not be
able to summon a gunboat in aid of
his diplomacy, to carry a big stick let
alone to brandish it. But he can carry
a briefcase well enough, and stock it
with proposals.”31
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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
late 1979 turned out to be—contrary
to the expectations of the Kremlin
leadership—the largest, longest, and
costliest military operation in Soviet
history. The United States, in support
of the Afghan resistance, waged an
exceedingly elaborate, expensive, and
ultimately successful covert war.
Unlike other proxy wars in Africa
and South America, for the first time
ever, the United States supported a
guerrilla army firing on Soviet
troops. With Pakistan’s General Zia-
ul-Haq as America’s foremost ally
and Saudi Arabia as the principal
source of funds, the CIA openly
recruited Islamic holy warriors from
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and
Algeria. Radical Islam went into
overdrive as its superpower ally and
mentor funneled support to the
mujahiddin. In 1988 Soviet troops
withdrew unconditionally and US-
Pakistan-Saudi-Egypt alliance
emerged victorious. A chapter of his-
tory seemed complete.
Appearances were illusory, how-
ever, and events over the next two
decades were to reveal the true costs
of the victory. Even in the mid 1990’s
—long before the 9/11 attack on the
United States—it was clear that the
victorious alliance had unwittingly
created a dynamic now beyond its
control. The network of Islamic mili-
tant organizations created primarily
out of the need to fight the Soviets in
Afghanistan did not disappear after
the immediate goal was achieved but,
instead, like any good military-indus-
trial complex, grew from strength to
strength. It now exists with extensive
transnational cooperation, coordina-
tion, and close ties. Indeed these non-
state actors have repeatedly targeted
their former sponsors, as well as
other states and governments glob-
ally—Pakistan, India, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Philippines, Indonesia, Rus-
sia, and the United States have been
attacked in recent times. 
Prologue To The Soviet Invasion
Building upon the crumbled edifice of
European colonialism, the United
States had emerged as a superpower
at the end of the Second World War
with vast global strategic and
economic interests. Desolate and
tribal, Afghanistan was of only mar-
ginal interest. Although there were
some attempts to increase US influ-
ence through economic aid in the
early 1950’s this dry, mountainous
and barren land was understood to
have no significant strategic or eco-
nomic value. Indeed, there had been
implicit acceptance of Afghanistan as
belonging to the Soviet sphere of
influence. For example, in the Eisen-
hower era, Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles had turned down
Afghan requests for American arms.
Moreover it placed high value upon
Pakistan, a key US ally in the fight
against communism, and saw no rea-
son to offend it. Pakistan had—and
still has—a simmering border dispute
with Afghanistan over the legitimacy
of the “Durand Line” by which
British colonialism had rather arbi-
trarily divided the two countries.
Because of its geographical prox-
imity, the Soviet interest in
Afghanistan was greater. Aid to
Afghanistan—motivated both by
ideals of internationalist solidarity
and the desire to increase political
influence—became of considerable
significance during the first decade of
the Cold War. By 1956, Afghanistan
possessed Mig-17s, Ilyushin-28s, and
T-34 tanks. Suspicions of Soviet
desires to install a socialist regime in
Afghanistan were sometimes aired in
the West. But, as a highly fragmented
Islamic tribal society, Afghanistan
appeared a highly unlikely candidate
for socialism. Tribal law and tradi-
tions held sway, making it impossible
for Afghanistan to function as a mod-
ern nation state. There was neither a
proletariat, nor a feudal system in the
usual sense. Even today cave-dwellers
are common in Afghanistan. The
subsistence economy provided no
market of any interest. 
Significant changes, with Soviet
support, began occurring in the
period of Sardar Muhammad Daud
Khan who served as the prime minis-
ter of Afghanistan 1953-1963. The
first Afghan university was
established in Kabul, and in parts of
the country a small start was made
on public education. Daud’s brother-
in-law, Muhammad Zahir Shah, had
been the King of Afghanistan since
1933. In 1963, he suddenly dismissed
Daud. Ten years later, Daud staged a
coup, returned to power, and abol-
ished the monarchy. Zahir Shah was
exiled to Rome (from where he even-
tually returned after the 9/11 attack).
Daud was supported by some Army
officers who later joined the Afghan
Communist Party, and by Babrak
Karmal, a leftist politician. (Six years
later, when the Soviets invaded, they
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installed Karmal as President of
Afghanistan.) By all accounts, the
Kremlin leadership was entirely satis-
fied with the state of affairs in the
early years of Daud’s rule. Soviet
influence grew, and the Soviet Union
became Afghanistan’s leading trading
partner as well as its leading arms
supplier. 
By abolishing the monarchy, how-
ever, Daud had removed the one sym-
bol of legitimacy that had held
Afghanistan together and established
the idea of seizing political power
through a military coup. A small
Marxist party, The People’s Democ-
ratic Party of Afghanistan, under the
leadership of Nur Muhammad
Taraki, was to carry this tradition
much further. From its inception the
PDPA was bitterly divided into two
factions, each named after its respec-
tive newspaper. Taraki’s “Khalq” fac-
tion was made up mostly of Pushtuns
from rural areas but it aspired to be a
Leninist working-class party. Babrak
Karmal’s “Parcham” presented itself
as a broad national democratic front
ready to work within the system.
Hafizullah Amin, an instructor at the
Teachers’ Training School in Kabul,
had just received an M.A. at Teachers
College of Columbia University in
New York. He was described by
some as “all charm and friendliness”
but ultimately was directly responsi-
ble for the execution of probably
6000 political opponents. Babrak
Karmal also had a devoted disciple—
a former medical student named
Najibullah. In each case, the disciple
ousted his patron in order to assume
the presidency of Afghanistan. Today
they are all dead. 
In 1978, despite bitter divisions,
the PDPA was able to pull together
enough unity to engineer a coup
against Daud. The Soviet Union,
which was watching the Shah of
Iran’s overtures to Daud, had become
wary of Daud and saw a determined
effort to draw Afghanistan into a US-
tilted regional and economic sphere.
It endorsed the coup but controlling
this most unorthodox Communist
Party was a nearly impossible task,
because its leadership was seriously
divided, with Karmal challenging
Taraki for power from the very
beginning. At the time of the coup, at
least a third of the Afghan Army’s
officer corps was Soviet-trained. Nev-
ertheless, nobody in power, in
Afghanistan or outside it, foresaw the
coup. Taraki boasted that the news of
our revolution took both superpow-
ers by complete surprise. 
By a series of decrees, the PDPA
set out to change Afghan society. To
be sure, many of the reforms had
honorable intent. For example, child
marriages were declared illegal and
the minimum marriageable age for
girls was set at 16. The purchase and
sale of women, sanctioned by tribal
law, was deemed an offence, as were
barter marriages. Female education
was declared compulsory. These
reforms were to end tragically, but
the reason was not just the conser-
vatism of Afghan society. From the
very beginning, the PDPA pursued a
disastrous course calculated to pro-
voke resistance among the people.
Taraki’s name occurred repeatedly
during a radio or TV broadcast with
ludicrous titles appended to it, his
house was turned into a “revolution-
ary shrine”, and his shoes, pens, and
inkpots were put on display. The tra-
ditional Afghan flag with colors of
Islam was replaced with a red banner.
Inexperienced and imperious bureau-
crats from Kabul infuriated the peas-
ants by enforcing clumsy “land-
reform”. It was almost as if the
revolutionary leaders had decided, in
the name of progress, to outrage
every segment of Afghan society.
By the winter of 1978-79,
Afghanistan was up in arms against
the communists. In the fall of 1978,
supported by Pakistan, the Islamic-
fundamentalist guerrilla groups that
had operated against Daud between
1973 and 1976 reentered
Afghanistan with a force of about
five thousand. There followed major
armed rebellions, which the
conscripts in the Afghan Army were
unable to put down. Many of them,
horrified at being asked to kill their
own kin, joined the resistance, bring-
ing their weapons with them. Units of
the Afghan Army in the provincial
capital of Asadabad defected en
masse. In March of 1979, an uprising
broke out in Herat, an ancient city
near the Iranian border populated by
Shiites, who were enthralled by the
Khomeini revolution. These pro-Iran-
Mohamed Kadry Said and panel on Human
Security and the Middle East.
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ian rebels went from house to house
looking for government collaborators
and Soviet advisers. About a thou-
sand people, including a number of
Soviet advisers and their families,
were killed; in reprisal, parts of the
city were destroyed. In June of 1979,
Tehran Radio broadcast the appeal of
a senior ayatollah calling upon the
people of Afghanistan to rise up
against the Communists. The Shiite
population of the Hazarajat region
staged another uprising.
As detailed in Raja Anwar’s semi-
nally important book ”The Tragedy
of Afghanistan”, Soviet efforts to reg-
ulate Afghan affairs succeeded only
in worsening the situation. On Sep-
tember 4, 1979, Anwar reports,
Taraki left for a visit to Havana, and
in his absence one of his supporters
drew up plans to assassinate Amin.
However upon Taraki’s return from a
visit to Moscow, Amin ordered tanks
into all key points in Kabul and had
Taraki arrested and confined to his
quarters. Three weeks later, the
founder of Afghanistan’s revolution-
ary party was murdered, on Amin’s
orders. Though Amin moved quickly
to placate the opposition, mostly by
promising religious freedom, and
though he was given increasing
Soviet military help, he could neither
put down the insurgency nor win
wider political support. He turned to
diplomacy to relieve the pressure,
courting both Pakistan and the
United States. Yet at the same time he
kept asking for more Soviet military
aid. By July, there were fifteen hun-
dred Soviet military advisers assigned
to the Afghan Army, and a Soviet
light-airborne battalion was deployed
near Kabul for their protection. In
late November, Amin asked the Sovi-
ets to bring in ten thousand soldiers
to protect Kabul, so that he could
free Afghan forces to attack the
rebels in the countryside.
The Soviets Invade
In December 1979, Soviet troops
crossed the Afghan frontier and, for
the first time since the end of the Sec-
ond World War, forcibly entered the
territory of a sovereign Muslim coun-
try. The overriding reason for the
invasion was that the civil strife
inside Afghanistan was viewed in the
Kremlin as “a seat of serious danger
to the security of the Soviet state” as
Leonid Brezhnev put it two weeks
later. Afghanistan has a thousand-
mile border with the Muslim Central
Asian republics of the Soviet Union,
which are populated by Tajiks,
Uzbeks, and Turkmens peoples that
also inhabit Afghanistan. In 1978,
there had been a riot of Tajiks against
the Russians in Dushanbe, a town on
the Soviet side of the frontier. Toward
the end of 1979, the Khomeini revo-
lution in Iran was stirring up Islamic
nationalism in the entire region, and
the taking of American hostages at
the American Embassy in Tehran on
November 4th increased the possibil-
ity of American military action
against Iran within a few hundred
miles of the Soviet border. 
An extraordinary meeting of 35
Islamic countries met in Islamabad
on January 27, 1980 to condemn the
“Soviet military aggression against
the Afghan people” and to urge that
no Muslim country recognize the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
—the name given by the Soviet-
installed government in Kabul. But,
pointing to the disunity in the Arab
world, and to its long-standing sup-
port for the Palestinian struggle, the
Soviet Union blunted the criticism
substantially. Four months later the
denunciations began to fade. This
was understandable because many
Arab countries had strong military
and economic ties with the Soviet
Union.
Reactions in the United States
were much harsher. Many US com-
mentators believed the invasion was
the first move in a grand strategic
plan aimed at expanding Soviet
power. President Carter quickly
accepted the judgment of his
national-security adviser, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, that the invasion was a
threat to the rest of the region. Carter
deemed the Soviet invasion as “the
greatest threat to peace since the Sec-
ond World War,” and on January 23,
1980, he announced a policy that
came to be known as the Carter Doc-
trine: “An attempt by any outside
force to gain control of the Persian
Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the
United States of America, and such
an assault will be repelled by any
means necessary, including military
force.” US experts declared that
Leonid Brezhnev had taken up Peter
the Great’s quest for a warm-water
port and may next break through
landlocked Afghanistan to arrive
eventually at the Persian Gulf by
invading either Pakistan or Iran.
Afghanistan now became a metaphor
for the Soviet Union’s boundless
appetite and unpredictable behavior.
America Organizes The Great Jihad
History may well have taken a differ-
ent course if the year of the Soviet
invasion had not also been the year
for presidential elections in the US.
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But with Ronald Reagan as the rival
candidate, Jimmy Carter could not
afford to appear soft on the Soviets.
Angrily condemning Soviet expan-
sionism, Carter withdrew the SALT II
treaty from consideration by the Sen-
ate, announced that the United States
would boycott the Moscow
Olympics, and prepared a major mili-
tary buildup, which included a Rapid
Deployment Force, intended primar-
ily for the Persian Gulf. The Adminis-
tration requested approval for a
C.I.A. covert operation in
Afghanistan, and offered Pakistan
four hundred million dollars in aid,
which General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’s
military ruler, dismissed as “peanuts”
in an astute political move. Suddenly,
Afghanistan had become the focal
point of American global strategy.
From the day the Soviets invaded,
American diplomatic strategy was to
mobilize world opinion against the
Soviets. American ire was aroused
not out of sympathy for the particu-
lar victim but by the act of aggression
itself and what it portended for the
future. Afghanistan was doomed to
be a domino. Officials like Richard
Perle, Assistant Secretary of defense,
saw Afghanistan not as the locale of
a harsh and dangerous conflict to be
ended but as a place to teach the Rus-
sians a lesson. Such “bleeders”
became the most influential people in
Washington. 
Given the highly conservative
nature of Afghan society and the
spontaneous resistance to the Afghan
communist resistance, it did not need
a genius to suggest that Islamic inter-
national solidarity could be used as a
powerful weapon. The task of creat-
ing such solidarity fell upon Saudi
Arabia, together with other conserva-
tive Arab monarchies. This duty was
accepted readily and they quickly
made the Afghan Jihad their central
cause. It was a natural course of
action to take. First, they felt
genuinely threatened by the Soviets.
Second, it shielded their patron and
ally, the United States, whose direct
confrontation with the Soviets would
have been dangerous and unwise in a
nuclear-armed world. But still more
importantly, to go heart and soul for
jihad was crucial at a time when
Saudi legitimacy as the guardians of
Islam was under strong challenge by
Iran, which pointed to the continued
occupation of Palestine by America’s
partner, Israel. An increasing number
of Saudis were becoming disaffected
by the House of Saud—its
corruption, self-indulgence, repres-
sion, and closeness to the US. There-
fore, the Jihad in Afghanistan pro-
vided an excellent outlet for the
growing number of militant Sunni
activists in Saudi Arabia, and a way
to deal with the daily taunts of the
Iranian clergy. 
Support for the Mujahideen also
fitted perfectly with the Reagan Doc-
trine—a global package of widely
publicized covert aid for anti-Com-
munist guerrillas fighting the estab-
lished governments in Nicaragua,
Angola, Kampuchea, and
Afghanistan. Now the United States
decided to play in the global game of
guerrilla politics and to do what the
Soviets had done in the sixties and
seventies when they had encouraged
wars of national liberation. The US
would henceforth do the same by
sponsoring right-wing guerrilla
movements in the eighties.
The US supplied support package
had three essential components—
organization and logistics, military
technology, and ideological support
for sustaining and encouraging the
Afghan resistance.
With William Casey as the direc-
tor of the CIA, the largest covert
operation in history was launched
after Reagan signed the “National
Security Decision Directive 166”,
calling for American efforts to drive
Soviet forces from Afghanistan “by
all means available”. US counter-
insurgency experts worked closely
with the ISI in organizing mujahideen
groups and in planning operations
inside Afghanistan. Indeed, it was
evident to residents in Islamabad and
Peshawar in the 1980’s that large
numbers of Americans were present
and involved in mysterious activities.
But the most important contribution
of the US was to create international
linkages and bring in men and mater-
ial from around the Arab world and
beyond. The most hardened and ide-
ologically dedicated men were sought
on the logic that they would be the
best fighters. Advertisements, paid
for from CIA funds, were placed in
newspapers and newsletters around
the world offering inducements and
motivations to join the Jihad. 
At the initial stage of the US
involvement, fears that the Soviet
Union would react harshly against
Pakistan prompted caution in supply-
ing arms and military technology to
the Afghan resistance. Therefore the
strategy then was to minimize the
appearance of American involvement
and so preserve deniability. Indeed, in
the early years, the CIA procured
arms of Soviet manufacture captured
by the Israelis during various Middle
Eastern wars and even manufactured
simulated Soviet arms in a clandes-
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tine factory. Some time into the war,
however, the US began to take a
much more overt position and US
supplied technology played a key role
in defeating the Soviet war machine
in Afghanistan. 
Perhaps the most decisive single
weapon was the shoulder-fired
ground-to-air missile known as the
Stinger. From 1986 the Afghan
mujahideen started receiving Blow-
pipe and Stinger ground-to-air mis-
siles from Britain and the United
States. The first shipment went exclu-
sively to the fundamentalist wing of
the resistance; that is, the three
groups favored by the ISI and headed
by Hekmatyar, Khalis, and Rabbani.
The new weapons made Soviet heli-
copters and low-flying air-support
missions exceedingly vulnerable and,
even today, helicopter and aircraft
wrecks litter Afghanistan’s landscape. 
The decision to send Stingers was
popular in Congress and seen as a
way to hurt the Soviets. Some offi-
cials in the Pentagon, however, were
aware of the risks that these sophisti-
cated weapons channeled through the
ISI could land up in other places.
Indeed, only a few months after the
first Stingers had been supplied, frag-
ments of these missiles were found in
the wreckage of two Iranian gun-
boats. A vigorous world arms market
offered high prices for these missiles,
and it is likely that many were sold
off. The number of missiles supplied
by the CIA is said to exceed 1500
and their recovery is still under way1. 
The third component of the Rea-
gan doctrine, emphasizing ideological
support to the Afghan resistance, was
implemented through extensive pro-
paganda in the global mass media.
US television channels lavished praise
on the “brave fighters for freedom”
and special documentary programs
were produced with adaptations for
Islamic countries. Less well known is
the extraordinary effort that went
into creating propaganda for Afghan
children2. 
An example is the textbook series
underwritten by US grants through
the mujahideen-operated “Education
Center for Afghanistan” in the
1980’s. These textbooks sought to
counterbalance Marxism through
creating enthusiasm in Islamic mili-
tancy. A third-grade mathematics
textbook, for example, asks the fol-
lowing question:
One group of mujahidin attack
50 Russian soldiers. In that attack 20
Russians are killed. How many Rus-
sians fled? 
Another example from a fourth-
grade mathematics textbook poses
the following problem:
The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet
is 800 meters per second. If a Russian
is at a distance of 3200 meters from a
mujahid, and that mujahid aims at
the Russian’s head, calculate how
many seconds it will take for the bul-
let to strike the Russian in the fore-
head. 
The quotes above are taken from
children’s textbooks published under
a $50 million grant from the United
States Agency for International
Development that ran from Septem-
ber 1986 through June 1994 and was
administered by the University of
Nebraska at Omaha. According to
Craig Davis, the UNO program staff
chose to ignore the images of Islamic
militancy in the children’s textbooks
for the first five years of the program
because “the University of Nebraska
did not wish to be seen imposing
American values on Afghan
educators”.
US-sponsored textbooks, which
exhort Afghan children to pluck out
the eyes of their enemies and cut off
their legs, are still widely available in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, some in
their original form3. Years after they
were first printed, they were
approved by the Taliban for use in
madrassas.
Pakistan Plays The Key Role
In the decade 1979-1989 Pakistan
became the front-line state in the
fight against communism. But it is
important to realize that Pakistan’s
involvement in organizing the Afghan
Islamic resistance dates much before
the Soviet invasion of 1979. In 1973,
when Daud, a Pushtun, took over the
government in Kabul for the second
time, he renewed encouragement to
the Pushtuns of Pakistan to secede
and join their blood brothers under
the Afghan flag. At that point, the
government of Pakistan fought back
by organizing the Pushtuns into a
guerrilla movement to harass the
Afghan government. For fifteen
years, two very different Pakistani
governments, the civilian government
of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the mili-
tary regime of Zia-ul-Haq, used the
Afghan resistance first as a way of
exerting pressure on Kabul, then as a
means to strengthen the often waver-
ing American commitment to Pak-
istan. The more the United States
involved itself in the Afghan cause,
the more Pakistan would emerge as
the indispensable staging area for the
fight against Communism, and the
more secure the flow of American aid
to Pakistan would be.
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelli-
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gence (ISI) Directorate, with head-
quarters in Islamabad, was charged
with distributing the weapons. This
was part of the bargain—in fact the
part that the US profoundly regrets
today—which was the most crucial in
determining the character and com-
position of the Afghan resistance.
Throughout the Soviet occupation,
the ISI gave only token aid to the
Pushtun tribes identified with Zahir
Shah even though they were the most
important tribes. Zahir Shah himself
was not allowed to come to Pakistan
to organize Pushtun resistance forces
under his banner, which he attempted
to do on several occasions. Pakistan
decided which groups in the Afghan
resistance got the $3 billion that the
United States and its friends poured
in. Most of that $3 billion went to
Islamic fundamentalist groups that
represented a tiny minority of
Afghans but were favored by the ISI.
Pakistan was looking for trusted col-
laborators who would help them to
establish a Pakistan-oriented client
state in Kabul after the war in order
to realize Zia’s dream of “strategic
realignment”4 They wanted to make
sure that no U.S. guns or money went
to Pushtuns who might try to get
back the lost Pushtun tribal areas
that now make up the Northwest
Frontier province of Pakistan. All
training camps were under direct
control and operated by the ISI.
Years after the Afghan war was won
and the Soviets defeated, these camps
would be used for training jihadists
to fight in Kashmir, Chechnya,
Bosnia, Philippines, Russia, and the
United States. 
By 1985 the Soviets were in bad
trouble militarily. They realized that
they had blundered into a situation
that offered no respite and offered to
withdraw without a political settle-
ment. The switch in the Soviet posi-
tion provoked an immediate switch
in the position of Pakistan that hith-
erto had only demanded a Soviet
withdrawal. Like the “bleeders” in
Washington, Pakistani military and
intelligence officials were in no mood
to let go of a windfall that had
brought them immense power, privi-
lege, and money. It therefore became
crucial for them to seek means for
avoiding a settlement. Indeed, Zia-ul-
Haq considered any kind of deal as a
betrayal of Pakistan. He spoke bit-
terly to newspaper editors in Islam-
abad. “America and Russia have
reached an understanding” he said.
“By brokering in coal, we have
blackened our face.” In the absence
of a coalition government including
the Mujahideen, refugees, and the
ruling PDPA, he said, “Soviet with-
drawal would only lead the country
into chaos, bloodshed, anarchy, and
civil war.” In such a situation, he
claimed that millions of refugees in
Pakistan would resist being returned
to their homes. But, in fact, these
were tactical ploys—Zia had a grand
design that envisioned a different
concept for Pakistan5 and refused to
be distracted. 
In 1987, the Afghan government
of Najibullah extended the olive
branch to Pakistan, declaring a uni-
lateral ceasefire and offering a gov-
ernment of national unity. This was
rejected. Certainly, this rejection was
a blow to Mikhail Gorbachev who
was now intent on withdrawing from
the Afghan quagmire. Nevertheless,
Gorbachev was undeterred and the
Russians withdrew unconditionally. 
Some Luminaries Of The
Afghan Jihad
Months after the Soviet invasion, the
US had been pressing hard upon
Arab governments to get more
involved in the Afghan situation.
President Anwar Sadat readily com-
plied, sending the growing Islamic
resistance weaponry and military
advisers. This act emboldened
Islamists in Egypt who, together with
leftists, had hitherto been suppressed
by the government. These Egyptian
Islamists were to form the core of a
cohesive Arab movement based in
Afghanistan. The CIA actively sought
volunteers from Muslim countries
across the globe to fight the Soviets,
emphasizing Islamic solidarity
together with pledges of full financial
support. Pre-occupied with a need to
bleed the Soviets as much as possible,
American officials rarely paused to
think of the doubtful qualities of the
individuals they had chosen to sup-
port. Had they chosen to listen to
what the seven resistance groups in
Peshawar were openly saying during
the course of the Afghan Jihad, their
enthusiasm could have been consider-
ably dampened. 
Osama bin Laden was among the
first Arabs to go to Afghanistan after
the Soviet invasion. It was a turning
point in his life. Speaking to an Arab
journalist, he said “I was enraged and
went there at once” and added that
“one day in Afghanistan was like
praying one thousand days in a
mosque”. He was appalled at the
chaos, disunity, and lack of clear
objectives. Although there does not
appear to be truth to a frequently
made allegation that bin Laden was
recruited by the CIA, he did undoubt-
edly benefit from CIA assistance in
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establishing a recruitment drive that,
over the next several years, would
bring thousands of Arab fighters into
Afghanistan. He met the expenses
from his own funds—derived from a
vast construction empire in Saudi
Arabia—and set up training camps.
The Ma’sadat Al-Ansar became the
main base for training Afghan
mujahideen. His close links with the
ISI greatly weakened after the deba-
cle in the battle for Jalalabad in
March 1989, just shortly after the
Soviet withdrawal.6
Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and
Ahmad Shawqi al-Islambuli were
among the first Egyptians to arrive in
Afghanistan. Zawahiri was an Egypt-
ian pediatrician who became
Osama’s second-in-command and a
dedicated commander. Islambuli too
was a hard-core fundamentalist and
brother of Khalid al-Islambuli, who
later assassinated Sadat. Both men
eventually became top-leaders of the
Al-Qaida network. 
Gulbadin Hekmatyar was a
young engineering student at Kabul
University in 1973 when he was con-
tacted by a Pakistani official,
Naseerullah Babar, who later became
Minister of the Interior under Benazir
Bhutto and is credited with creating
the Taliban as a political force. Hek-
matyar came from an Afghan rural-
tribal background. Contact with
modernity at Kabul University
changed him—as happens not infre-
quently when East meets West—into
a hard-line Islamist. This made him a
Pakistani favorite and a major recipi-
ent of C.I.A. aid although he was also
well known for his outspoken con-
tempt for the United States. He
declared that he would not stop fight-
ing until a fundamentalist order in
Afghanistan was established, and if
Pakistan closed its doors then he
would continue the fight from Iran.
After being elected chairman of the
alliance of resistance groups in
Peshawar, he declared plans to liber-
ate the Muslim republics of the Soviet
Union. After the Russians left, Pak-
istan picked Hekmatyar to be its man
in Kabul, but he had little popular
support because his forces had
lobbed rockets and artillery shells at
the beleaguered city for months. He
was dropped when the Taliban
appeared on the scene. When the Tal-
iban were destroyed by the American
offensive he tried hard to fight his
way back into the political scene but
he seems to have lost out and is cur-
rently either in Iran or Peshawar. 
Burhannudin Rabbani, a gradu-
ate of Al-Azhar University in Cairo
was another favorite of the ISI
because of his close integration into
the infrastructure of Islamic move-
ments such as the Ikhwan-ul-Mus-
limeen and Muslim Brotherhood. He
was particularly influenced by the
writings of Hasan-al-Bana and
Sayyid Qutb who called for violent
overthrow of governments in Muslim
countries to establish a true Islamic
state. Rabbani considered both the
US and the Soviet Union as sworn
enemies of Islam and opposed to
Iranian and Afghan revolutions.
Thousands of Kabul residents were
killed in the fighting between pro-
Rabbani and pro-Hekmatyar forces
after the Soviet withdrawal and the
overthrow of Najibullah.
Younis Khalis, a theologian of the
stern Wahabi tradition and a gradu-
ate from a Deobandi madrassa was
ideologically close to Rabbani but
subsequently split and formed the
Hizb-e-Islami. In an interview Khalis
told Eqbal Ahmad that he went to
Pakistan in 1973 to organize resis-
tance forces to fight Daud, whom he
considered a dangerous modernist,
even a Communist.
Ismail Khan, the warlord gover-
nor of Herat, and a high-ranking
member of the Jamiat-I-Islami, is
accused of butchering and torturing
thousands. His claim to fame is that,
during the Soviet occupation he
refused to fire on to a crowd and,
instead, turned his guns on to the
Soviets killing over 350 men and
their family members. He is currently
with Hamid Karzai’s government and
considered a pillar of support by the
US. He also maintains close relations
with Iran.
Today the mujahideen leaders are
condemned universally as murderers
and thugs but it shall remain a histor-
ical fact that these very men had been
celebrated as heroes in the US media.
TV cameras have recorded for pos-
terity the day when Ronald Reagan
feted them on the lawn of White
House, lavishing praise on “brave
freedom fighters challenging the Evil
Empire” and claiming that there were
“the moral equivalent of the Found-
ing Fathers [of America]”.
Fathering Global Militant
Islamic Revivalism
Why did the Afghan jihad succeed
when so many other initiatives to
promote Muslim unity (e.g. revival of
the Caliphate in the early 20th cen-
tury) failed? In large part, this was
because of a gradual but fundamental
change in Muslim attitudes towards
the world around them. Islamic fun-
damentalism simply did not exist
until approximately 30 years ago as a
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political force. Today many impor-
tant Muslim leaders are fundamental-
ists but, looking back at the last cen-
tury, there was not even one!
Turkey’s Kemal Ataturk, Algeria’s
Ahmed Ben Bella, Indonesia’s
Sukarno, Pakistan’s Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser,
and Iran’s Mohammed Mosaddeq all
sought to organize their societies on
the basis of secular values. 
It took barely a generation or two
for the nationalist period to be can-
celled out by rising religious fervor.
The reasons are complex7 but one
truth stands out—the imperial inter-
ests of Britain, and later the United
States, feared independent national-
ism. Anyone willing to collaborate
was preferred, including the ultracon-
servative Islamic regime of Saudi
Arabia. In time, as the Cold War
pressed in, independent nationalism
became still more intolerable. In
1953, Mosaddeq of Iran was over-
thrown in a CIA coup and replaced
by Reza Shah Pahlavi who faithfully
served US economic and political
interests. Again, for economic
motives, Britain targeted Nasser
while Indonesia’s nationalist presi-
dent Sukarno was replaced by
Suharto after a bloody CIA-led coup
that left hundreds of thousands dead. 
Secular, nationalist governments
all over the Muslim world started
collapsing. Pressed from outside, cor-
rupt and incompetent from within,
they proved unable to defend
national interests or deliver social
justice. They began to frustrate
democracy and dictatorships flour-
ished. These failures left a vacuum
that Islamic religious movements
eventually grew to fill. The theoreti-
cal basis for such movements had
been laid in the late 1950s by
Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi of Pak-
istan, Saiyyid Qutb of Egypt, and
later by Ayatollah Khomenei of Iran.
Theirs was a call to arms, to stop the
decay of Muslim civilization and val-
ues, and to return to the Golden Age
of early Islam. But their message was
largely ignored until the turn of
events suddenly made them relevant. 
The Iranian revolution was the
first milestone in forging a strong
Islamic militancy. Its impact would
have been still greater but for Iran’s
Shia character. Soon thereafter Gen-
eral Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq seized
power and ruled Pakistan for eleven
years during which he strove to
Islamize both state and society. In
Sudan an Islamic state arose under
Jaafar al-Nimeiry wherein amputa-
tion of hands and limbs was
sanctioned. Then, in 1982 the PLO
was decisively routed by the Israelis
and forced out of Beirut. This largely
secular organization was
subsequently eclipsed by Hamas, a
fundamentalist Muslim movement.
Every secular government in Muslim
countries was increasingly challenged
from within by Islamic forces.
Although Muslim frustration kept
growing, the anger was undirected
and unable to generate a coherent
path of action. The real
breakthrough came when the Afghan
jihad pitted Sunnis against commu-
nist infidels and gained full support
from the world’s most powerful
nation, the United States. Its superb
organizational skills, massive human
and technical resources, and single-
minded dedication to anti-commu-
nism enabled it to create potent and
unified Islamic entities. No 20th cen-
tury Muslim ideologue could even
have dreamed of such spectacular
success. The global jihad industry
had finally come into its own.
At least until 11 September, US
policy makers were unrepentant,
even proud of their winning strategy.
A few years ago, Carter’s U.S.
national security adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski, one of the key players and
“bleeders” of the time gave an inter-
view to the Paris weekly Nouvel
Observateur. He was asked whether
in retrospect, given that “Islamic fun-
damentalism represents a world men-
ace today”, US policy might have
been a mistake. Brzezinski promptly
retorted:
What is most important to the
history of the world? The Taliban or
the collapse of the Soviet empire?
Some stirred-up Moslems or the lib-
eration of Central Europe and the
end of the Cold War?
What Brzezinski had not quite
calculated was that his “stirred up
Moslems” wanted to change the
world. And in this they were to suc-
ceed beyond all doubt.
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Notes
1 During and after the US offensive
against Al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan,
US agents sought to buy back these
shoulder-fired missiles. Even though
their internal batteries have overrun
their shelf-life, they continue to consti-
tute a danger to US aircraft. The local
arms industry in Darra is said to have
found a way to revitalize the Stingers.
According to Pakistani newspaper
reports, several Stingers have recently
been bought back and the going rate is
said to be around $50,000 a piece. 
2 See, for example, Craig Davis in World
Policy Journal, Spring 2000. The
author, who was a doctoral candidate
at Indiana University, conducted field-
work in Afghan education in
Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1999-
2000. The examples quoted in the pre-
sent essay are from his work. 
3 As recently as the time of this confer-
ence (Nov 2002) books with a similar
content continue to be used in some
schools in Islamabad.
4 This notion of achieving “strategic
depth” has long been espoused by key
Pakistani generals including, Akhtar
Abdur Rahman (killed along with Zia),
Hamid Gul, and Mirza Aslam Beg.
This, in fact, was the raison d’etre for
Pakistan’s unstinting support for the
Taliban until 9/11. 
5 In an interview with an American jour-
nalist Zia said, “All right, you Ameri-
cans wanted us to be a front-line state.
By helping you we have earned the right
to have a regime in Afghanistan to our
liking. We took risks as a front-line
state, and we won’t permit it to be like
it was before, with Indian and Russian
influence there and claims on our terri-
tory. It will be a real Islamic state, a real
Islamic confederation. We won’t have
passports between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. It will be part of a pan-
Islamic revival that will one day win
over the Muslims in the Soviet Union,
you will see.”
6 Osama was extremely angry and con-
vinced that the ISI had drawn the
mujahideen into needless slaughter by
deliberately misinforming them about
the strength of Afghan government
troops. But, General Asad Durrani, a
former Director General of the ISI,
emphatically denied this during our
recent conversation on this subject and,
instead, put the blame on the lack of
organizational discipline of the
mujahideen.
7 For one analysis of the Muslim world’s
predicament with science and modern
thought, see “Islam and Science—Reli-
gious Orthodoxy and the Battle for
Rationality”, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Zed
Books, London, 1991. 
A Look at the Nature and Utility 
of Space Weapons: Not Yet
Richard L. Garwin, Council on Foreign Relations †
In this paper I attempt to sketch the
utility of space weaponry, primarily
from the point of view of the United
States.
In this I draw upon the excellent
RAND book1, “Space Weapons,
Earth Wars.” That study was com-
missioned by LGen Roger DeKok,
DCS Plans and Programs, HQ USAF.
I am guided also by the views
expressed in presentations and discus-
sions of which I am aware over the
past year. But these are my own judg-
ments, which will be refined by the
interactions at this Pugwash session. 
I come to this study from a back-
ground of 40 years as scientist and
manager with the IBM Research
Division, and more than 50 years of
involvement with the US
Government’s national security pro-
grams, beginning with the develop-
ment and testing of nuclear weapons,
and extending to missiles and space.
The US Space Commission
Report2 cited several needs for space-
weapon capability:
1. Defensive Counter-space: To
reduce US military space vulnera-
bility.
2. Offensive Counter-space: To deny
the use of space and space assets to
adversaries
3. Rapid and global power projection
to earth.
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To address these needs, the
RAND Report assesses distinct
classes of weapons:
1. Directed-energy weapons such as
space-based lasers.
2. Kinetic-energy weapons against
missile targets.
3. Kinetic-energy weapons against
surface targets.
4. Conventional warheads delivered
by space-based, or space-traversing,
vehicles.
In addition, any assessment must
consider the potential for non-space
weapons to perform any of these
tasks. This introduces the competing
capabilities of:
1. Surface-based anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons such as high-power lasers,
or missiles with pellet warheads, or
hit-to-kill vehicles.
2. Rapid-response delivery of conven-
tional munitions by forward-
deployed cruise or ballistic missiles,
or non-nuclear payloads on ICBMs.
And one must also consider coun-
termeasures to space weapons and to
these competing systems. A final ele-
ment of assessment is the vulnerabil-
ity of both space weapons and of
competing systems.
In this preliminary assessment, I
take into account the experience of
my civilian and military colleagues
and their judgments of existing and
future threats to US military space, as
well as their views of the potential
utility of various space and non-space
weapons.
Defensive counter-space
We turn to the first application in our
list, defensive counter-space. Here we
discover that space weapons have
little capability for meeting the felt
needs identified above. 
Satellite vulnerability is and prob-
ably will continue to arise in consid-
erable part from jamming or other
electronic countermeasures, sensor
blinding from high-powered lasers on
earth, and pellet payloads on short-
range pop-up missiles. Perhaps the
most proliferated vulnerability is the
threat of Denial and Deception, cam-
ouflage that undermines the effective-
ness of our reconnaissance satellites,
or operations scheduled under cloud
or when satellites are not in position
to observe. Here is a tabulation of
threats, with the most likely ones
listed first:
1) denial & deception
2) electronic warfare




7) nuclear detonation in space 
But space weapons do not help to
reduce vulnerability for most of these
threats,. They are limited to
intercepting objects that approach
satellites in a noticeably offensive
way, such as hit-to-kill kinetic energy
weapons; and that capability remains
to be assessed. 
One of the most effective threats
is a microsatellite in the form of a
“space mine.” Surrey Satellite Tech-
nology Ltd., a Surrey University com-
pany, is a leader in developing
microsatellite technology, and has
numerous collaborative programs
with other countries and with non-
state groups. Although microsatel-
lites have peaceful and military non-
weapon uses—observation,
communication, and the like—they
make particularly good antisatellite
weapons. In this role, a microsatellite
space mine equipped with maneuver
capability exceeding that of the
quarry satellite would sit always
within lethal range (even a few tens
of meters) ready to explode at a
moment’s notice. 
A microsatellite as inspection
device might have been useful in con-
junction with Columbia’s final flight,
but a long-endurance microsatellite is
a more difficult task. Nevertheless, a
cautionary tale is this account of a
January 29, 2003, US microsatellite
exercise; the XSS-10 repeatedly
maneuvered to within 115 ft of its
final-stage rocket, taking pictures. A
shotgun shell could have destroyed a
satellite from such a range.
China carried out similar maneu-
vers with Surrey technology several
years ago.
Since in the vacuum of space (as
was known to Galileo) a feather and
lead shot fall at the same speed with-
out significant drag, a microsatellite
with little payload necessary to
devote to other tasks can be equipped
to outmaneuver and outlast a major
satellite, the primary job of which is
surveillance, high-bandwidth com-
munication, and the like.
It is difficult to counter space
mines once they are in place. It might
be done with defensive microsatel-
lites, but the asymmetric nature of
the threat (i.e., tiny expenditures for
the microsatellite vs. $200 million-
plus for a major US LEO satellite,
makes it desirable to prevent the
emergence of such threats.
Two general tools for resolving
the microsatellite dilemma are rules of
conduct in peacetime, and deterrence
by holding non-space assets at risk. 
In summary, space weapons are
generally not good at protecting
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satellites. In the case of microsatel-
lites, one might plagiarize Jonathan
Swift and commit to deploy “smaller
still to bite ‘em.” This is an arms race
in which United States resources far
outweigh those of any other state,
but this advantage is outweighed by
the vulnerability inherent in the cost
of existing and future high-capability
satellites in low Earth orbit. 
Power projection and offensive
counter-space
We turn now to the remaining two
uses for space weapons, power pro-
jection and offensive counter-space.
Different space weapons have vary-
ing degrees of utility in these areas, so
we will now look at the utility of spe-
cific weapons.
We have already seen how useful
space mines may be AGAINST those
who have valuable satellites and use-
less against those who have none.
Another weapon much discussed
is long-rod penetrators. The idea is
that these long tungsten or uranium
rods would be orbited, and (accord-
ing to the RAND Report) de-orbited
by canceling their orbital velocity, so
that they would fall essentially verti-
cally through the atmosphere, strik-
ing their target with enormous
energy. Two problems that will not
be alleviated by the progress of tech-
nology: the energy is larger the higher
the orbit, but the fall time is greater
as well. The energy of high explosive
corresponds to a material speed of 3
km/s, and one does not arrive at a
similar energy per gram from a pro-
jectile dropped from altitude until
one reaches 460 km, with a
corresponding fall time of 12 min-
utes; a fall from GEO takes almost 6
hours and provides about ten times
the energy density of high explosive. 
A rod would need to be guided
accurately to strike its target within
some meters in order to destroy a
surface target by the explosion.
Long rods might be used to pene-
trate through earth to hard or deeply
buried targets. However, the physics
of high-velocity impact limits pene-
tration depth as shown by high-speed
photography of a bullet impacting
steel at just above 1 kilometer per
second. A copper-jacketed lead bullet
fragments against the hardened steel,
but in the process produces a pres-
sure sufficient to leave a small crater.
Very strong projectiles impacting
earth or rock at similar speed can
penetrate to depths several times
their length.
Tests done by Sandia laboratory
confirm predictions that, even for the
hardest rod materials, penetration is
maximum around 1 km/s. Above that
speed, the rod tip simply liquefies,
and penetration depth falls off,
becoming effectively independent of
impact speed. Therefore, for maxi-
mum penetration, such rods would
need to be orbited at very low alti-
tudes, and could only deliver one
ninth the destructive energy per gram
as a conventional bomb. The effort is
entirely mismatched to the results.
Dominating the cost is the need to
put the rod into orbit in the first
place and later cancel its orbital
velocity so that it drops back to
earth. The propellant required to
place the entire weapon in orbit must
suffice to lift both the rod and its
attendant deorbiting propellant. For
low earth orbit, the total velocity
change of about 15 km/s typically
requires several thousand times the
orbiting mass in propellant. Taking
the typical $10,000 per kg launch
cost to LEO, and assuming a 0.1 ton
rod with the 3 tons of propellant to
stop its orbital motion, the launch
cost to orbit would be some $30 mil-
lion. And for timely delivery against a
single target at temperate latitude,
several rods in each orbit would be
required and a good many orbits—
say 10. Clearly, the more conven-
tional deorbit maneuver would be
preferable, with a small energy
change and the use of atmospheric
drag (combined with wings or a lift-
ing-body approach) to preserve much
of the orbital velocity as the rod
John Rhinelander, Bob Lawson and Steven Miller.
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approaches the vertical.
Whatever the effect actually
achieved against a target, it is far bet-
ter to propel the rod directly from
launch to target and avoid orbits
altogether— by placing the rods on
ballistic missiles. Specifically, a one-
km/s penetrator could be provided
flexibly by a nominal solid rocket
motor giving an acceleration 30 times
that of gravity—so 300 m/sec2. The
desired 1 km/s would be obtained in
3.3 s, over a distance of 1.65 km. A
speed of 3 km/s would take 10 s and
a distance of 15 km. The cost would
be some $100,000 or less, plus what-
ever cost for the terminal guidance
system—which is surely no greater
for the ballistic missile than for the
orbiting projectile.
Looking now at the common aero
vehicle (CAV) carrying conventional
ordnance or intelligence payloads,
one finds again that this capability is
dominated by CAV delivery by ballis-
tic or cruise missiles— perhaps
guided by observation from space.
Indeed, the role of the CAV itself is
largely supplanted by the familiar
“bus” technology for delivering mul-
tiple payloads from a ballistic missile
launch.
Space weapons and missile defense
We turn now to space weapons (and
their competition) for missile defense.
For boost-phase intercept—BPI—
space-based kinetic-energy (hit-to-
kill) interceptors are in competition
with surface-based interceptors (on
land or sea, or even on aircraft). The
non-space options excel against a
small state such as North Korea,
largely surrounded by water. For BPI,
space-based interceptors must be
given acceleration and divert capabil-
ities very similar to those required for
surface-based interceptors, if they are
not to pass harmlessly by the quarry
missiles. For missile launches from a
small area, space-based interceptors
have their required number
multiplied by the number of simulta-
neous launches, and also by the
“absentee ratio” because most of the
SBI will be on the other side of the
Earth and unable to join the fray for
a clustered launch. 
However capable the surface-
based interceptors would be against
North Korea, Iraq, or even against
launches from Iran, unless based
within the target country they are
ineffective against ICBMs launched
from China or Russia, because the
interior of those countries is so far
from the borders.
Yet China and Russia are highly
capable powers, and it would be
much easier for them to destroy
space-based interceptors as the con-
stellation is gradually built than it
would be for the US to use the SBIs to
counter ballistic missile launch. Some
observers are skeptical that Russia or
China (or France, for that matter)
would destroy SBIs in peacetime, but
when the question is posed what the
US would do if another state
deployed a vast number of SBIs, the
response of many of my colleagues is
that we would destroy them—“shoot
them down”.  
The airborne laser (ABL) under
development and in early flight test
(in contrast to the space based laser
(SBL) for which no US program cur-
rently exists) might serve as a BPI
capability against ICBMs launched
from North Korea. In the spirit of a
“capabilities based” system, it would
to some extent complicate NK’s
ICBM program: North Korea would
need to deploy from the beginning
countermeasures to mid-course and
would have to consider countermea-
sures to an ABL BPI defense. Unlike
the mid-course interceptors which,
once deployed, would always be
ready for use, the ABL would incur
large operating costs to maintain a
constant presence.  
Another weapon of considerable
interest is the Space Based Laser.
These weapons could attack over
long distances at the speed of light,
although space mines and the ABL
could be equally prompt. A SBL
could also attack terrestrial targets,
but only with suitable laser
wavelengths to penetrate the atmos-
phere. The current candidate SBL
lasers cannot attack ground or air-
borne targets.
A single SBL, costing billions of
dollars, could typically have a range
of at most 3000 km, unless the SBL
constellation were conceived to have
a large number of redirecting (“fight-
ing”) mirrors3. Under those circum-
stances, a competitive system could
use a ground-based laser, redirected
by such mirrors3. Cloud at the GBL
site would cancel the capability of a
GBL, so several would be needed to
have high probability that the system
would be operable at any time. In
any case, the fighting mirrors might
be classed by the potential victims as
weapons in space as well.
An SBL would be a very expensive
means of attacking a satellite, but
might be more useful for missile
defense purposes. With relatively few
SBL in orbit, one might need to be
used at 3000 km range. At that dis-
tance, with no loss through the
atmosphere, a perfect mirror of 3 m
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diameter, and laser power output of 3
MW in the 3.8-micron DF band, a
target protected with 3 cm of cork
could withstand about 200 MJm-2
before exposing the target surface to
laser heat. (Some Minuteman ICBMs
have had a 0.6-centimeter layer of
cork to protect the booster from skin
friction heating during launch. Such a
layer would be vaporized with about
50 MJm-2 (5 kJcm-2) from a SBL.)
The laser consumes fuel at a rate of
some 3kg/MWs, or 9 kg/s, and it
would need to fire for 1700 s at the
assumed 3000-km range, thus using
15 tons of fuel, at a launch cost for
fuel of $150 million per target
attacked. At a range of 1000 km, the
launch cost would be some $16 M
per target. 
Other countermeasures are feasi-
ble and could be multiplicative—such
as the slow rotation of the booster
during launch.
A substantial constellation of
SBLs covering the strategically
important region of the Earth could
consist of 20-50 such satellites, which
could provide rapid illumination of
most important points, providing
that the target can be destroyed by
the laser, and that it is not covered by
cloud. Cloud coverage is typically 30-
40%, but can range to 70% or more
in parts of Germany or North Korea.
But, as analyzed in detail in the
RAND publication, many targets are
not vulnerable to destruction by SBL,
and many that are can be protected
by smoke, by water shields, or in
other ways. Aircraft yes, and com-
bustible targets or thin-skinned stor-
age tanks. But not bunkers, armored
vehicles, or many buildings.
We have already seen that the use
of an SBL can easily cost in the range
of $100 million per target and is con-
tingent on the target being thin-
skinned and not obscured by a cloud.
For comparison, a Tomahawk missile
costs some $600,000 and will attack
heavily armored and non-flammable
targets, and is not affected by cloud. 
Even enthusiasts consider SBLs a
weapon to attack very special targets,
while most military capability against
similar targets is to be provided by
more conventional means. In contrast
almost all portions of the earth are
reachable by existing cruise missiles
(Tomahawk Block 3) launched from
outside the 12 nmi limit. The flight
time can be several hours. 
For the space-based laser, “rapid
response” is a sometime thing, since
it is necessary to have clear air to
allow the laser beam to strike the tar-
get—no cloud in the way.
With these competitive means of
striking the target, observation could
still be provided by non-weapon space
assets, so that in addition to attack by
navigation (using GPS) one could use
a laser-target designator from space
with observation and designation pro-
vided at the time when a destructive
payload arrives in the vicinity of the
target—an example of non-weapon
military space capabilities contribut-
ing to US military capability.
In summary, the one target which
can surely be held at risk at modest
cost is important and costly satellites,
of which the US possesses by far the
greatest number and value.
The US Space Commission
Report is generally considered as sup-
port for the proposition that the US
should proceed to develop and
deploy space weapons in order to
counter the evolution of space
weapons by others, and to effect the
needed reduction in vulnerability of
US satellites. In fact the commission
does not specifically advocate the
development of offensive weaponry
for deployment in space. In particu-
lar, it reads,
“The government…should:
• Invest in technologies to permit the
US Government to field systems
one generation ahead of what is
available commercially to meet
unique national security require-
ments.
• Encourage the US commercial
space industry to field systems one
generation ahead of international
competitors.”
Also,
“Fourth, we know from history
that every medium—air, land and
sea—has seen conflict. Reality indi-
cates that space will be no different.
Given this virtual certainty, the US
must develop the means both to deter
and to defend against hostile acts in
and from space.”
And
“The US must participate actively
in shaping the space legal and regula-
tory environment.”
Conclusions
My own analysis indicates that US
deployment of space weapons will
encourage and demand the develop-
ment and deployment of space
weapons by others. Others can and
will respond to space weapons in
asymmetric ways—including the
deployment of space mines in their
vicinity and the use of short range
missiles to lift ton-class pellet
payloads against LEO weapons. Fur-
thermore, such responses would
inevitably threaten and legitimize
counters to US non-weapon LEO
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satellites essential to our entire mili-
tary capability.
It is therefore essential to judge
the utility and necessity of space
weapons. Of course, any proposed
augmentation of US military capabil-
ity must compete with other means
for accomplishing the task. Capabili-
ties unique to space weapons use
resources, which must be taken into
account.
Net judgments on space weapons
utility: 
• For offensive counterspace—deny
military space to others
– Jam uplinks or downlinks (from
ground or space)
– Attack ground stations essential
to satellite capability
– Obscure line of sight by screens in
space
• For defensive counterspace—pre-
serve US military space capability 
– Attack ground systems which
might be disabling satellites
– Interdict ASAT in powered flight
– Deter by promise of retaliation—
not against satellites but against
military and political assets
• For destructive antisatellite (ASAT)
– The most prompt means is proba-
bly microsatellite as space mine,
orbiting Earth within 10-100m of
its quarry
– Short-range missiles lobbing ton
payloads of coarse sand to orbital
altitude at the right time
– Homing kill vehicles as direct-
ascent ASAT
The United States can do it best, but
others will soon do it well enough.
• Global and prompt force projection
– Kinetic-energy (KE) weapons on
ICBMs or shorter-range missiles
– Advanced conventional weapons
on ICBMs (CAV?) with observa-
tion or designation from space,
ground, or UAV
• Non-space weapons will provide
more capability and sooner than
space weapons
• Destructive ASAT and space-ASAT
weapons are a serious threat to
overall US military capability and its
dependence on space.
Countering satellite vulnerability: A
general approach to reducing satellite
vulnerability is to reduce our depen-
dence on satellites while maintaining
the benefits of satellites at reasonable
cost. This can be achieved by supple-
menting satellite capabilities in
wartime by theater resources:
• High-power pseudolites (on the
ground and on UAVs) in the theater
of operations so that the adversary
would obtain no benefit in theater
conflict by destroying GPS satellites.
• UAV and rocket capabilities for
imagery. At altitudes of 20-30 km, a
20-cm aperture would have the
same resolution as a 2-m diameter
mirror at a range of 300 km. Such
platforms can provide near-
constant presence, as well.
A primary means of reducing vul-
nerability is to reduce the threat—by
agreements not to damage or destroy
non-weapon satellites. This should be
backed up by US developments to
intercept or counter such weapons or
ASAT used in violation of such an
agreement.
We have found general accep-
tance of this (conditional) conclusion: 
If space weapons and destructive
ASAT could be avoided by the United
States giving up such capability, it
would be in our national security
interest to do so.
Asserting a “might makes right”
rule in space and elsewhere leads,
again, to the asymmetric use of force,
and this might be the destruction of
valuable satellites in peacetime rather
than holding them at risk for future
destruction. 
Nothing is forever—perhaps not
even the regime we favor—so an
aggressive campaign to prevent the
deployment of weapons by others
might best be implemented as a US
commitment: 
not to be the first to test or deploy
space weapons or to further test
destructive anti-satellite weapons. 
This should be supported by a US
initiative to codify such a rule—first
by parallel unilateral declarations
and then by a treaty. Such a
campaign would legitimize the use of
force against actions which would
imperil satellites of any state.
Notes
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The issue of climate change has sur-
faced relatively recently on the scale
of environmental concerns, yet inter-
national responses to it have been
notably swift and tightly targeted. In
just over a decade and a half, climate
change has garnered international
attention and the international
response to this global problem has
shifted from contentious debate on
its presumed-dubious scientific
groundings, to virtually global accep-
tance of the reality of the problem
and the severity of its predicted
effects. This progress has been quite
remarkable given the breadth and
complexity of the problem, in social,
economic, political, and scientific
terms. However, while the
expediency of the international cli-
mate change negotiation process
deserves guarded praise, the exclusive
nature of the process, from a gender
perspective, raises considerable cause
for concern. 
Despite the overt United Nations
commitment requiring all UN
processes to abide by the principles
for mainstreaming a gender perspec-
tive, the international climate change
negotiation process has remained in
contravention of these principles by
assuming gender-neutrality and by
failing to engage in required gender-
analysis. I will argue that this failure
has not only resulted in the process
coming up short on gender equity
principles, but also that this has had,
and will continue to have, injurious
effects on the process in terms of effi-
ciency and effectiveness1. The inter-
national climate change process will
be unable to achieve truly global
legitimacy or relevance until it adopts
the principles of gender equity at all
stages of the process, from scientific
research, through analysis, agenda
formation, negotiation and decision-
making, regime implementation, and
finally in further development and
evaluation. 
Setting the boundaries through
definition
In order to effectively engage in this
debate, it will be useful to clarify a
few concepts at the outset. First of
all, ‘gender’ is a concept, distinct
from ‘sex’, that “refers to the way in
which, in any particular society, indi-
viduals are socially constructed to
behave and experience themselves as
‘female’ or ‘male’” (Jacobson 2002).
This is changeable over time and
there are wide variations of gender
experiences within and between cul-
tures, which depend on factors such
as age, class, and ethnicity (Mertus
2000, 18). Furthermore, “gender
always carries with it some form of
relational content”, which
contributes to a person’s gendered
identity (Jacobson 2002). Thus, the
use of a gender perspective in the
analysis of any issue “recognizes,
understands, and utilizes the knowl-
edge of gender differences in
planning, implementing and evaluat-
ing programs and working relation-
ships” (Hanley, quoted in Mertus
2000, 15).
According to the UN’s Beijing
Declaration and the Platform for
Action, there is a stated need to
mainstream a gender perspective
throughout all UN activity areas
(UN 1996). Furthermore, the UN has
acknowledged that women’s right to
participate in decision-making consti-
tutes their basic human right as well
as their right and responsibility as
citizens (Gierycz in Skjelsbaek &
Smith 2001, 18-19). In July 1997,
the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) defined the mainstream-
ing of a gender perspective as:
The process of assessing the implica-
tions for women and men of any
planned action, including legislation,
policies or programmes, in all areas
and at all levels and as a strategy for
making women’s as well as men’s
concerns and experiences an integral
dimension of the design, implementa-
tion, monitoring and evaluation of
policies and programmes in all politi-
cal, economic and societal spheres so
that women and men benefit equally
and inequality is not perpetuated. 
(Gierycz in Skjelsbaek & Smith 2001,
19)
These principles collectively chal-
lenge the assumption of gender-neu-
trality, rendering this assumption ille-
gitimate and ignorant not only of
accepted UN policy but also blatantly
ignorant of concern for gender
equity.
Let us now also open up some of
the conceptual definitions surround-
ing climate change and allow the
clarification of what I refer to as the
“international climate change negoti-
ation process”. While it is not practi-
cal in this context to engage in a
lengthy scientific explanation of the
From Beijing to Kyoto: Gendering the
international climate change negotiation process
Christie E. Dennison, University of Bradford, UK
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processes that cause and result in cli-
mate change, it is feasible to begin by
acknowledging that:
…scientists have known for many
decades that an increase in the atmos-
pheric concentration of carbon diox-
ide (CO2) and other gases which
absorb infra-red radiation should
warm the earth’s surface, changing
climates in various ways. Measure-
ments started in 1957 showed unam-
biguously that atmospheric concen-
trations of CO2 were rising steadily
due to human activities, primarily
fossil fuel burning and deforestation. 
(Grubb et al 1993, 61)
If it may be agreed that this is
more or less the scientific process
causing climate change, then the
human process of international meet-
ings and negotiation to obtain agree-
ment on how to slow or alter this
process, or at least to mitigate its
effects, can be referred to as the inter-
national climate change negotiation
process. 
The general objectives of this
process were summed up in the UN
Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UN FCCC). Article 2
(Objective) states:
The ultimate objective of this Con-
vention…is to achieve…stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved
within a time frame sufficient to
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally
to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to
enable economic development to pro-
ceed in a sustainable manner.
(Grubb et al 1993, 63)
The UN FCCC remained the
focal point of the international cli-
mate change negotiation process
throughout the 1990s and has now
survived into the 2000s, with the
most current major development in
the process being the agreement in
1997, and ongoing ratification, of the
Kyoto Protocol (Grubb et al 2001,
36-37). 
Very briefly, the Kyoto Protocol,
which is the culminating product of
the Kyoto conference, i.e. “the
biggest and most high-profile event
on the international environment
since the Rio Earth Summit”, sets out
legally binding (pending ratification)
commitments by industrialised coun-
tries to limit their greenhouse gas
emissions (Grubb et al 2001, 61).
The commitments were made accord-
ing to agreed implementation time
scales in conjunction with “a com-
plex package” of “global ‘soft’ com-
mitments, related processes on tech-
nology transfer and financial
mechanisms, policies and measures,
minimization of adverse impacts,
sinks, and compliance
mechanisms…designed to gain and
sustain global participation” (Grubb
2001, xli). In short, Kyoto is the
world’s comprehensive—albeit
imperfect—agreement guiding inter-
national policy and practice on the
control and mitigation of climate
change.
Given this definitional introduc-
tion to two seemingly distinct “issue
areas”, it will now be useful to draw
some links between gender issues and
climate change, and to establish the
foundation for a gender-based
critique of the international climate
change negotiation process.
Foundations for fair criticism
As I have begun to show, the formal
principles guiding international
action on both climate change and
gender equity are grounded in devel-
opment initiatives of the United
Nations. The UN FCCC is actually
one of several agreements emerging
from the UN Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED),
which itself was the product of a long
preparatory history of meetings and
discussions.2 Similarly, much of the
formal international work on gender
equity has taken shape in the UN,
beginning with the creation of the
UN Commission on the Status of
Women (CSW) in 1947, further tak-
ing shape through UNIFEM and the
UN Conferences on Women in
Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985,
Beijing 1995, Windhoek 2000, and
also with Security Council Resolution
1325 (Gierycz in Skjelsbaek & Smith
2001, 15). Underpinning both of
these development initiatives are con-
cerns for achieving greater global
equity and efficiency in development,
in the interests of women and men,
and the common future they share on
Earth. As such, progress in the areas
of both gender and environmental
issues was intended to crosscut all
issue areas of the UN, and to avoid
becoming mainstreamed as an after-
thought to other processes (Gierycz
in Skjelsbaek & Smith 2001, 19;
Greene 2001, 390). 
Given these parallel beginnings, it
is increasingly evident that gender,
environmental, and development
concerns should be considered in
concert with one another, as comple-
mentarities, and certainly not as com-
peting interests. Moreover, based on
the common goals of achieving effi-
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ciency and equity, it would appear
that the two issue areas stand to gain
from being mutually supportive, and
contrastingly, that it would be of
lesser value to consider one to the
exclusion of the other. Ironically,
while the formal UN-based women’s
movement has developed and main-
tained an interest in the inclusion of
environmental issues throughout its
development3, the UN-based envi-
ronmental movement, and
specifically the international climate
change negotiation process, has
essentially ignored gender issues by
assuming gender-neutrality4.
Before moving on to a discussion
of how this exclusion came to be, and
how the process may be redeemed,
allow me first to explain briefly why
gender issues should indeed be made
central to the development of the
international climate change negotia-
tion process. 
Making the case for gender
inclusiveness
Climate change is often viewed as a
scientific process, making it difficult
to understand and often even more
difficult to explain to the wider pub-
lic (Villagrasa 2002, 41). This is fur-
ther confounded by the belief that
most of the effects of climate change
will occur only in the future, compli-
cating the generation of immediate
public concern (Villagrasa 2002, 41).
Fortunately, however, the very real,
very human aspects of climate
change, including its anthropogenic
causes and the severe effects it will
likely have on human life are increas-
ingly being acknowledged.5 Conse-
quently, there is also growing aware-
ness of the differential ways in which
women and men are slated to experi-
ence climate change. These
differences occur principally in the
areas of responsibility, vulnerability,
adaptability, and mitigation (Skutsch
2002).
Responsibility
Evidently, both sexes are implicated
in the human responsibility for cli-
mate change based on their participa-
tion in the global economy (Skutsch
2002, 32).6 However, women’s and
men’s participation in the global
economy, defined in this case as their
use of products and services owing to
the emission of greenhouse gases, is
neither the same, nor equivalent, on a
global scale (Skutsch 2002, 33). For
example, if we consider car use and
ownership, although the sexual divi-
sion has become less extreme in the
past few decades in the Western
world, “it is evident that cars are still
more used by men than by women,
with the side-effect that women are
often disproportionately dependent
on public transport” (Skutsch 2002,
33). This is only one of thousands of
examples of women’s and men’s dif-
ferential involvement in the global
economy contributing to climate
change. The point here is not to
accrue blame on one sex or the other,
but rather to emphasize the fact that
since women and men have differen-
tial responsibilities for contributing
to climate change, it is thus only logi-
cal to incorporate a gender perspec-
tive when conducting research on
human responsibility for climate
change.7
Vulnerability
It is with regard to vulnerability that
the majority of women’s research on
gender differences and climate
change has been conducted. This is
because it is relatively frequently
acknowledged that “the effects of
climate change are very likely to be
gendered…because of the strong rela-
tionship between poverty and vulner-
ability to environmental change, and
the stark fact that women as a group
are poorer and less powerful than
men” (Nelson et al 2002, 51). While
a statement as broad as this should
not be accepted without qualification
and acknowledgement of the signifi-
cant gains women have made to chal-
lenge their assumed vulnerability8, it
is clear that climate change will have
the most dramatic and likely detri-
mental effects on the most vulnerable
segments of society (IPCC 2001), and
this does, for a variety of reasons9,
often include women (Nelson et al
2002, 52).
Adaptability and Mitigation
Regarding adaptability and mitiga-
tion, women have been shown to be
both capable of, and especially adept
at, adapting to climate change
(Masika 2002, 6), as well as being
willing to play a key role in develop-
ing and implementing mitigation
strategies (Skutsch 2002, 35). How-
ever, in both cases, women are much
more likely to achieve this if granted
the opportunity and agency necessary
to become involved in the process
(Skutsch 2002, 35). This would,
however, involve the granting of
space for the voices of women to
speak on behalf of women. This issue
brings us neatly back to the lack of
gender analysis and gender perspec-
tive in the international climate
change negotiation process. 
Based on the evidence presented
in the preceding paragraphs, it is irre-
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sponsible to deny that climate change
is a gendered concept. After all,
under the assumption of the gender
neutrality of both the problem and
the process, it is not that the above
issues disappear, but rather that they
remain suppressed and ignored. It
would seem logical, therefore, if our
goal is to achieve maximal efficiency,
for our response to climate change to
aptly emerge from a gender analysis
and incorporate a gender perspective
at all stages of the process, from sci-
entific research, through regime for-
mation and mitigation-strategy
implementation. Yet the international
climate change negotiation process
fails to incorporate a gender perspec-
tive in an integrated and meaningful
way. I maintain that the consequence
of this neglect is a lack of efficiency
and equity in the process, given that a
gender-neutral process and gender-
neutral mitigation strategies will fail
to address the differentiated concerns
and needs of half of the human popu-
lation. 
I will now turn my attention to an
examination of the development of
the process, in order to illustrate how
it evolved to the exclusion of women,
before proceeding to recommenda-
tions on how the process might be
reorganised in such a way as to
include a gender perspective. 
How the process proceeded to
exclusion
As I have noted, the international cli-
mate change negotiation process has
its roots in UN initiatives, not the
least of which was the formation of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) in 1988, under
the auspices of the UN Environment
Program (UNEP) and the World
Meteorological Organisation
(WMO) (Grubb et al 2001, 4). The
IPCC provides “authoritative assess-
ments to governments of the state of
knowledge concerning climate
change” and it is these reports that
provide the “scientific underpinning
for the diplomatic processes of the
UN FCCC” (Grubb et al 2001, 4).
The IPCC has evolved into “what is
probably the most extensive and
carefully constructed intergovern-
mental advisory process ever known
in international relations” (Grubb et
al 2001, 4). Its first assessment report
jump-started the UN FCCC and its
second assessment report “marked a
crucial stage in the progress of global
action to combat climate
change…set[ting] the context for the
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol”
(Grubb et al 2001, 4). And yet, this
most influential UN-based body has
taken an almost exclusively gender-
neutral stance in its research and
reports. Hence, the international cli-
mate change negotiation process, in
its assumption of gender-neutrality,
started on the course of regime for-
mation as a process exclusive of gen-
der concerns, and continued in that
vein despite strong statements from
the UN requiring mainstreaming of a
gender-perspective. 
Still, the process cannot be let off
the hook quite so easily. There were
intervening moments and factors
throughout the process that should
have reeled it back into the realm of
gender equality. The first of these was
Agenda 21, the ‘comprehensive’
international programme of action
for achieving sustainable
development in the 21st Century
(Grubb et al 1993, 97). Section III,
Chapter 24 of Agenda 21 emphasises
the need for the active involvement of
women in decision-making and
plainly acknowledges the need to
forcibly eliminate gender discrimina-
tion (UNCED 1992). Secondly there
was the Beijing Platform for Action
emerging from the UN Conference
on Women in 1995, which
propounded in no uncertain terms
the continuing efforts to eliminate
gender discrimination and further
entrenched efforts to adopt a gender
perspective cognisant of women’s
identity and agency across all UN
activity (United Nations 1996). 
However, notwithstanding these
intervening and purportedly vital
documents, and despite a strong
move by women away from viewing
women as the vulnerable victims of
this global phenomenon, neither the
UN FCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol
make any mention of gender or
women’s issues relative to global
environmental change (Skutsch 2001,
30). Equipped with all the necessary
bases for designing a gender-inclusive
process of international negotiation
on climate change, the agents of this
process still failed to do so.10
Getting back on track: mechanisms
to promote gender inclusiveness
One foremost consideration to retain
is that a numerical representation of
women does not necessarily result in
the theoretical representation of femi-
nist goals, i.e. gender equity. There-
fore, while the number of women
participating in climate change nego-
tiations should increase at all levels—
in government, business, and NGO
communities—and throughout the
process of regime formation, this will
not necessarily guarantee an accept-
able representation of women’s inter-
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ests (Villagrasa 2002, 41). In order to
achieve adequate representation,
women must be acting as women, on
behalf of other women, and in
women’s interests. 
At the current point in the climate
change regime formation process,
one strategy that would serve to
quickly integrate a gender perspective
would be the design of gender-sensi-
tive climate change mitigation strate-
gies. Without requiring a total revi-
sion of the process, gender-sensitive
strategies could be taken into account
within the existing mechanisms
devised to mitigate climate change,
such as the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) and the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) (Denton
2002, 16). Projects falling under the
discretion of these mechanisms
should presume the inclusion of the
main stakeholders at all stages of
project development anyway, thus
providing a perfect opportunity to
achieve a high measure of gender-
sensitivity (Denton 2002, 16).11 Since
there is “enough evidence to show
that women are at the centre of sus-
tainable development, and that
ensuring gender equalities in all sec-
tors would mean that society as a
whole would benefit” (Denton 2002,
17), it seems logical to incorporate a
gender perspective at the stage of mit-
igation design, given that it is too late
to achieve the ideal incorporation of
such a perspective at all stages of the
process. 
A second method which may
prove effective has been put forth by
Delia Villagrasa, who suggests that
developing a mentoring process may
help to effectively integrate newcom-
ers, theoretically both women and
men as required, into the process. As
negotiations on climate change and
the implementation of agreements
become increasingly complex, Villa-
grasa suggests that it has become
more and more difficult to invite in
stakeholders who have been previ-
ously disengaged from the process
(Villagrasa 2002, 43). A mentorship
system could help identify the miss-
ing links and build competence in this
area, thus ensuring the continuity of
the process as well as incorporating a
greater range of valuable interests. If
designed according to gender-equity
principles, this plan could stand to
improve not only equity, but also the
overall efficiency of the process as it
reaches crucial stages of implementa-
tion, enforcement, and further
development.
Thirdly, data collected to study
the impacts of climate change on
human populations should be disag-
gregated by sex in order to show the
different experiences of women and
men relative to climate change, as
well as to climate change mitigation
strategies. If we do not know how
women and men are differently
affected by climate change, then how
can we effectively plan gender-equi-
table mitigation and adaptation
strategies? Sex disaggregated data has
proven vital to the analysis of conflict
on men and women; it stands, simi-
larly, to illuminate the international
climate change negotiation process
(UNIFEM 2003).
Recommendations for improving
the equity and efficiency of the inter-
national climate change negotiation
process will only increase in number
as more and more stakeholders are
empowered to become involved in
the process. One key point to be
recalled during the consideration of
gender perspectives is that assump-
tions of essentialism and universalism
in feminism have become outdated as
the field takes on a more post-mod-
ern approach. Avoiding universalism
is especially worthy of concern with
regard to the climate change process,
in view of the differentiated experi-
ences, goals, and mitigation mecha-
nisms of women in the global North
and South, especially when it comes
to questions relating to development,
industrialisation, and the
environment (Dankelman 2002;
Masika 2002, 4; Littig 2002, 121).12
The costs of gender-blindness, and
the benefits of gender-equity
One further issue may need to be
problematised before proceeding to a
conclusion that recommends gender
inclusion in the ongoing international
process of climate change
negotiation. Building on the notion
of improving equity and efficiency in
international systems, it may actually
be premature to be contemplating
gender equity in environmental crisis,
given the unresolved issues of
poverty, inequality, and development
in the context of a globalising, liber-
alising world. After all, we have
never entirely made up for the lost
‘development decade’ of the 1980s,
nor have we achieved the goals we
established for developing sustain-
ably in the 1990s. Neither can we say
with any confidence that the 20th
Century featured the attainment of
gender equality, despite whatever
advances were made. 
However, I do not consider this
necessarily to be cause for pause in
the current climate change negotia-
tion process. It may be that the miti-
gation of environmental degradation
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and the expansion of gender equality
could be catalytic elements in a
greater equation involving social and
economic development as well.13
This has been proven to be the case
in certain, though rare, ‘post-conflict
moments’ (Cockburn 2001), where
the reorganisation of social order fol-
lowing the social upheaval
experienced during conflict has actu-
ally had positive, equality-oriented
benefits for women.14
What may be enlightening in this
context is the reconsideration, or a
slight reinterpretation, of the ‘no
regrets’ principle. Rather than simply
having a situation in which
greenhouse gas emissions are reduced
to the point of negative net costs and
the generation of direct or indirect
benefits are considerable enough to
outweigh and offset the costs of
implementing the options, perhaps
we could also envision a situation
where the direct and indirect benefits
of achieving gender equity (ie. effi-
ciency and equity) outweigh the costs
of implementing gender equitable
policies. It is by thinking in these
terms that we will begin to fully com-
prehend the potential gains associ-
ated with incorporating a gender per-
spective. 
Conclusion
I have begun to establish the regret-
table consequences associated with
making the faulty assumption of gen-
der-neutrality in a process as anthro-
pocentric as the international climate
change negotiation process. By exam-
ining the links between environmen-
tal, development and gender
concerns, I have been able to demon-
strate how the process has remained
lacking in this area, and have
suggested that until the process main-
streams a gender perspective at all
levels of regime formation and imple-
mentation—as should all UN-based
activities—it will lack the gender-sen-
sitivity required to achieve truly
global relevance and legitimacy.
Finally, out of interest and respect for
the continued development of the
process, I have highlighted a couple
of suggestions that may serve as a
starting point for the integration of
gender equity. These recommenda-
tions may be necessary, but they are
certainly not sufficient to achieve
gender equity. They are, however, a
starting point, and a start is most cer-
tainly hurriedly welcomed, lest we
reach a point where regret becomes
the dominant feeling associated with
the international climate change
negotiation process. 
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Jo Rotblat and members of ISYP.
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69.08.76.91, Fax: (++33-1) 69.08.65.77,
E-mail: lkoch@discovery.saclay.cea.fr
Prof. Janusz Komender, Member, Polish
Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland 
Institution: Polish Academy of Sciences,
00-901 Warsaw, Pl. Oefilad 1 PKIN,
Poland, Tel.: (++48-22) 620-3332, Fax:
(++48-22) 620-3803
Prof. Michiji Konuma, Professor Emeri-
tus of Physics, Keio University; Japan
*Office: Musashi Institute of Technology,
Yokohama 224-0015, Japan, Tel.: (++81-
45) 910-2500, Fax: (++81-45) 910-2600,
E-mail: konuma@yc.musashi-tech.ac.jp
Dr. Peter H. Langille, Senior Research
Associate & Human Security Fellow,
Peace and Conflict Studies, UN Peace
Operations,Victoria, BC, Canada
*Office: Centre for Global Studies, Uni-
versity of 472-4830 E-mail:
plangill@uvic.ca 
Mr. Bob Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor,
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and
Disarmament (IDA), Department of For-
eign Affairs and International Trade,
Canada
*Office: IDA, Dept. of Foreign Affairs &
International Trade, Lester B. Pearson
Building, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa,
Ontario K1A 0G2, Canada, Tel.: (++1-
613) 944-1003, Fax: (++1-613) 944-
3105, E-mail: bob.lawson@
dfait-maeci.gc.ca 
Mrs. Christine Lindhard Ramirez, Prac-
ticing Therapist, Madrid, Spain
*Home/Office: P.O. Box 2, 28792
Miraflores de la Sierra (Madrid), Spain,
Tel./Fax: (++34-91) 844-4695, E-mail:
ramirez@psi.ucm.es 
Prof. Lee Lorch, Department of Mathe-
matics and Statistics, York University,
Toronto, Canada
*Office: Dept. of Mathematics & Statis-
tics, York University, 4700 Keele Street,
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada, Tel.:
(++1-416) 736-5250, Fax: (++1-416)
736-5757, E-mail: lorch@pascal.math.
yorku.ca
Mr. Morten Bremer Maerli, Researcher,
Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway
*Office: NUPI, P.O. Box 8159 Dep., N-
0033 Oslo, Norway, Tel.: (++47) 22 05
65 03, Fax: (++47) 22 17 70 15, E-mail:
mbm@nupi.no
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Dr .Miguel Marin-Bosch, Member, Pug-
wash Council; Professor, Universidad
Iberoamericana, México, D. F., Mexico
*Office: Universidad Iberoamericana,
Prol. Paseo de la Reforma 880, Lomas de
Santa Fe, México, D. F. 01210 Mexico,
Tel.:. 59507678, E-mail: mmarinbosch@
hotmail.com
Prof. Omar Masera, Professor of Ecology,
Instituto de Ecología, National
Autonomous University of Mexico
(UNAM), Campus Morelia, Michoacan,
Mexico; Advisor to Secretary of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources]
*Office: Instituto de Ecología, UNAM,
A.P. 152, Patzcuaro 61609, Michoacan,
Mexico, Tel./Fax: (++52-434) 23216,
E-mail: omasera@ate.oikos.unam.mx
Prof. Jiri Matousek, Professor of Toxicol-
ogy, Masaryk University Brno, Faculty of
Science, Research Centre for
Environmental Chemistry and Ecotoxi-
cology, Brno, Czech Republic
Office: Masaryk University Brno, Faculty
of Science, Research Centre for Environ-
mental Chemistry and Ecotoxicology,
Kamenice 3, CZ-25 00 Brno, Czech
Republic, Tel.: (++420-5) 4712-1411,
Fax: (++420-5) 4712-1431, E-mail:
matousek@recetox.muni.cz 
Prof. (R.) Ian McAllister, Professor of
Economics and International Develop-
ment Studies, Department of Economics,
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Sco-
tia, Canada
*Institution: Department of Economics,
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Sco-
tia, B3H 3J5, Tel.: (++902) 494 -6993,
Fax: (++902) 494-6917 E-maol: ian.mcal-
lister@dal.ca
Prof. Anne McLaren, Principal Research
Associate, Wellcome Trust/Cancer
Research UK, 
*Institute: Tel.: (++44-1223) 334 088,
E-mail: a.mclaren@welc.cam.ac.uk
Mr. André L. Mechelynck, retired Engi-
neer, now Consultant in Energy Matters,
Huldenberg, Belgium
*Office/Home: Koxberg 25, B-3040
Huldenberg, Belgium, Tel.: (++32-2) 687
4212, Cellular: (++32-475) 87.79.41,
Fax: (++32-2) 687 3157, E-mail:
mechelynck@compuserve.com
Dr. Peter Meincke, President Emeritus,
Universtity of Prince Edward Island,
Charlottetown PE C1A 4P3, Canada
Home: 1236 River Road RR#3,
Manotick Ontario Canada K4M 1B4,
Tel./Fax: (++1-613) 692 2785, Cell: (++1-
613) 866 1582, E-mail:
peter.meincke@rogers.com
http://www.upei.ca/~meincke
Prof. Asoka Mendis, Research professor,
Department of Electrical & Computer
Engineering, University of California San
Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
*Institute: Department of Electrical &
Computer Engineering, University of Cal-
ifornia San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-
0407, USA, Tel.: (++1-858) 534-2719,
Fax: (++1-858) 822-3214, E-mail:
mendis@ece.ucsd.edu
Mr. Lucius (D.L.O.) Mendis, Technical
Advisor, Ministry of Irrigation and Water
Management, Colombo, Sri Lanka
Office Ministry of Irrigation and Water
Management, Sri Lanka T B Jayah
Mawatha, Colombo 10, Sri Lanka,
Tel./Fax: (++94-1) 593210; E-mail:
lomendis@yahoo.com 
Dr. Steven Miller, Director, International
Security Program, Center for Science &
International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
USA
*Office: CSIA, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, Tel.: (++1-617)
495 1411, Fax: (++1-617) 495 8963,
E-mail: steven_miller @harvard.edu
Dr. Robert Mtonga, General Practictioner
to Lusaka Hospitals, Zambia
Office: University of Zambia, P.O. Box
50110, Lusaka, Zambia, Tel.: (++260)




Prof. Marie Muller, Chair, Pugwash
Council; Dean, Faculty of Humanities,
University of Pretoria, South Africa
*Office: University of Pretoria, Pretoria
0002, Republic of South Africa, Tel.:
(++27-12) 420-2318, Fax: (++27-12) 420
4501, E-mail: mmuller@postino.up.ac.za
Prof. Maciej Nalecz retired Director,
Institute of Biocybernetics and Biomed-
ical Engineering, PAS (1975-94), Warsaw,
Poland
*Office: International Center of Biocyber-
netics, ul. Ksiecia Trojdena 4, 02-109
Warsaw, Poland, Tel.: (++48-22) 658-
2877, Fax: (++48-22) 658-2872, E-mail:
Maciej.Nalecz@ibib.waw.pl
Prof. Giuseppe Nardulli, Professor of
Theoretical Physics, University of Bari,
Italy
*Office: Physics Department, University
of Bari, Via E. Orabona 4, 70126 Bari,
Italy, Tel.: (++39-080) 544-3206,
Fax: (++39-080) 544-2470, E-mail:
giuseppe.nardulli@ba.infn.it
Ms. Binalakshmi Nepram, School of
International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi, India
Office: School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
110067, India, Tel.:  (++98-91) 210-264
(mobile), Fax: (++91-11) 2619-6117,
E-mail: Sadibeins@Rediffmail.com /
Nepram_bina@Hotmail.com..
Dr. Götz Neuneck, Member, Pugwash
Council Senior Fellow, IFSH, Hamburg,
Germany
*Office: IFSH, Falkenstein 1, D-22587
Hamburg, Germany, Tel.: (++49-40)
866077-21, Fax: (++49-40) 866-3615,
E-mail: neuneck@public.uni-hamburg.de
Dr. Elaine Newman, Professor, Dept. of
Biology, Concordia University, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada
*Office: Dept. of Biology, Concordia Uni-
versity, 1455 de Maisonneuve West,
Montreal, H3G 1M8 Quebec, Canada,
Tel.: (++1-514) 848 3410,Cell: (++1-514)
572-4307, Fax: (++1-514) 848 2881,
Email: neweb@vax2.concordia.ca
Prof. Jiri Niederle, President, Council for
Foreign Affairs of the Academy of Sci-
ences of the Czech Republic *Institute:
ASCR, Narodni Street 3, 117 20 Prague
1, Czech Republic, Tel.: (++420-224) 240
532, Fax: (++420-224) 240 608, E-mail:
niederle@kav.cas.cz
Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director, Center
for Political and International Studies
(CPIS), Moscow, Russia
*Office: Center for Political and Interna-
tional Studies, Prospect Mira 36,
Moscow 129010, Russia, Tel.: (++7-
095)280-3441, Fax: (++7-095) 135-
5279, E-mail: cpis@mail.ru
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Mr. Niu Qiang, Secretary General, Chi-
nese People’s Association for Peace and
Disarmament (CPAPD), Beijing, China
*Office: CPAPD, PO Box 188, 15 Wan-
shou Rd., Beijing, China 100036, Tel.:
(++86-10) 6827-1736, Fax: (++86-10)
6827-3675, E-mail: niuq@china.com.cn
(and) cpapd@cpapd.org.cn
Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff, Professor, Dept.
of Microbiology and Genetics, Darmstadt
University of Technology, Darmstadt,
Germany
*Office: Dept. of Microbiology and
Genetics, Darmstadt University of Tech-
nology, Schnittspahnstr. 10, D-64287
Darmstadt, Germany, Tel.: (++49-6151)
163955, Fax: (++49-6151) 162956,
E-mail: nixdorff@bio.tu-darmstadt.de 
Prof. Hitoshi Ohnishi, Vice President,
and Professor of International Relations
in the School of Law, Tohoku University,
Sendai, Japan
*Office: School of Law, Tohoku Univer-
sity,Kawauchi, Aoba-ku, Sendai 980-
8577, Japan; E-mail: hitohnishi@aol.com
Gen. Pan Zhenqiang, Professor, Institute
of Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, PLA, China
*Office: Institute of Strategic Studies,
National Defense University, PLA, China,
No. 14, Building 281, A-3 Hongshankou,
Tel/Fax: (++86-10) 8283-1159, E-mail:
panzq@cgw.net.cn
Shri Ashok Parthasarathi, Professor, Cen-
tre for Studies in Science Policy, School of
Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-
versity (JNU), New Delhi, India
Office: Centre for Studies in Science Pol-
icy, School of Social Sciences-1, JNU,
New Delhi-110067, Tel.: (++91-11)
2617-9906, Fax: (++91-11) 2619-5777;
E-mail: aparthasarathi2002@yahoo.com
Prof. Derek Paul, retired Professor of
Physics, University of Toronto, Canada
*Home: 122 Hilton Avenue, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada M5R 3E7, Tel.: (++1-
416)-532 6440;Fax: (++1-416)-532
8009. Email: farp@sympatico.ca
Prof. Amnon Pazy, Professor of Mathe-
matics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Israel
*Office: Dept. of Mathematics, Hebrew
University, Jerusalem 91904, Israel, Tel.:
(++972-2) 658-5127, Fax: (++972-2)
563-0702, E-mail: apazy@math.huji.ac.il
Dr. Annaswamy N. Prasad,
Commissioner, UNMOVIC, United
Nations, New York
*Home: 114/74, 6th Main Road, 5th
Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore-560 041,
India, Tel.: (++91-80) 665-1106, E-mail:
an_prasad@satyam.net.in
Mr. Jan Prawitz, Visiting Scholar,
Swedish Institute for International
Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden
Office: P.O. Box 1253, SE-111 82 Stock-
holm, Sweden, Tel. (++46-8) 23 40 60,
Fax. (++46-8) 20 10 49, E-mail:
prawitz@ui.se
Prof. Gwyn Prins, Alliance Professor,
London School of Economics and Politi-
cal Sciences, UK
*Office: LSE, Room V912, London, UK,
Tel.: (++44-20) 7852 3678, E-mail:
g.prins@lse.ac.uk
Dr. Victor Rabinowitch, Consultant in
Science & International Affairs, Develop-
ment, Philanthropy, Washington, DC,
USA
*Home: Tenley Hill, #507, Washington,
DC 20016, Tel.: (++1-202) 363-2414,
Fax: (++1-202) 363-0565, E-mail:
vrabinow@aol.com
Prof. J. Martin Ramirez, Professor of Psy-
chiatry, and Head, Psychobiology Depart-
ment, & Institute for Biofunctional Stud-
ies, Universidad Complutense, Madrid,
Spain
Office: Psychobiology Department, &
Institute for Biofunctional Studies, Uni-
versidad Complutense Madrid, Spain,
Tel./Fax: (++34-91) 8444-695, Fax:
(++34-91) 394-31 89, E-mail:
mramirez@med.ucm.es 




#1, 4978 Crescent Beach Road, La Have,
Nova Scotia, Canada, B0R 1C0, Tel.:
(++1-902) 688-1161, Fax: (++1-902)
688-1149, E-mail: mccreford@
ns.sympatico.ca




#1, 4978 Crescent Beach Road, La Have,
Nova Scotia, Canada, B0R 1C0, Tel.:
(++1-902) 688-1161, Fax: (++1-902)
688-1149, E-mail: mccreford@
ns.sympatico.ca
Hon. John B. Rhinelander, Senior Coun-
sel, Shaw Pittman, Washington, DC, USA
*Office: Shaw Pittman, 2300 N St. NW,
Washington, DC 20037-1128, USA, Tel:
(++1-202) 663-8048, Fax: (++1-202)
663-8007, E-mail: john.rhinelander@
shawpittman.com
Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., The Senate
of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
*Office: University of Alberta, Edmon-
ton, Alberta, Canada, Tel.: (++1-780)
466-8072, Fax (++1-780) 469-4732,
E-mail: ROCHED@SEN.PARL.GC.CA
Dr. Jorge Rodríguez Grillo, Doctor in
Sociological Sciences; Cuban Movement
for Peace and Sovereignty of Peoples,
Cuba
*Home: Edif. 8 apto.202, Ciudad Camilo
Cienfuegos, Habana del Este, Havana,
Cuba, Tel.: (++537) 952123 / 320506,
Fax: (++537) 333860, E-mail:
movpaz@ip.etecsa.cu
Sir Joseph Rotblat, Emeritus Professor of
Physics, University of London, UK
Office: Pugwash Conferences on Science
and World Affairs, Flat A Museum Man-
sions, 63A Great Russell Street, London
NC1B 3BJ, England, Tel.: (++44-20)
7405 6661, Fax: (++44-20) 7831 5651.
E-mail: pugwash@mac.com
Acad. Yuri Ryzhov, President, Interna-
tional Engineering University, Moscow,
Russia
*Institute: 6 Leninsky pr., Moscow, Rus-
sia, Tel.: (++7-095) 236-5066 / 9761,
Fax: (++7-095) 236-1469, E-mail:
info@miu.ru 
Ms. Ritva Saario, Lawyer and Researcher
in Humanitarian Law, University of
Helsinki, Finland
*Home: Pohj. Hesperiankatu 13 B 25,
FIN-00260 Helsinki, Finland, Tel.:
(++358-9) 454 3638, Mobile: (++358-40)
523 1369, E-mail: ritvasaario@
hotmail.com
Dr. Walter Scheuer, former Senior
Researcher/Head of Department (1953-
1989), Argentine Atomic Energy Com-
mission
*Home: Av. E. Bustillo 22800, San Carlos
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de Bariloche (Rio Negro), Argentina,
Tel./Fax: (++54-42944) 448 294, E-mail:
wscheur@bariloche.com.ar
Mr. Douglas Scott, President, The Mark-
land Group, Ancaster, ON, Canada 
*Home/Office: The Markland Group,
203-150 Wilson Street, Ancaster, ON,
Canada L9G 4E7, Tel.: (++1-905) 648-
3306, Fax: (++1-905) 648-2563, E-mail:
marklandgroup@yahoo.com
Prof. Behzad Shahandeh, Full Professor,
Faculty of Law and Political Science,
Tehran University, Tehran, Iran
Office: Faculty of Law and Political Sci-
ence, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran,
Tel.: (++982-1) 877 3894, Fax: (++982-1)
896-9565, E-mail: shahandeh2001@
yahoo.com
Amb. Mohamed Shaker, Chairman,
Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs
(ECFA), Cairo 
Office: ECFA, 120 Moh’e El-din Abu
Elezz Mohandesean, Cairo Tel.: (++20-2)
337-8242, Fax: (++20-2) 760-3552,
E-mail: moshaker@ecfa-egypt.org 
Prof. Erika Simpson, Associate Professor
and Visiting Research Fellow, Liu Insti-
tute, University of British Columbia,
B.C., Canada 
*Home: 4634 Vantreight Drive, Victoria,
BC, Canada V8N, Tel.: (++1-250) 383-
3297
Mr. Alan Slavin, Professor of Physics,
Trent University, Peterborough ON,
Canada 
*Office: Trent University, Peterborough
ON K9J 7B8 , Canada, Tel.: (++1-705)
748-1011 (x1289), Fax: (++1-705) 748-
1652,E-mail:  Aslavin@trentu.ca
Mr. Hussein Solomon, Associate, Dept.
of Political Sciences, Univ. of Pretoria,
Pretoria, Republic of South Africa 
Office: , Department of Political Sciences,
University of Pretoria, Pretoria 0002,
Republic of South Africa, Tel.: (++27 12)
420-4339, Fax: (++27 12) 420 3886,
E-mail: hsolomon@postino.up.ac.za
Prof. Fernando de Souza Barros, Profes-
sor Emeritus, Physics Institute, Federal
University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
*Office: Physics Institute, UFRJ, Caixa
Postal 68528, 21941-972 Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, Tel.: see below, Fax: (++55-21)
2562-7368, E-mail: fsbarros@if.ufrj.br;
fsbarros@infolink.com.br
Prof. Metta Spencer, Emeritus Professor,
University of Toronto, Toronto, ON,
Canada
*Home: 155 Marlee Ave., Apt. 201,
Toronto, ON, Canada M6B 4B5, Tel.:
(++1-416) 789-2294, Fax: (++1-416)
789-4508, E-mail: mspencer@web.net
Dr. Malur Srinivasan, Member, National
Security Advisory Board; Senior
Adviser/Consultant, Tamilnadu, India
*Home/Office: Sunningdale, Kota Giri
Road, Ootacamund-643002, Tamilnadu,
India, Tel.: (++91-423) 2443 216, Fax:
(++91-423) 2442 572, E-mail:
email@thenilgiris.com
Prof. Jean-Pierre Stroot (Belgium/
Switzerland), retired Physicist ; Geneva 
Office: GIPRI, rue de la Voie-Creuse 16,
1202 Geneva, Switzerland, Tel. (**41-22)
919 79 40, Fax: (**41-22) 919 79 43;
E-mail:stroot@gcsp.ch
Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh
(Germany/South Korea), Senior
Researcher, Free University of Berlin,
Berlin, Germany
Office: Department of Political Science,
Freie Universität Berlin, Room 117a,
Ihnestrasse 22, D-14195 Berlin,
Germany, Tel.: (++49-30) 8385-5402,
Fax: (++49-30) 8385-5049, E-mail:
BMSuh@gmx.net; Mark@Suh-Mail.de
Dr. Olga Sukovic, Scientific Adviser, Insti-
tute of International Politics and
Economics, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Office: Institute of International Politics
and Economics, Makedonska 25,
Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Tel.: (++381-11)
3221-433, E-mail: sukovic@un.org and
sukolga@Eunet.yu
Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki, Senior Research
Scientist, Central Research Institute of
Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Tokyo;
Professor, Keio University Graduate
School of Media and Governance; Co-
Founder, Peace Pledge, Japan
*Office: CRIEPI, 1-6-1, Ohtemachi,
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8126, Japan,




Prof. M.S. Swaminathan, President, Pug-
wash Conferences on Science and World
Affairs, and Member, Pugwash Executive
Committee; UNESCO Chair in Ecotech-
nology ; Chairman, MS Swaminathan
Research Foundation, Chennai, India
*Office: , MS Swaminathan Research
Foundation, 3rd Cross Street, Taramani
Institutional Area, Chennai-600 113,
India, Tel.: (++91-44) 254 2790 / 1698,
Fax: (++91-44) 254 1319, E-mail:
msswami@mssrf.res.in
Ms. Mariko Taniuchi, Journalist, Tokyo,
Japan
*Home: 2-6-21 Horinouchi, #B-104, Sug-
inami-ku, Tokyo, Japan 166-0013,
Tel./Fax: (++81-3) 3316 8320, e-mail:
hiroshi.taniuchi@verizon.net
Mr. Murray Thomson, Member CAN,
Network to abolish nuclear weapons,
Canada
*Home: 554 Orkney Priv., Ottawa, ON
K2C 3M7, Tel.: (++1-613) 224-8155,
Fax: (++1-613) 563-0017, E-mail:
mothom@cyberus.ca
Dr. Gérard Toulouse, Director of
Research (CNRS), Department of
Physics, Ecole Normale Supérieure
(ENS), Paris, France
*Office: ENS, Dept. of Physics, 24 rue
Lhomond, F-75231 Paris cedex 5,
France, Tel.: (++33-1) 44 32 34 87, Fax:
(++33-1) 43 36 76 66, E-mail: Toulouse@
lpt.ens.fr
Dr. Tran Ha Anh, retired (since
1/04/2003) from National Assembly of
Vietnam
*Institution: National Assembly of Viet-
nam, 35 Ngo Quyen, Ha Noi, Vietnam,
Email: tranhaanh@hotmail.com
Mr. Anthony Turton, Head, African
Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU),
Center for International Political Studies
(CIPS), University of Pretoria, Pretoria,
South Africa 
*Office: AWIRU, CIPS, Pretoria Univer-
sity, Pretoria 0001, South Africa, Tel.:
(++27-12) 420-4486, Fax: (++27-12)
420-3886, E-mail: aturton@csir.co.za
Dr. Vo Hong Anh, Senior Researcher,
Professor of Theoretical Physics, Vietnam
*Office: Vietnam National Atomic
Energy Commission, Tel.: (++84-4) 942-
3479, Fax: (84-4) 942-4133, Email:
hqvaec@hn.vnn.vn
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Prof. Radovan Vukadinovic, Director,
Graduate Program in International Rela-
tions, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb,
Croatia
*Institute: Graduate Program in Interna-
tional Relations, Faculty of Political Sci-
ence, Lepusiceva 6, Zagreb, Croatia, Tel.:
(++385-1) 464-7545, Fax: (++385-1) 465
5316, E-mail: radovanvukadinovic
@hotmail.com
Mr. Peter Walker, Coordinator, Peace
Operations Summer Institute (POSI),
Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada
*Office: POSI, Acadia University,
Wolfville, NS, Tel.: (++1-902) 542-0077,
E-mail: peterwalker@ns.sympatico.ca
Prof. Michael D. Wallace, Department of
Political Science, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 
*Institution:Department of Political Sci-
ence, University of British Columbia,
C472-1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC,
Canada V6T 1Z1, Tel.: (++1-604) 822-
4550, Fax: (++1-604) 822-5540, E-mail:
mdwallac@interchange.ubc.ca
Prof. Mel Watkins, Professor Emeritus of
Economics and Political Science, Univer-
sity of Toronto, Canada
*Home: 186 Baillie Ave., Woodlawn,
ON, Canada K0A 3M0, Tel.: (++1-613)
832-9349, E-mail: melvillewatkins
@yahoo.ca
Dr. Christopher Watson, Senior Consul-
tant; Emeritus Fellow, Merton College,
Oxford, UK
*Home/Office: 15 Hurst Rise Road,
Oxford OX2 9HE, UK, Tel.: (++44-1865)
420661, Fax: (++44-1865) 420661,
E-mail: cjhwatson@ntlworld.com
Ms. Zhang Jia, Officer of American Pro-
grams, China Reform Forum, Beijing,
China
*Office: China Reform Forum, No. 35,
Baofang Hutong, Dongcheng District,
Beijing, China, Tel.: (++86-10) 6523-
3432-808, Fax: (++86-10) 6512-8410,
E-mail: zhangjia@crf.org.cn
Dr. Aharon Zohar, Consultant, Regional
and Environmental Planning, Carmei-
Yosef, Israel
*Office: Tel.: (++972-8) 928-7157, Fax:
(++972-8) 928-6087, E-mail:
aazohar@bezeqint.net
Prof. Matinuzzaman (Matin) Zuberi,
retired Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-
versity (JNU), New Delhi, India
*Home: XC-3 Sah Vikas Apartments, 68
I.P. Extension, Patparganj, Delhi 110
091, India, Tel.: (++91-11) 2242-4963,
Fax: (++91-11) 2246 0485, E-mail:
izuberi@hotmail.com
Dr. Bob van der Zwaan, Researcher, Har-
vard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;
Researcher, Energy Research Center of
the Netherlands (ECN), Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
*Office: ECN-Policy Studies, POB 37154,
1030 AD Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
Tel.: (++31-224) 56 4442, Fax: (++31-
204) 922 812, E-mail: vanderzwaan@
ecn.nl
S T U D E N T / Y O U N G  P A R T I C I P A N T S
Ms. Sarahh Bokhari (Pakistan), Journal-
ist and free-lance Research Scholar,
Imprint, Toronto, Canada 
*Home: 22 Earlton Road, Scarborough,
M1T 2Rs, Canada, Tel.: (++1-416) 609
9330, E-mail: sarahhb@yahoo.com 
Mr. Hugo Daniel Estrella, Deputy Gen-
eral Co-ordinator, Human Rights Pro-
grams, Córdoba State Government,
Códoba, Argentina
Institution: Centro de Asistencia a la Vic-
tima del Delito, Pje. Santa Catalina 66,
Córdoba, Argentina, Tel.: (++54-351)
434-1500, (++54-351) 434- 1501, e-mail:
hstar@tutopia.comù;
pugwash@tutopia.com
Ms. Sonika Gupta, Research Officer and
PhD Candidate in Chinese Studies, Cen-
ter for East Asian Studies, SIS, J. Nehru
University, New Delhi, India, E-mail:
sonikasonika@yahoo.co.in
Mr. Julian Hamfjord (Norway), Student,
Dept. of Medicine, University of London,
King’s College, UK
*Home: Skaaneveien 9, 3180 Nykirke,
Norway, Tel.: (++47-330) 21844, E-mail:
julian.hamfjord@uwc.net,
support@student-pugwash.org 
Ms. Elena Krivosheina, PhD Student,
Russian Academy of Public Administra-
tion under the President of the Russian
Federation
Institution: Russian Academy of Public
Administration under the President of the
Russian Federation, Tel.: (++7-095) 436-
0007; E-mail: Ekrivosheina@hotmail.ru
Ms. Magdalena Kropiwnicka
(Poland/Italy), MA student in interna-
tional affairs, St. John’s College, Rome
Campus, Italy; Consultant UN FAO (as
of 7 July 2003), Rome
*Home: Via Ugo Ojetti 41, 00136 Rome,
Italy, E-mail: KMagdalena@yahoo.com
(and) sypitaly@yahoo.com 
Akira Kurosaki, Research Associate,
International Peace Research Institute,
Meiji Gakuin University (PRIME),
Tokyo, Japan 
Office: Meiji Gakuin University, 1-2-37
Shirokanedai, Minatoku, Tokyo 108-
8636 Japan, Tel.: (++81-3) 5421-5652,
Fax: (++81-3) 5421-5653, E-mail:
kurosakiakira@hotmail.com
Ms. Karolin Lundström, PhD student in
sociology, University of Uppsala, Upp-
sala, Sweden
*Institution: Department of Sociology,
Thunbergsvägen 3, Box 821, 751 08
Uppsala, Sweden, Tel.: (++46-18) 471 11
84, Fax: (++46-18) 471 11 70, E-mail:
karolinl@hotmail.com (and)
info@soc.uu.se
Mr. William Marshall, PhD Student,
Department of Physics, University of
Oxford, UK
Office: Dept. of Physics, Univ. of Oxford,
Clarendon Lab, Parks Road, Oxford
OX1 3PU, UK, Tel.: (++44-7968)
122770, Fax: (++44-1865) 272400,
E-mail: wsm@physics.ox.ac.uk
Ms. Irna van der Molen, MA Public
Administration with a specialization in
International Relations, PhD in Irrigation
Management in Sri Lanka; Lecturer,
Technology and Development Group,
University of Twente, The Netherlands
E-mail: p.vandermolen@utwente.nl 
Mr. Miquel Munoz (Spain), Student,
Energy and Environmental Studies,
Boston University, Cambridge, MA, and
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona,
Spain
*Home: 4 William Street, Cambridge,
MA 02139, USA, E-mail: miquel@bu.edu 
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Mr. Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra,
Undergraduate Student in Physics, Uni-
versidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico,
Mexico City, Mexico
Institution: Facultad de Ciencias, Univer-
sidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico,
Mexico City, Mexico, E-mail:
pardog@ciencias.unam.mx;
jpardog@prodigy.net.mx 
Ms. Joelien Pretorius (South Africa), PhD
student, Centre for International Studies,
Cambridge University, UK 
*Office: Centre for International Studies,
Cambridge University, Fitzwilliam
House, 32 Trumpington Street,
Cambridge CB2 1QY, UK, Tel.: (++44-
1223) 7413-11/12, Fax: (+44-1223)
7413-13, E-mail: jp313@cam.ac.uk
Mr. Moritz Riede, PhD Student in Solar
Cell Research, Fraunhofer Institute for
Solar Energy Systems, Freiburg, Germany
*Office: Fraunhofer Institute for Solar
Energy Systems, Heidenhofstr. 2,
Freiburg, Germany, Tel.: (++49-173) 464-
2787, Fax: (++49-821) 486-3380, E-mail:
moritz.riede@ise.fhg.de;
moritz.riede@web.de
Ms. Gina van Schalkwyk, Researcher,
South African Institute of International
Affairs (SAIIA), Univ. of the Witwater-
srand, Braamfontein, Johannesburg,
South Africa
*Office: South African Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Jan Smuts House, Univ.
of the Witwatersrand, Braamfontein,
Johannesburg, South Africa. Tel.: (++27-
11) 339-2021, Fax: (++27-11) 339-2154,
E-mail: vanschalkwykg@saiia.wits.ac.za;
ginavanschalkwyk@yahoo.com 
Mr. Robert Schingler, Researcher, NASA
Ames, E-mail: rschingler@yahoo.com
Mr. Sebastian Straube, 3rd-year Student
in Physiology, St. Peter’s College, Univer-
sity of Oxford, E-mail:
Sebastian.straube@peters.oxford.ac.uk 
Mr. Pablo Suarez (Argentina), PhD Stu-
dent in Geography (climate change, deci-
sion-making, environmental justice) and
Research Assistant, Boston University,
Boston, Massachusetts
*Office: Boston University, Dept. of
Geography, 675 Commonwealth Ave.,
Boston, MA 02215, USA, Tel.: (++1-617)
783-3046, E-mail: suarez@bu.edu
Mr. George T. Whitesides, Project
Director, Permission to Dream Institu-
tion, Venice, CA, USA
*Office: Permission to Dream Institu-
tion, 254 Horizon Ave., Venice, CA
90291, Tel.: (++1-626) 833-5869, Fax:
(++1-413) 604-0142, E-mail:
gtw@alumni.princeton.edu
C A N A D I A N  S T U D E N T /
Y O U N G P A R T I C I P A N T S
Ms. Jessy Cowan, 4th-year Student in
Math and Physics, Queen’s University,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
*Home: 89 Princess Street, apt. 204,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3E4,
Tel.: (++1-613) 548-3643, Fax: (++1-613)
924-1814, E-mail: 9jke@qlink.queensu.ca
(and) jessy@its-a-revolution.net 
Ms. Christie Dennison (Canada),
student/MA candidate in conflict resolu-
tion, Dept. of Peace Studies, University of
Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK
Institution: University of Bradford, Rich-
mond Road, Bradford, West Yorkshire
BD7 1DP, UK, Tel.: (++44-1274) 236994,
E-mail: c.e.dennison@bradford.ac.uk 
Mr. Brandon Gallant, undergraduate stu-
dent in international politics and the evo-
lution of world order, University of
Waterloo and Group of 78, Ontario,
Canada
Institution: University of Waterloo, 200
University Ave., W. Waterloo, Ontario,
Canada N2L 3G1, Tel.: (++1-519) 888-
4567; E-mail: begallant@hotmail.com
Ms. Moira Goodfellow, Intern, Pearson
Peacekeeping Centre, Cornwallis Park,
Clementsport, NS, Canada
*Office: PO Box 100, Clementsport,
Nova Scotia, Canada, B0S 1E0, Tel.:




Hannah Hickey, graduate student in cli-
mate modeling, University of Victoria,
School of Earth and Ocean Sciences
(SEOS), Victoria, BC, Canada
*Institution: University of Victoria,
SEOS, Ian Stewart Complex, P.O. Box
3055, Victoria, BC, V8W 3P6, Canada,
Tel.: (++1-250) 472-4003, Fax: (++1-250)
472-4004, E-mail: hickeyh@uvic.ca 
Dr. Katrina Hurley, Emergency Medicine
Resident and Secretary-Treasurer, Physi-
cians for Global Survival (Canada), Hali-
fax, Nova Scotia, Canada
*Institution: Department of Emergency
Medicine, Dalhousie University, 351
Bethune, VG Site, QEII Health Sciences
Centre, 1278 Tower Road, Halifax, NS,
Canada B3H 2Y9, , Tel.: (++1-902) 494-
3199, Fax: (++1-902) 473-3617, E-mail:
kfhurley@dal.ca
Mr. Blair MacPherson, graduate of Aca-
dia University, incumbent Law student,
Ontario, Canada
*Home: 158 Heathwood Hts. Dr.,
Aurora, Ontario, Canada L4G 4V9,
E-mail: Blairmacpherson@hotmail.com
Ms. Joann Macrae, Dalhousie University,
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
*Home: 1275 Hollis St., Apt # 2, Halifax
NS B3J 1T7, Canada, Tel.: (++1-902)
422-4592, E-mail: jmacrae@dal.ca
Mr. Alex Mazer, Student in Political The-
ory, University of Toronto, Ontario,
Canada
*Home: 276 Clinton St., Toronto ON
M6G 2Y6, Canada, E-mail:
mazer@canada.com 
Mr. David Sandomierski 74 Gypsy Rose-
way, Willowdale ON M2N 5Y9, Canada,
E-mail: d.sandomierski@utoronto.ca
Pugwash Newsletter, December 2003 123
Amb. (ret.) Ochieng Adala, of the Africa
Peace Forum (APFO) in Nairobi, Kenya,
is former Permanent Representative of
Kenya to the United Nations in New
York, former Deputy Secretary/Director
for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation,
and former Ambassador of Kenya to the
Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; APFO,
P.O. Box 76621, Tel.: (++254-2)
574092/6, Fax: (++254-2) 561357,
E-mail: oadala@amaniafrika.org 
Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell is Executive Director
of Pugwash Conferences on Science and
World Affairs, former Associate Execu-
tive Officer at the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, and for-
mer Staff Aide at the National Security
Council in Washington, DC; Pugwash
Conferences, Tel.: (++1-202) 478-3440,
Email: pugwashdc@aol.com 
Prof. Francesco Calogero is professor of
theoretical physics at the University of
Rome “La Sapienza”, Chair of the Pug-
wash Council, former Secretary-General
of Pugwash (1989-1997), and a former
member of the Governing Board of SIPRI
(1982-1992); Pugwash Conferences, via
della Lungara 10, I-00165 Roma, Italy,
Tel. (++39-06) 687-2606, Fax: (++39-06)
687-8376, E-mail: francesco.calogero@
uniroma1.it (and) francesco.calogero@
roma1.infn.it (please use BOTH) 
Col. (ret.) Pierre Canonne is a Lecturer in
Disarmament and Arms Control issues at
the Univ. Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, former
Head of TDB at the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The
Hague, former Staff in the Strategic
Affairs Department of the Ministry of
Defense, and former Negotiator, Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention; 29 Avenue
Danton, 43300 Langeac, France,
Tel./Fax: (++33-4) 71 77 24 57, E-mail:
canonne.pierre@wanadoo.fr
Mr. Chen Jifeng is Convener of the Pug-
wash Group of China, Vice President of
the China Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Association, and Executive Vice
President of the China Association for
Promotion of International Science and
Peace. He was formerly Secretary General
of the Chinese People’s Association for
Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD) in Bei-
jing, and Council Member of the Chinese
Association for International Understand-
ing; CPAPD, PO Box 188, 15 Wanshou
Rd., Beijing, China 100036, Tel.: (++86-
10) 6827-1736 or 6821-4433 (ext.
8586), Fax: (++86-10) 6827-3675,
E-mail: jifengchen66@sina.com
Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino is Professor
of Mathematical Physics at the University
of Milan in Italy, Secretary General of the
Union of Italian Scientists for Disarma-
ment (USPID), and Director of the Pro-
gram on Disarmament and International
Security, Landau Network—Centro
Volta, Como; Department of Physics,
University of Milan, Via Celoria 16,
20133 Milan, Italy, Tel.: (**39-02) 5031
7277, Fax: (**39-02) 5031 7480, E-mail:
cotta@mi.infn.it 
Dr. Lynn Eden is Senior Research Scholar
at the Center for International Security
and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford
University in California, and co-chair of
the US Pugwash Committee; CISAC,
Encina Hall, 2nd floor, Stanford Univer-
sity, Stanford, California 94305-6165,
Tel. : (++1-650) 725 5369, Fax : (++1-
650) 724 5683, E-mail: lynneden@
stanford.edu
Dr. Karen Hallberg, a physicist, is cur-
rently Research Fellow at the National
Council of Science and Technology, and
Professor at the Balseiro Institute, in Bar-
iloche, Argentina, as well as a Member of
the Board of the Argentine Physics Asso-
ciation; Centro Atomico Bariloche, 8400
Bariloche, Argentina, Tel.: (++54-2944)
445170, Fax: (++54-2944) 445299,
E-mail: karen@cab.cnea.gov.ar
Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy is Professor of
Nuclear Physics at Quaid-e-Azam Univer-
sity in Islamabad, Chairman of Mashal
Books, an independent maker of docu-
mentary films for popularising science in
Pakistan, and an activist for peace and
social reform; E-mail: hoodbhoy@
pierre.mit.edu
Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said is
Head of the Military Studies Unit and
Technology Advisor at the Al-Ahram
Center for Political and Strategic Studies,
Al-Ahram Foundation in Cairo, Egypt;
Professor of Missile Mechanics of Flight
at the Military Technical College (MTC)
in Cairo; Member of the Committee of
Strategic Planning of the Egyptian Coun-
cil of Space Science and Technology; Al-
Ahram Center for Political and Strategic
Studies, Al-Galaa St., Cairo, Egypt, Tel.:
(++20-2) 770-5630, Fax: (++20-2) 578-
6037, E-mail: mkadry@ahram.org.eg
Dr. Martin Kaplan, an American living in
Switzerland, is a former director of
research at the World Health Organiza-
tion and former Secretary-General of
Pugwash (1976-88); Pugwash Geneva
Office, The WMO/OMM Building, 7 bis
Avenue de la Paix, CH-1202 Geneva,
Switzerland, Tel. (++41-22) 730-8620,
Fax: (++41-22) 730-8625, E-mail:
pugwash.geneva@gcsp.ch 
Prof. Saideh Lotfian is Associate Profes-
sor of Political Science at the Faculty of
Law and Political Science at the Univer-
sity of Tehran, Deputy Director of the
Center for Middle East Strategic Studies
in Tehran, and Director of the Middle
East Program at the Center for Strategic
Research; Faculty of Law & Political
Science, University of Tehran, Enghelab
Ave., Tehran, Iran, Tel.: (++98-21) 611-
2546, Fax: (++98-21) 896-9565, E-mail:
slotfian@ut.ac.ir
Ambassador Miguel Marin-Bosch is a
professor at the Universidad Iberoameri-
cana in Mexico, and a former Deputy
Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the
Conference on Disarmament for the gov-
ernment of Mexico; Universidad
Iberoamericana, Paseo de la Reforma
880, Lomas de Santa Fe, Mexico, DF
01210, Mexico; Tel. (++59-507.678),
E-mail: mmarinbosch@hotmail.com
Prof. Anne McLaren is Principal
Research Associate at Wellcome
Trust/Cancer Research UK, Institute of
Cell and Developmental Biology; a Mem-
ber of the British Pugwash Group; Mem-
ber of the European Commission’s Life
Sciences Group and European Group on
Ethics; and former Foreign Secretary of
the Royal Society; Tel.: (++44-1223) 334
088, E-mail: a.mclaren@welc.cam.ac.uk
Dr. Steven Miller is director of the Inter-
national Security Program of the Belfer
Center for Science and International
Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy
School of Government, editor-in-chief of
the quarterly International Security, and
co-chair of the US Pugwash Committee.
Formerly, he was a senior research fellow
Pugwash Council for the 2002–2007 Quinquennium
at the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), and taught
defense and arms control studies in the
political science department at the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology; CSIA,
J.F.Kennedy School of Government, Har-
vard University, 79 JFK Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, Tel.
(++1-617) 495-1411, Fax: (++1-617)
495-8963, E-mail: steven_miller@
Harvard.Edu 
Prof. Marie Muller is Dean of the Faculty
of Humanities, and Director of the Cen-
tre for International Political Studies, at
the University of Pretoria. She is also a
Council Member of the Academy of Sci-
ence of South Africa, and Chair of the
Pugwash South Africa Group; University
of Pretoria, Pretoria 0002, Republic of
South Africa, Tel.: (++27-12) 420-2318,
Fax: (++27-12) 420 4501, E-mail:
mmuller@postino.up.ac.za
Dr. Götz Neuneck is a physicist working
on international security issues. He is cur-
rently Senior Fellow at the Institute for
Peace Research and Security Policy
(IFSH) in Hamburg; Member of the
Council of the German Physical Society
(DPG), and Deputy Chairman of the
Working Group “Physics and Disarma-
ment” in the DPG; IFSH, Falkenstein 1,
D-22587 Hamburg, Germany, Tel.:
(++49-40) 866077-21, Fax: (++49-40)
866-3615, E-mail: neuneck@public.
uni-hamburg.de
Dr. Alexander Nikitin is Director of the
Center for Political and International
Studies (CPIS); Vice Chairman of the
Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists
for Disarmament and International Secu-
rity; Professor at Moscow State Institute
for International Relations; First Vice-
President of the Russian Political Science
Association; and Board Member of the
Russian Academy of Political Sciences;
CPIS, Prospect Mira 36, Moscow, Russ-
ian Federation 129010, Tel. (++7-095)
280-3441, Fax: (++7-095) 280-0245,
E-mail: cpis@mail.ru 
Prof. Hitoshi Ohnishi is Professor of
International Relations and Deputy
President at Tohoku University in Sendai,
Japan; former President of the Peace
Studies Association of Japan; and former
Council Member of the Japanese Political
Science Association; School of Law,
Tohoku University, Kawauchi, Aoba-ku,
Sendai 980-8576, Japan, E-mail:
hitohnishi@aol.com
Gen. Pan Zhenqiang is Professor at the
Institute of Strategic Studies at the
National Defense University, PLA, China,
a retired Major General in the Chinese
People’s Army, and former Director of the
Institute of Strategic Studies; Institute of
Strategic Studies, National Defense Uni-
versity, PLA, China, Tel/Fax: (++86-10)
8283-1159, E-mail: panzq@cgw.net.cn
Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., is a mem-
ber of The Senate of Canada; former Vis-
iting Professor at the University of
Alberta in Edmonton; Chairman of the
Canadian Pugwash Group; Chairman of
the Middle Powers Initiative; and former
Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament;
University of Alberta, Edmonton,
Alberta, Canada, Tel.: (++1-780) 466-
8072, Fax (++1-780) 469-4732, E-mail:
djroche@shaw.ca (or) roched@sen.parl.
gc.ca
Prof. Sir Joseph Rotblat is emeritus pro-
fessor of physics at the University of Lon-
don, emeritus President of Pugwash, and
a recipient of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize;
8 Asmara Road, London NW2 3ST, UK,
Tel. (++44-20) 7405-6661, Fax: (++44-
20) 7831-5651, E-mail: pugwash@
mac.com (*)
Acad. Yuri Ryzhov is President of the
International Engineering University in
Moscow; Chair of the Russian Pugwash
Group; Academician of the Russian
Academy of Sciences; former Member of
the Presidential Council of the Russian
Federation; and former Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Russia to France; 6 Leninsky pr.,
Moscow, Russia, Tel.: ++7-095) 236-
5066 / 9761, Fax: (++7-095) 236-1469,
E-mail: info@miu.ru 
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM,
VrC, VM, a former veteran fighter pilot
and Director of Operations of the Indian
Air Force, is currently Director of the
Centre for Strategic and International
Studies; he was Director of the Institute
for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
in New Delhi (1987-2001); he has pub-
lished extensively on strategic and secu-
rity issues; 18/803, Heritage City,
Mehrauli Road, Gurgaon-122002, India,
Tel.: (++91-124) 891-7701, E-mail:
jasjit_singh@vsnl.net (or) csis_India@
yahoo.co.in
Prof. Ivo Slaus, a Member of the Croat-
ian Parliament, is Chairman of the Parlia-
mentary Subcommittee on Science,
Higher Education & Technology, Presi-
dent of Croatian Pugwash, a Member of
the Club of Rome, a Fellow of the World
Academy and Academia Europea, former
Professor of Physics at Rudjer Boskovic
Institute, and former Foreign Secretary of
the Croatian Academy of Sciences &
Arts; Rudjer Boskovic Institute, Bijenicka
54, P.O. Box 1016, 10000 Zagreb, Croa-
tia, Tel.:(++385-1) 46 80 202, Fax:
(++385-1) 46 80 239, E-mail: slaus@
rudjer.irb.hr 
Prof. Fernando de Souza Barros is Profes-
sor Emeritus at the Physics Institute of the
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in
Brazil; Physics Institute, UFRJ, Tel. :
(++55-21) 2562-7337, Fax : (++55-21)
2562-7368, E-mail : fsbarros@if.ufrj.br
Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh, a South
Korean political scientist, is a senior
researcher in the Department of Political
Science at the Free University of Berlin in
Germany and President of the Korean
Pugwash Group. He was formerly the
director of the Korean International
Peace Research Institute (KIPRI)in Seoul,
and a member of the Advisory Council
on Peaceful and Democratic Unification
of Korea; Schlieperstr. 12, D-13507
Berlin, Germany, Tel.: (++49-30) 433-
8574, Fax: (++49-30) 433-2896, E-mail:
mark.suh@epost.de 
Prof. M.S. Swaminathan, a renowned
agriculture scientist. Considered the sci-
entific leader of the Green Revolution, his
approach in pioneering “ever-green revo-
lution” is at the heart of what is now
called sustainable agriculture. He is a past
recipient of the World Food Prize, the
Honda Award, the Ramon Magsaysay
Award, the UNESCO Gandhi Prize, and
the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disar-
mament and Development. He chaired
the International Commission on Peace
and Food, and is UNESCO Chair in
Ecotechnology, and Chairman of the MS
Swaminathan Research Foundation in
Chennai, India; MS Swaminathan
Research Foundation, 3rd Cross Street,
Taramani Institutional Area, Chennai-
600 113, India, Tel.: (++91-44) 254 2790
/ 1698, Fax: (++91-44) 254 1319, E-mail:
msswami@mssrf.res.in
Calendar of Future Pugwash Meetings
6-9 February 2004 South African Pugwash Group: Planning meeting on proposed
Cape Town, South Africa project, Threats without Enemies: Health Issues of the 21st Century
(with support of International Pugwash)
20-22 February 2004 Indian Pugwash Society Meeting on South Asian Security: 
New Delhi, India The Role of Confidence-building Measures (with the support of 
International Pugwash)
4-7 March 2004 Pugwash Meeting no. 291: 11th Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East:
Amman, Jordan Prospects for the Peace Process
1-4 April 2004 Pugwash Meeting no. 292: 2nd Pugwash Workshop on The Impact of 
Havana, Cuba Agricultural Biotechnology on Environmental and Food Security
13-16 April 2004 Pugwash Meeting no. 293: 3rd Pugwash Workshop on East Asian Security:
Beijing, China From Confrontation to Dialogue: Prospect of a New Security Framework in 
North East Asia
22-24 April 2004 Conference on Ensuring Security in Space: Enhancing Stakeholder
Washington, DC Cooperation (jointly organized by the Center For Defense Information,
The Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the Pugwash
Conferences on Science and World Affairs) 
1-2 May 2004 Pugwash Meeting no. 294: 21st Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group
Oegstgeest, Netherlands on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions
2-4 July 2004 Pugwash workshop on Elimination of Fissile Materials 
Moscow, Russia and Cuts in Nuclear Arsenals
17-19 September 2004 2nd Pugwash workshop on Science, Ethics and Society
Ajaccio, Corsica, France
4-9 October 2004 54th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: Bridging a 
Seoul, South Korea Divided World Through International Cooperation and Disarmament
27-31 July 2005 55th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
Hiroshima, Japan
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
President Professor M.S. Swaminathan 
Secretary-General Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino 
Executive Director Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell
Pugwash Council
Chair Professor Marie Muller
Members Ambassador Ochieng Adala









Maj. Gen. Mohamed Kadry Said
Dr. Martin M. Kaplan
Prof. Saideh Lotfian 
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Air Commodore Jasjit Singh
Professor Ivo Slaus
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Accademia Nazionale de Lincei
via della Lungara, 10
1-00165 Rome, Italy
Phone: **39-06-6872606
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